Unfolding the philosophical nature of Yogac?ra

Unfolding the philosophical nature of Yogac?ra

Kazal Barua

Abstract

Yog?c?ra is one of the principle schools that constitute Mah?y?na Buddhism. It is usually categorized under Indian idealistic philosophy. But debates and disputes have been continuing among the modern scholars regarding whether yog?c?ra is idealism or not or what form of idealism. Some scholars apply the terms ‘absolute idealism’ or ‘monistic idealism’ to it. But some other scholars disagree to call it idealism as it is understood in the western philosophy and attributes a different name to it. Paul Williams uses the term ‘dynamic idealism’ to yog?c?ra. Yet there are others who are completely unwilling to attribute the term idealism to it such as, Thomas A Kochumuttom calls it as ‘Realistic Pluralism”. But the controversy is still continuing regarding the topic and thus it is worthy of profound consideration.

This paper is an attempt to explore the philosophical nature of yog?c?ra. First I will present a brief discussion on the concept of Idealism as it is explained in the western philosophy. Then I will focus on the fundamental doctrines of yog?c?ra philosophy. After that I will discuss the concepts and arguments offered by the modern scholars and finally based on this over all discussion I will draw my conclusions determining the form of Yog?c?ra.

Key words: Idealism in the western philosophy, findamenta doctrines of Yog?c?ra, prevalent concepts, philosophical nature Yog?c?ra.

Introduction: Yog?c?ra is one of the principle schools that constitute Mah?y?na Buddhism. It is usually categorized under Indian idealistic philosophy. But debates and disputes have been continuing among the modern scholars regarding whether yog?c?ra is idealism or not or what form of idealism. Some scholars apply the terms ‘absolute idealism’ or ‘monistic idealism’ to it. But some other scholars disagree to call it idealism as it is understood in the western philosophy and attributes a different name to it. Paul Williams uses the term ‘dynamic idealism’ to yog?c?ra. Yet there are others who are completely unwilling to attribute the term idealism to it such as, Thomas A Kochumuttom calls it as ‘Realistic Pluralism”. But the controversy is still continuing regarding the topic and thus it is worthy of profound consideration and discussion.

Idealism: ‘Idealism” is one of the two key divisions of philosophy. The other one is ‘materialism’. The term ‘idealism’ derived from French idéalisme or German Idealismus in the late 18th century, via late Latin ‘idealis’ which in turn came from Greek idea 'form, pattern', from the base of ‘idein’ ‘to see'.[1]

Although the term is included into English in the eighteenth century, idealism as a philosophical viewpoint appeared in the ancient period when the philosophical thinking was in ‘embryo’. According to the history of philosophy the fundamental question that philosophers attempted to solve since the antiquity is the questions: what is primary ‘mind’ or ‘matter’? And is the world cognizable? These questions led to the two major streams of philosophy. The branch of philosophy that answers ‘mind’ is primary and ‘matter’ secondary is generally called Idealism and those who prefers ‘matter’ to ‘mind’ is called Materialism. There is one controversy regarding Yog?c?ra that the scholars who call it idealism judge it from western perspective. But if look at the first basic philosophical questions we see that it is true to all parts of the world. These were the earliest puzzles in the philosophy that the philosophers or thinkers of all different parts of the thought about. It is also true that going to answer these questions differences of thought occurred with the development of philosophy.

Definition of Idealism: Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy defines idealism as

“the philosophical doctrine that reality is somehow mind-correlative or mind-coordinated – that the real objects constituting the “external world” are not independent of cognizing minds, but exist only as in some way correlative to mental operations.”[2]

This statement emphasizes that reality exists in a mutual relationship with mind. There is no existence of the ‘external world’ apart from ‘cognizing mind’. It is the reflection of ‘workings of mind’.

According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica

“Any view that stresses the central role of the ideal or the spiritual in the interpretation of experience. It may hold that the world or reality exists essentially as spirit or consciousness, that abstractions and laws are more fundamental in reality than sensory things, or, at least, that whatever exists is known in dimensions that are chiefly mental—through and as ideas.”[3]

This definition focuses on any philosophical viewpoint that believes ‘spirit’ or ‘consciousness’ as primary and plays the key role in determining the experiential world or reality which is secondary and thus subject to the mind or ideas or reality manifests itself as ‘spirit’ or ‘consciousness’ or the existence is mainly ‘mental’ and can be realized through mental functions is called idealism.

