Causalism and Anti-Causalism in Historical Explanations

The conference deals with the philosophical quarrel as to whether explanations in historiography are a form of causal explanations. Although Hempel’s “Covering-Law-Model” is not seriously debated as a paradigm of historical explanation anymore, the view that human actions are to be explained by causes is still predominant in recent philosophy of historiography, theory of social sciences, and action theory. In opposition to Hempel and other causalist approaches, some philosophers hold that human actions are to be explained by reasons, mainly by reference to the goals and the purposes of the agents. Consequently, historical explanations consist in understanding the rationality of an action of an historical agent rather than in the verification of causal hypotheses. But does not Davidson’s point, that real reasons must be “effecting” actions, speak against the teleological approach – such that reasons must be understood as causes nonetheless? But opposition to causal explanations of human conduct did not vanish. Especially in recent years the causalist mainstream seems to have come under fire (again) by an anti-causalist “fin de siecle movement”. The main goal of the conference is to discuss the pros and cons of causalism and anti-causalism in action theory and philosophy of historiography and thus contribute to the long-term question whether there is a principal difference in the methods of science and humanities.

Attendance is free. Please register: [email protected]

Organizer: Gunnar Schumann

Sponsored by the FernUniversität in Hagen, the Gesellschaft der Freunde der FernUniversität in Hagen and the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP).