Attitudinal Cognitive Phenomenology and the Horizon of Possibilities

Marta Jorba (University College Dublin)

ABSTRACT

In this talk I present a defence of cognitive phenomenology by focusing on two related elements: (i) the attitude component of cognitive mental episodes, and (ii) the background knowledge and what can be called ‘the horizon of possibilities’. Firstly, I examine the relation of cognitive attitudes and phenomenal character and defend the view that different kinds of cognitive attitudes exhibit different kinds of cognitive phenomenology. This view is supported by a version of the epistemic argument (Pitt 2004) applied to cognitive attitudes. Secondly, and focusing on cases of consciously thinking a thought, I argue that these are not isolated intentional experiences but rather we have to acknowledge holistic clusters where our previous beliefs and knowledge play a certain role in the anticipation of future experiences. I call this anticipation aspect ‘the horizon of possibilities’ and I elaborate on what it is, why it is experienced, whether it is reducible or not to a temporal anticipation and, finally, how it contributes to cognitive phenomenology.