These definitions are rather general and explain reality as manifestation of ‘mind’, ‘consciousness’ or ‘spirit’ which is fundamental in determining reality. It is summed up as “reality is fundamentally mental in nature”[4].

Along with the development of philosophy questions also arose regarding the identification of the nature of ‘mind’ and thus the concept of idealism also flowed into various streams that led to the emergence of different divisions and subdivisions. In philosophy Idealism is mainly sub-divided into two: subjective idealism and objective idealism.[5]

Subjective Idealism: This philosophy is grounded

“On the premise that nothing exists except minds and spirits and their perceptions or ideas. A person experiences material things, but their existence is not independent of the perceiving mind; material things are thus mere perceptions. The reality of the outside world is contingent on a knower.”[6]

George Berkely (March 121685-January 14, 1753) is the chief proponent of this philosophy. His famous proposition Esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”)[7] sums up his philosophy. According to this philosophy mind is the root of existence and reality. It rejects the existence of any external object apart from the ‘perceiving mind’. Whatever mind perceives is real. External reality is nothing but the mere perceptions or ideas of minds. Existence is limited to the conscious mind of man. Whatever mind perceives is existent to the man.[8]

Objective Idealism: Objective Idealism believes in some superhuman or supernatural mind idea and individual mind is the manifestation of that superhuman mind. A clear explanation of objective idealism is evident in the philosophy of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato (428-347 BC) and the modern German philosopher Hegel. The ‘idea’ of Plato is not the idea of individual, it is the ‘idea’ which exists beyond everything. The idea of the individual mind and all objects are the partial reflection of this ‘Idea’. According to Hegel everything in the world, whether individual mind or external world is connected to each other. Nothing can be known separately. Everything constitutes the totality and totality includes everything. But this totality which he terms as ‘Absolute Spirit” is not perceptible by senses. It can be perceived through intellect, rationality and mind.[9] He further says “the Absolute must ultimately be regarded as pure Thought or Spirit or Mind in the process of development.” This development process to the Absolute is dialectic. Thus “reality” for Hegel “is understood as the Absolute unfolding dialectically in a process of self-development.”[10] Objective idealism is also identified with absolute idealism.

Apart from the above two sub-schools various other concepts and theories within the Idealistic camp of philosophy. Here, I will talk about another form of idealism which is identified with Yog?c?ra.

Transcendental Idealism: This term is attributed to the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant in his famous book Critique of Pure Reason (1781) says

“I understand by the transcendental Idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are not sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.”[11]

Here we see the distinction between ‘appearance’ and things in themselves. According to Kant we can never know ‘things in themselves’. We can only know things as they appear to us and thus they are “mere representations”. Things exist outside human mind. Our senses collect data or ideas based on reality and we gather knowledge through synthetic process based those ideas. This is a function of ‘intuition’ and ‘sensibility’ by which we acquire knowledge but the ‘thingness’ itself remains beyond our understanding.[12] As interpreted by Sebastian Gardner

“All objects of our intuition are either temporal (inner objects) or spatial and temporal (outer objects). All spatio-temporal objects are therefore appearances (transcendentally ideal), and since they are the only objects given to us, all objects for us are appearances (transcendentally ideal).”[13]

The difference between transcendentally ideal and transcendentally real is the former is considered from as the mental image or representation and the latter is considered as existing independent of human sensibility.

From the above concise discussion on idealism, we may draw a few conclusions.

The Fundamental Ideas Yog?c?ra: Before we talk about whether yogc?r? is idealism we need to make a brief discussion on the fundamental ideas the school and corresponding logics, arguments and interpretations provided by the scholars. This school basically discusses the following doctrines.

