BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260609T100559Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20121001T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20121001T100000 SUMMARY:Philosophical Explorations: Basic Desert UID:20260610T165025Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:

Guest Editors: Derk Pereboom and Maureen Sie

Submission Deadline:  \;Oct 1st\, 2012 (please let us know that you aim to submit\, before March 2012)

\n\nInvited Contributors: Michael McKenna\, Dana Nelkin\, Adina Roskies\, and Thomas \;Scanlon\n
\n
Background and Aim:
In\n 1962\, P. F. Strawson concluded his hallmark essay &ldquo\;Freedom and \nResentment&rdquo\; \;with the remark that a sufficiently modified version of the \noptimist&rsquo\;s view on \;moral responsibility is the \;right one. With this he \nhad in mind that our \;everyday practice of holding each other morally \nresponsibility retains its \;raison d&rsquo\;ê\;tre even if free will as \nlibertarians construe it turns out to be \;illusory. By his lights\, \noptimists justify this practice solely by its \;beneficial consequences\, \nwhile pessimists correctly reject this strategy. A key \;claim of \nStrawson&rsquo\;s is that the pessimist&rsquo\;s \;reaction discloses how deeply \;rooted \nour natural reactive attitudes are\, and his famous contention is \nthat \;the metaphysical debate on the issue of free will and moral \nresponsibility should \;take these attitudes as its point of departure. \nThe quest for a justification \;for holding each other moral \nresponsibility can only be understood from within \;the practice itself\, \nand it is the \;reactive attitudes that lie at the core of \;this practice. \;

The\n half a century since the appearance of Strawson&rsquo\;s paper has \nwitnessed \;significant developments of multiple perspectives on free will\n and moral \;responsibility. Many compatibilists \;have been strongly \ninfluenced by Strawson&rsquo\;s \;view\, and some have linked it to accounts of \nresponsibility in which our \;ability to act in response to reasons\, or \nelse the notion of a real self\, \;has \;the crucial role. Libertarians have \nset out new and more sophisticated versions \;of the non-causal\, \nevent-causal\, and agent-causal perspectives\, and in many \;such \naccounts\, \;Strawson&rsquo\;s notion of what moral responsibility is has had \na \;major influence.  \;But at the same time\, philosophers\, psychologists\, \nand \;neuroscientists have attempted to cast doubt on \;whether a notion of \nmoral responsibility \;as strong as Strawson&rsquo\;s legitimately applies to us\,\n and some have claimed that \;we should abandon or radically change our \neveryday practices of \;holding each \;other morally responsible.

A \nfocal point of the current discussion is the claim that the \nreactive \;attitudes presuppose a robust notion of desert. When one agent \nis indignant \;with another\, the attitude in some sense \;presupposes that \nthe agent to whom it \;is directed deserves\, in a robust sense\, that \nindignation.  \;It remains \;open whether the desert that is presupposed can\n be given a contractualist or \;consequentialist account\, or whether it is\n basic in the sense that the agent \;deserves the indignation just because\n she has knowingly committed an immoral \;action. This special issue \nof \;Philosophical Explorations seeks contributions \;that shed light on the\n notion of desert implicated in our practice of holding \;each other \nmorally responsible\, and on whether and how such a \;notion might \nbe \;retained in the face of the challenges that have sought to dislodge \nit.


Submission Details
Please send a pdf-version of your paper (max. 8000 words) to Maureen Sie (sie@fwb.eur.nl). Contributions that do not make it to the special issue may be considered for \;publication in one of the regular issues of Philosophical Explorations.

Further Inquiries
Please direct any inquiries about this call for papers to Maureen Sie (sie@fwb.eur.nl)\, mention 'Basic Desert' as subject

Derk Pereboom
Sage School of Philosophy
218 Goldwin Smith Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca NY\, 14853 USA

Personal website:\n
http://www.arts.cornell.edu/phil/homepages/pereboom/

Maureen Sie
Department of Philosophy
Erasmus University Rotterdam\nPo box 1738\n3000DR\, Rotterdam\nThe Netherlands\n
Personal \;website:\n \;
http://www.maureensie.info\n\n ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR