CFP: Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals

Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals

Edited volume under contract with DeGruyter Berlin/Boston

Edited by Martin Grajner (Dresden/New York) and Pedro Schmechtig (Dresden)

We welcome submissions of manuscripts dealing with the topics: epistemic reasons, epistemic norms, and epistemic goals (broadly construed). In particular, we would be interested in papers exploring questions such as those listed below. Manuscripts should be prepared for blind review and should be between 6,000 and 10,000 words in length. Please follow the guidelines for authors listed below. Deadline for submissions is February 1st 2015. All inquiries should be sent to [email protected].

1)   The nature and ontology of epistemic reasons: What are epistemic reasons-are they mental states, propositions, or facts? Is there a substantial difference between epistemic and practical reasons? Are epistemic reasons normative?

2)   The nature of epistemic normativity: How should epistemic normativity be characterized? Is epistemic normativity different in kind from practical normativity? Is epistemic normativity categorical or instrumental (or neither)?

3)   The nature of epistemic norms: What is the norm of belief? What is the norm of assertion? What is the norm of practical reasoning?  

4)   Epistemic goals: Is there a basic epistemic goal (e.g., truth, knowledge, understanding, …)? What is the relation between epistemic goals and epistemic appraisals? What are the prospects of epistemic consequentialism?

Please submit your manuscript electronically to [email protected].  Please submit your manuscript ONLY in Word format (either .doc (preferred) or .docx). If your manuscript contains diagrams or special symbols, please additionally submit a PDF file of your manuscript.

Author guidelines

Title page

Please include with your submission a title page containing:

Title of the paper

Name(s) of the author(s)

Academic affiliation(s) and address(es) of the author(s)

E-mail address(es) of the author(s)

An informative abstract of 200-250 words

Text

Typeface: Please use Times or Times New Roman.

Typesize: 12 point.

Spacing: Main text should be double spaced.

Indicate a paragraph by indenting the first line rather than by including an extra space between the paragraphs.

Please use italics for emphasis.

Use the automatic page numbering system to number the pages.

Please leave all headers and footers blank; in particular, do not include page numbers in the header or footer.

Headings

Please use the decimal system of headings with no more than three levels.

Footnotes

Footnotes should be used to give additional information. Please do not use footnotes solely to specify a reference.

Citation

Please cite references in the main text by name, year in parentheses, and pages. Some examples:

The most fully developed version of this argument can be found in Jones (2000).

Jones has in recent work addressed this worry (see Jones (2000), 67-69).

Jones puts the point succinctly: “simplicity and unity are features of the events and facts of the world as well of our beliefs and propositions” (Jones (2000), 68).

Reference list

The reference list should only contain works that are cited in the main text. Please do not use footnotes or endnotes instead of a reference list. Journal names and book titles should be italicized. 

Journal articles:

Conee, E. and R. Feldman 1998: The Generality Problem for Reliabilism. In: Philosophical Studies 89, 1-29.

Articles by DOI:

Lyons, J. C. 2012: Should Reliabilists be Worried About Demon Worlds? In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00614.x

Book chapters:

Alston, W. P. 1989: Epistemic Circularity. In: W. P. Alston: Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca (N. Y.). 

Books:

Williamson T. 2000: Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford.

Online documents:

Chalmers, D. 2003: The Matrix as Metaphysics. http://consc.net/papers/matrix.pdf (08/01/2008).