CFP: The Logic and Metaphysics of Predication

THE LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS OF PREDICATION

Workshop

Oslo, 11-12 June 2015


Organized by Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo

 
THEME

Do predicates have semantic values? If so, what entities play this semantic role? While some linguistic evidence suggests that predicates co-refer with their nominalizations and therefore have objects as semantic values, various philosophical considerations lend support to the view, famously held by Frege, that predicates stand for predicable entities of a higher type. Since properties are commonly taken to serve as semantic values of predicates, this dispute is intertwined with the debate about the nature of properties.

Key questions include:

- What does the linguistic phenomenon of nominalization teach us about the semantic contribution of predicates?
- Can we develop a theory of properties that, while avoiding paradox, enables them to serve as semantic values of predicates?
- What is the relation between properties and sets?
- Are all properties definable? Do all definitions (including impredicative ones) define properties?
- What is the best response to Frege's "concept horse" problem?
- Is there some tenable version of the "reference principle" according to which co-referring expressions are substitutable salva congruitate in all contexts? 


SCHEDULED SPEAKERS

Salvatore Florio (Kansas State), Bob Hale (Sheffield), Øystein Linnebo (Oslo), Jon Litland (Texas), Friederike Moltmann (CNRS, IHPST), Agustín Rayo (MIT), Stewart Shapiro (Ohio State), and Robert Trueman (Stirling)

 
CALL FOR PAPERS

A limited number of contributed papers will be accepted for presentation. Bursaries are available for speakers in need of financial support to attend the workshop. For consideration, please submit an extended abstract or a complete paper, ready for blind review, to [email protected] by April 1, 2015.

 
To inquire about the event, please email Salvatore Florio at [email protected]