Phenomenal Character and Experiential Ascpectuality

Elisabetta Sacchi (San Raffaele University)

ABSTRACT

In my paper I shall argue for the claim that the phenomenal character of conscious intentional states has a substantive role to play in a fully comprehensive theory of intentionality. And yet this role is not in my view the one that most people adhering to the “phenomenal intentionality research program” [Kriegel, 2013] assign to phenomenal character. What I shall claim, to put it in a slogan, is that phenomenal character is not the source of intentionality but only of one if its features, namely: aspectuality. After having argued for this point, by showing how the attempt to account for aspectuality purely in terms of mind-world tracking relations succeeds only at the price of denying that our mental states represent ordinary mind-independent entities (be they properties or individuals) [Kriegel,2011] , I shall present my positive proposal as regards the nature of phenomenal character which will turn out to be a variant of adverbialism [Thomasson, 2000]. I shall conclude by providing my reasons for rejecting the claim that the phenomenal properties which account for aspectuality are constitutive of the content of conscious mental states. This will enable me to say what I find troublesome in so called intentional psychologism [Pitt, 2009].