Basic Social Cognition without Mindreading

Prof Dan Hutto (University of Wollongong)

Abstract: This paper argues that Mind-Reading Hypotheses (MRHs), of any kind, are not needed to explain basic social cognition. It reviews the two most popular MRHs: One-ToM and Two-ToM theories. These MRHs face competition in the form of Complementary Behaviour Reading Hypotheses (CBRHs). Following Buckner (2014), it is argued that the best strategy for putting CBRHs out of play is to appeal to need-based considerations about the psychosemantics of basic acts of social cognition. Against this backdrop a new competitor for MRHs is revealed: Mind Minding Hypothesis (MMHs) - these too are capable of explaining the known facts about basic forms of social cognition and also satisfy the teleological criterion. Objections concerning the theoretical tenability of MMHs are addressed.