Epistemic Bribes

Dr Robert Simpson (Monash Philosophy)

Abstract: If my believing some proposition, P, is expected to result in epistemically good outcomes, does this generate an epistemic reason for me to believe P, or merely a practical reason to believe P? Construing such reasons as epistemic reasons seems to lead towards absurd consequences in some cases. In particular, it seems to entail that it can be epistemically reasonable for an agent to hold beliefs that are in conflict with her own assessment of her evidence’s probative force. Here I explain why the view that such reasons are epistemic reasons needn’t have this result, and argue that the intuitive implausibility of this view softens once we bracket off this (and a few other) complicating factors. I also present a positive case for conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons, namely, that they exhibit a kind of interpersonal normative parity which is characteristic of epistemic reasons in general, but not practical reasons. I then offer some inconclusive reflections on what it is or would be like to respond to reasons like these while conceiving of them as epistemic reasons. And finally I relate this discussion to some broader questions about the social epistemological complexion of religious convictions.