1. Grasper-Graspable duality: It refers to the duality between the grasper (gr?hya) and the graspable (gr?haka). According to this concept an object is experienced or cognized through the contact between the grasper (the subject) and the grasped (the object). In the ordinary level, people know and distinguish the subject as subject and the object as object. This level of knowledge is called “the imagination of unreal” abh?ta-parikalpa and it prevails in sams?ra. But at the ultimate level of knowledge there is no subject-object duality and neither subject nor object. What is there is only emptiness.

“The imagination of the unreal means the discrimination between the graspable and the grasper. The pair is the graspable and the grasper. Emptiness means that state of the imagination of the unreal which is lacking in the form of being graspable or grasper.”[14]

This emptiness is “the absolute state of existence” or “thing as it is (yath?-bh?ta) or “suchness (tath?ta)” where subjectivity and objectivity disappear.

Three natures (Tri-svabh?va): According to this doctrine reality can be realized through three natures. This doctrine is explained in the treatise of tri-svabh?va nirde?a composed by Vasubandhu. In chapter three of his book Thomas A Kochumuttom makes an analytical discussion of this doctrine.[15] These three natures are as follows:

a.      Imagined nature (Parikalpita svabh?va): This state of existence refers to the subject-object duality. Here an individual imagines things (all living and non-livings things) in the form of subjectivity and objectivity. It is just mental construction of things but these things do not have “any extra-mental existence.”[16]

b.      Other dependent (Paratantra Svabh?va): It is called “other dependent” because it depends on causal condition. It has double characteristics. It leads to the false conception of things as they appear in the form of subjects and objects[17] and manifests as the double forms of subjectivity and objectivity.

c.       The absolutely accomplished nature (Parinispanna svabh?va): This is called the absolutely accomplished because in this state the imagination of the unreal as subject-object and the discrimination between them in duality completely disappears.[18] Whether consciousness or mind itself is no more. This state is called ‘reality as such” or “suchness” (tath?ta)”.

These three natures indicate the process or flow that an individual undergoes. In parikalpita-svab?ba and paratantra-svabh?va an individual looks at things in the forms of subjectivity and objectivity whereas in parinispannasvabh? the same individual looks at things as yathabh??ta. In the first case happens in sams?ra and the second one is nirv?na. That is why it is said that “the distinction between nirvana and samsara is basically only a matter of view-point.”[19] Here the term ‘viewpoint’ bears especial significance for later discussion.

Consciousness (vijñ?na): consciousness (vijñ?na) is explained as the transformation (parin?ma) of itself into ‘different mode of existence’ which is called ‘concepts’. Consciousness and concept are not separate or different form but mutually exist. All transformations of consciousness can be categorized under two terms i.e., subjectivity (?tman) or citta (mind) and objectivity (dharma) or caitta (mental factors). These citta and caittas being transformation of consciousness “do not have extra-mental existence.”[20] In another place Kochumuttom says that consciousness arises in connection with living and non-living things. When consciousness is considered it is considered as consciousness of “self, idea, living or non-living (artha, sattva, alma and Vijñanpti), and the consciousness itself)”. But one can only experience the things that “fall within the range of one’s experience…while the things in themselves remain beyond the limits of experience”[21].  This statement indicates that there are ‘things’ existing apart from consciousness. It also implies that whatever one can experience is not real or thing in itself. These are merely the “representation of consciousnesses”. Again the transformation of consciousness undergoes three different ‘mode of existence’ Store consciousness (alaya- vijñ?na), Thought-consciousness (mano- vijñ?na, Active consciousness (pravrtti- vijñ?na). These threefold mode of consciousness signify “three stages in the development of consciousness namely maturing, thinking, and knowing of objects”.

External object: In his book Kochumuttom analyses the text Madhy?ntavibh?ga by Vasubandhu under the chapter two. According to the following verse of the text

“There is nothing as its [i.e. consciousness’s] object,

And thus that object being absent

That [consciousness], too, is non-existent.”[22]

According to Vasubandhu objects whether living or non-living are the “representation of consciousness”. As interpreted by Kochumuttom objects including all its categories are appearance (pratibhasa). They do not have ‘form’ (?kara). What consciousness grasps or experiences is ‘false appearance’ (vitatha- pratibhasa,) of objects not the things in themselves. The objects appear to consciousness are false because they are imagined by consciousness based on past experiences. Since the objects have no form or graspability to be grasped by the grasper, consciousness, the objects do not exist and thus consciousness itself also does not exist. Because consciousness can exist only in relation to object.[23]

Kochumuttom in chapter five of his book page 174 to 181 presents another argument of denying the existence of external object as it is understood by atomic realism of the Vaibh??ika. According to the following verse of Vi??atik?:

“The object is [experienced]

Neither as a single entity,

Nor as many discrete atoms,

Nor as an aggregate of them,

Because not a single atom is obtained [in experience at all].”[24]

This verse implies that objects do not have a solo entity nor have different isolated atoms or even a collection of them because an atom is also composed of different parts and hence we cannot say that a collection of atoms. Atom does not have single existence. So aggregate of atoms is impossible. Since compilation of atoms is impossible the concept that the world is constituted of the assemblage of atoms is also not real. It is merely a “conceptual image of the world” which exists only in the imagination of the unreal in the sams?ric level. On the other hand Kochumuttom mentions that “this does not, however, in any case, mean that the world is non-existent or illusory.” But it is experienced only by the enlightened ones. In few other places he mentions that Vasubandhu’s theory never denies “an extra-mental world.” But it cannot be experienced in single, discrete or aggregate of atoms as the atomic realism of the Vaibh??ika philosophy.

Edward Conze presents the following interpretation that rejects the non-existent nature of subject and object.

“First the yogin breaks down the external object and then also the thought which seizes upon it. Since the object does not exist, so also the consciousness which grasps it; in the absence of a cognizable object there can also be no cognizer.”[25]

This statement indicates that if the external object is divided repeatedly nothing remains which can be called an object. Since there is no existence of any fundamental object there is no consciousness too.

Prevalent Concepts: Let us see the opinions proposed by the different scholars.

1.      Dynamic Idealism: Paul Williams prefers to call it ‘dynamic idealism’ Instead of ‘idealism’ as it is understood in the western philosophy. He says it could be a ‘danger’ to call it idealism. He considers the experiences of things that an individual undergoes as subject and object is ‘flow of perception’ from the sams?ric state to the liberation. This flow of perception happens as the transformation or development of consciousness. That is why, for him’ it is better to call ‘dynamic idealism”[26].

 

2.      Absolute Idealism: Edward Conze tends to call yog?c?ra as Absolute Idealism. In his book Buddhist Thought in India, he makes a brief discussion on yog?c?ra where he mentions that the ultimate state of existence that an individual realizes through the process of development of consciousness which is called ‘suchness’ and where there is no subject-object distinction is ‘pure Thought’ or ‘pure Spirit’[27] “by means of pure thought” we realize the ‘absolute aspect of the data of experience” which has ‘immutable suchness’.[28]

A K Chatterjee also follows the same direction and comments consciousness is the absolute state because there is no subject-object duality and in this sense he considers as “void, ‘sunya’, devoid of duality” and “it cannot be characterized by any of the empirical predicates”. Thus he opines yog?c?ra approach of consciousness “the absolute”, “pure will”[29]. Likewise Stcherbatsky in his Madhy?nta-vibh?ga: Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes, translates vijñanpti-m?trata as “Absolute Reality of the Pure Spirit” and identifies it with identifies Hegel’s Absolute Idea. Dr. C. D. Sharma in his A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy and S. N. Dasgupta in his Buddhist Idealism calls it “Pure Consciousness”, P. T. Raju in his Idealistic Thought of India says, “vijñanpti-m?tra is some supra-mundane consciousness”. It seems that all these scholars are inclined to categorize yog?c?ra from as Hegel’s Absolute idealism. This is according to Kochumuttom a misunderstanding of the term Vijñanpti-m?tra.[30]

3.      Realistic Pluralism: Thomas A Kuchumuttom gives anti-thesis to all the previous ideas and opines yog?c?ra is not idealism at all rather it ‘realistic pluralism”. He made an analytical and elaborate interpretation of the major texts of yog?c?ra and comes to the conclusion that “yog?c?ra nowhere mentions the monistic conception of the world.”[31] Rather it is “Realistic Pluralism” which is, according to him,

