Accountability and Personal Identity: Locke's Response to the Problems of his Predecessors
Ruth Boeker (University of Melbourne)

September 18, 2014, 12:15pm - 2:15pm
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne

Room G16 (Jim Potter Room)
Old Physics Buidling, Parkville
Melbourne
Australia

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Abstract: Locke introduces the distinction between the terms ‘person’, ‘man’ and ‘substance’ in order to address questions of moral accountability. However, it is not clear that such a distinction is needed to answer questions of accountability. Commonly we think about the relation between moral accountability and personal identity differently: (A)  Personal identity consists in the continued existence of a human being and personal identity is one among other necessary conditions for accountability. My aim in this paper is to show that Locke carefully thought about the need for introducing the term ‘person’ in addition to our term of a human being and has reasons to prefer his view over the alternative model (A). To explain why Locke does not endorse (A), I will turn to the metaphysical and religious debates of his predecessors concerning the afterlife and argue that Locke responds to and avoids problems that arise for the different views of his predecessors.

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