The Identity Theory of Truth Conference

May 20, 2016 - May 21, 2016
Faculty of Philosophy, Cambridge University

Trinity College, OCR
Cambridge CB2 1TQ
United Kingdom

View the Call For Papers

Sponsor(s):

  • The Mind Association
  • The Aristotelian Society

Speakers:

Daniel Brigham
Cambridge University
Stewart Candlish
University of Western Australia
Pascal Engel
University of Geneva
Jennifer Hornsby
Birkbeck College, University of London
Michael Potter
Cambridge University
Gila Sher
University of California, San Diego
Peter Sullivan
University of Stirling
Robert Trueman
Cambridge University

Organisers:

Daniel Brigham
Cambridge University
Robert Trueman
Cambridge University

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Details

The purpose of this conference is to bring together new research on the identity theory of truth. To a first approximation, the identity theory states that a proposition is true just in case it is identical with a fact. The identity theory is often seen as an alternative to both correspondence and minimalist theories of truth. The topic has many important connections to work in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. And it plays an important role on in the history of philosophy: versions of the theory can be detected in the works of Bradley, Frege, Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein, amongst others.

The sorts of questions that may be addressed at this conference include:

- How exactly should the identity theory of truth be formulated?

- Why should we accept the identity theory? Is it a mere truism, is it supported by a desire to minimise our ontological commitments, or is it motivated in some other way, perhaps as a way to secure the idea that true thought ‘reaches right out to reality’?

- It is tempting to think that if the proposition that p is true, then it is true because p. Can this tempting thought be accommodated by the identity theory?

- Does the identity theory play a role in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus? If so, what are the implications for the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy? And are there any lessons for contemporary philosophy here?

- To what extent, if at all, is the relationship between minimalism and the identity theory antagonistic?

Please direct any inquiries to identitytheoryoftruth2016 [@] gmail.com

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May 13, 2016, 8:00am EET

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Cambridge University
King's College London

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