Two arguments against epistemic infinitism
Tim Oakley (La Trobe University)

May 12, 2016, 12:15pm - 2:15pm
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne

G16 (Jim Potter Room)
Old Physics Building
Melbourne
Australia

Topic areas

Details

Abstract

Epistemic infinitists (Peter Klein, Scott Aikin and others) reject foundationalism and coherentism, and claim that the justification of a proposition derives from its heading an infinitely long chain of reasons, each member of which provides justification for its successor. In this paper I present two reductio arguments against infinitism. A first reductio is to the effect that infinitism has the consequence that no one would ever have doxastic justification in any belief. The second and more important reductio is a long-standing objection to infinitism. This is the objection that if infinitism were true, no proposition would ever be propositionally justified for anyone. I restate and try to sharpen this objection, and argue that various attempts to rebut it have completely failed.

Supporting material

Add supporting material (slides, programs, etc.)

Reminders

Registration

No

Who is attending?

No one has said they will attend yet.

Will you attend this event?


Let us know so we can notify you of any change of plan.