A Theory of Parenthood
Dr Ryan Tonkens (Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics, )

August 26, 2016, 10:00am - 12:00pm
Philosophy and Bioethics Departments, Monash University

E561, Menzies, 5th Floor
Monash University
Clayton 3800
Australia

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Abstract     Determining who the parents are of a particular child has been thought to depend on identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for parenthood, and from there assessing the extent to which a given individual meets those conditions in a specific context. There are a number of seemingly plausible contenders for these conditions, including: genetics, gestation, causation and intention. Some, like Bayne & Kolers (2003), endorse a pluralistic view, where each of these conditions are thought to be (sometimes) sufficient. In this article, I identify important shortcomings of this general approach to conceptualizing parenthood. The major limitation of these standard conditions is that one can be a ('natural' or 'social') parent without meeting any of them (and thus none of them are necessary), and someone that meets all of them can sometimes not be a parent (and thus they are not sufficient, either). I develop an account of parenthood that emphasizes the conditions for bringing a new life into existence of which someone can be a parent (i.e. contribution of biogenetic material, gestational environment, and volitional participation), and the legitimate maintenance or transferal of parental claims. I argue that this way of understanding (natural and social) parenthood is promising since: (a) it does not rely on intuition about parenthood at its foundation, (b) it can explain how standard sufficiency conditions ought to be ranked in particular cases, even when none of the agents that meet different sufficient conditions have behaved immorally (something Bayne & Kolers' view cannot do), and (c) it can explain parenthood in especially tricky cases, where standard accounts are implausible or uninformative (e.g. cases of women gestating their own grandchildren). I also discuss some interesting implications of this account: (1) some children that have a mother and a father can also be parentless, (2) all parenthood is essentially contractual (and thus all parenthood is to some extent 'social' parenthood), (3) post-conception, pre-natal parenthood is possible (but not automatic), (4) clinical embryologists that assist others in reproduction can (sometimes) be parents to the resulting children, and (5) there is good reason to allow more than two spaces for listed parents on birth certificates (as some countries have been allowing).

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