Basic Joint Intentional Actions

Glenda Satne (University of Wollongong)

ABSTRACT

According to many, understanding the nature and development of human knowledge of other minds requires understanding the relationship between such knowledge and characteristic human forms of interaction and shared agency. Some authors (Butterfill 2012) have even claimed that Interactive agents might have a route to knowledge to other people mental states that passive observers are not in the position to have. This insight can be substantiated in different ways, depending on how one understands the relevant forms of interaction and shared agency. In this presentation, I argue that there are cases of joint intentional action in which when someone acts jointly with another, she is in the position to have knowledge of the other agent’s  intentions. Furthermore, that this knowledge of another person’s intentions is on a pair with knowledge of one’s own intention, i.e. that is kind of practical knowledge. I call this is the Joint Practical Knowledge Thesis (JPK). In arguing for it, I distinguish the genus of joint intentional activity to which the joint practical knowledge thesis applies, and a species of the genus, Basic Joint Intentional Actions. While there are reasons to think the latter presents the most complicated case for JPK, I argue by drawing on both argument and empirical evidence that cases of such a basic action-type can be taken to be paradigmatic of JPK.