 

“a theory that recognizes a plurality of beings which really exist and operate independently of each other. It positively holds that individuals are real as well as mutually independent of beings.”[32]

Denial of Duality not Plurality: Referring to Madhyanta-vbh?ga he says, it denies the existence of subject-object duality and admits the existence of plurality of beings. As he states it “concerns about duality, not of plurality. The existence of these plural beings have to be understood as emptiness (suny?ta) neither as subjectivity or objectivity.

vijñanpti-m?trat?: here Kuchumuttom denies the opinions of the scholars who tend call yog?c?ra as ‘Idealism” or “absolute idealism’ and says that they have misunderstood the term vijñanpti-m?trat?. He also says Vasubandhu uses the term vijñanpti-m?tra not to mean ‘the absolute reality or the final mode of existence” rather it is used to mean “whatever falls within the reach of one’s sams?ra experience is mere representation of consciousness or thought-only or mind only”[33]. In Chapter six “Idealism or Realism” of his book he says it is “an intermediary step towards final enlightenment and therefore, should eventually be transcended.”[34] Then he argues that what is imagined as unreal or mental construction and thus non-existent is subject-object duality not the entire cosmos as is understood by idealism. Graspable-grasper duality does not include the existence of the experiential universe ‘as it appears’ which is implied by ‘representation of consciousness’ (vijñanpti-m?trat?-v?da).

The philosophical nature of yog?c?ra: Analyzing the above discussion we can come to following conclusions:

First, yog?c?ra is not absolute idealism as interpreted by some scholars because it does not recognize the absolute existence of ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’ rather it denies the existence of consciousness itself.

Second, it is also not ‘dynamic idealism’ because although the experiences of the things is viewed as ‘flow of perception’ here we should consider yog?c?ra as a view itself that looks at things as ‘flow of perception’ which is an interpretation of reality. In this sense, it can generally be categorized as idealism.

Thirdly, about the concept of pluralistic realism we can say that if individual beings exist and function independent of each other, each individual has the same subject-object existence which is possible in the sams?ric state of existence which is the imagination of the unreal. Besides, each of these individuals can also go through the transformation of consciousness and finally they also have the opportunity to realize emptiness. If it is true then in the ultimate sense the existence of plurality of beings is also mere representation of consciousness and thus imagination of the unreal which is conventional or sams?ric truth. In this sense ‘realistic pluralism’ can be true in the sams?ric existence not in the ultimate existence because the ultimate truth is nothing but ‘emptiness’.

Finally, If we consider the ideas such as, graspable-grasper duality, three natures, consciousness, external world and thing in itself or suchness or suny?ta, we see that these ideas are interpreted in two different state of existence  such as, sams?ric existence where the whole world is experienced by the unenlightened ones as imagination of the unreal or ‘graspable-grasper’ or atman and dharmas or mere representation of consciousness and ‘emptiness’ which is called ‘thing in itself or suchness, meaning the eradication of subject-object duality. This eradication happens mentally, through the transformation and developmental process of consciousness from the conventional to ultimate level and finally through disappearance of consciousness itself. If this concept means that at the ultimate level the subject-object duality disappears into emptiness, it of course occur psychologically or spiritually not physically or materially. Because one realizes the emptiness he or she still exists in the physical world. If it is true then Yog?c?ra of course, in the broader sense, falls into the idealistic viewpoint in contrast to the materialism or more specifically scientific materialism.

Conclusion: finally if we look at the definition of three major sub-schools of idealism, as I have discussed above we can say that Yog?c?ra does not fully belong to any of these three but if we consider the general concept of idealism it can be categorized under idealism. If we look at the Yog?c?ra idea of sams?ra existence, to some extent, it can be identified with subjective idealism and transcendental idealism but with absolute idealism. Because philosophically Yog?c?ra unfolds the nature of reality and comes to the conclusion that nothing remains in the ultimate level of existence except ‘emptiness’ which is called ‘thing in itself’ or ‘suchness’. This is concept does not go with idea of absolute idealism.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography:

Kochumuttom, Thomas A. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. Delihi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982.

