Wittgenstein’s Ways
Nikolay Milkov (Universität-GH Paderborn)

part of: 5th International Ontological Workshop on Topological Philosophy
February 9, 2016, 10:00am - 10:30am
International Center for Formal Ontology

Okopowa 55
Warsaw 01-043
Poland

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Organisers:

Bartlomiej Skowron
Warsaw University of Technology
Miroslaw Szatkowski
International Center for Formal Ontology

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Wittgenstein’s Ways

Abstract

Aristotle first investigated different modes, or ways of being. Unfortunately, in the modern literature the discussion of this concept has been largely neglected. Only recently, the interest towards the concept of ways increased. Usually, it is explored in connection with the existence of universals and particulars. Some authors claim that universals, the shape of my house, for example, are simply different ways in which its building blocks (the particulars) are ordered. Another group of metaphysicians focuses attention on the relation between universals and particulars. Well-known conception is that it is a relation of supervenience that eschews reductivism. In the last few years the relation between universals and particulars was also explored with the help of the concept of grounding.The approach we are going to follow in this paper is different. It discusses Wittgenstein’s Tractarian conception of higher ontological levels as ways of arranging elements of lower ontological levels. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein developed his ontology of ways (Art und Weise) in six steps: (i) Constructing states of affairs out of objects; (ii) Constructing propositions out of states of affairs; (iii) Constructing propositional signs; (iv) Constructing thoughts with the help of propositional signs; (v) Constructing truth / falsity; (vi) Constructing works of art.

Wittgenstein’s Tractarian ontology remained ontology of one world, in opposition to the ontology of many subordinated worlds of his teachers Frege (the author of the conception of three worlds) and Russell (the author of the Theory of Types): the transition from one ontological level into another, higher level doesn’t mean a transition from one world into another. This is the main advantage of Wittgenstein’s constructivist ontology of ways: it makes the belief in emergence of new worlds redundant. Another its advantage is that it suggests a tangible, topological, solution of the problem.

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#Topological Philosophy Conference, #International Center for Formal Ontology, #Mathematical Philosophy, #Wittgenstein’s Ways