Lusthaus, Dan. Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yog?c?ra Buddhism and the Ch’ng Wei-Shih Lun. London: Routledge, 2002

Chatterjee, A K. The Yog?c?ra Idealism. Delhi: Motilala Banarsidass. 1962.

Akira, Hirakawa; Translated by Paul Groner. A History of Indian Buddhism: From Sakyamuni to Early Mahayana. Honolulu University of Hawaii Press. 1990.

Williams, Paul. Mah?y?na Tradition: The Doctrinal Foundations. New York: Routledge. 2009

Conze, Edward. Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin. 1962.

Nagao, Gadjin M; translated by L. Kawamura.  M?dhamika and Yog?c?ra. Delhi: 1992.

Hanson, Elena France. Early Yog?c?ra and its Realtion to N?g?rjuna’s Madhyamaka: Change and Continuity in the History of Mah?y?na Buddhist Thought. Massachusetts: Harvard University. 1998.

Harris, Ian Charles. The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yog?c?ra in Indian Mah?y?na Buddhism. Leiden: E J Brill. 1991.

Auddi, Robert (ed.). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1999

Blackburn, Simon (ed.) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996.

Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason,tr. and ed, Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998.

Gardner, Sebastian, Kant and Critique of Pure Reason. London: Routeledge. 1999.

Allison, Henry E, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New haven: Yale University Press.2004.

[1] Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/idealism

[2] Audi, Robert, The Cambridge of Philosophy, P. 412

[3] "Idealism." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite.  Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010.

[4] Blackburn, Simon, “The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy”, P. 226

[5] Karim, Sardar Fazlul, Darshankosh, P. 209

[6] "Subjective idealism." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite.  Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010.

[7] Ibid

[8] Karim, Sardar Fazlul, Darshankosh, P. 209

[9] Ibid, P. 209-210.

[10]Baird, Robert M. "G. W. F. Hegel." Microsoft® Encarta® 2006 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2005.

[11] Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, P. 426.

[12] Sardar Fazlul Karim, Darshankosh, P. 250

[13] Gardner, Sebastian, P. 89

[14] Kochumuttom, Thomas A, P. 30

“Tatra-abhuta-parikalpograhya-grahaka-vikalpah. Dvayam grahyam grahakam ca. Sunyata tasya-abhuta parikalpasya grahya-grdhaka-bhavena virahitata. Tasyam-api savidyata iti-abhuta-parikalpah. Evam yad yatra nasti tat tena Sunyam-iti yathabhutam samanupaiyati, yat punar-alra-ava£if{am bhavati tat sad-iha-asti-iti yathabhutamprajanati-iti-aviparitam iunyata-lakfanam-udbhdvitam bhavati.” M V K B. 1.2

[15] Kochumuttom, Thomas A, P. 90-126

[16] Ibid, P.152 “Yenayena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate
Parikalfita-eva asau svabhavo na sa vidyate.” Trim s. 20

[17] Para-tantra-svabhavas-tu vikalpah pratyaya-udbhavah. Trim s. 21

[18] Nispannas-tasya purvena sada rahitatd tu ya. Trim s. 21

[19] Kochumuttom, Thomas A, P. 97-98

[20] Ibid, P. 146

[21] Ibid, P. 47-48

[22] Ibid, P. 50; . . . nasti ca-asya-arthas-tad-abhavat tad-api-asat. M V K 1.4

[23] Ibid, P. 45-57

[24] Ibid, P. 175; Na tad-ekam m ca-anekam visayah paramapusah Na ca te samhatayasmat paramatfur-na sidhyati. V im s.ll

[25] Conze, Edward, P. 252

[26] Williams, Paul, P. 94

[27] Conze, Edward, P. 252

[28] Ibid, P. 259

[29] Chatterjee, A K, P. 133-134

[30] Kochumuttom, Thomas A, P. 199-100

[31] Ibid, p. 17

[32] Ibid, P. 1-2

[33] Ibid, P. 201

[34] Ibid, P. 204