Indiana Philosophical Association

Fall 2022 Conference at Indiana University - Kokomo, 11-12 November 2022

Meeting Program

Friday, 11 November	Session A Kelley Student Center Room 130AC	Session B Kelley Student Center Room 130B
8:30-9:00 8:50	*Registration* Kresge Auditorium *Welcome*	
9:00-12:00	**Undergraduate Session** Chair: Domenic D'Ettore, Marian University	**Metaphysics** Chair: Jeffrey Gower, Wabash College
9:00-9:55 Speaker: Commentator	Reevaluating Longstanding Norms: The Case for Proto-Morality in Complex Non-Human Animals Samuel Berendes, Marian University Neal Baird, Marian University	Whence the form? Graham Renz, WUSTL Andrew T. Ramirez, WUSTL
10:00-10:55 Speaker: Commentator	Malebranche's Occasionalism and the Freedom of the Intellect Joseph Graff, Marian University Grady Edward Stuckman, Bowling Green State University	The Nature of Racial Powers Talhah Mustafa, University of Nebraska – Lincoln Corey Reed, Butler University
11:00-11:55 Speaker: Commentator		Kant's Second Analogy on a Representational Reading Andrew Roche, Centre College Christopher Buckman, IU Kokomo
12:00-1:30	*Lunch*	
1:30-3:30	**Epistemic Injustice** Chair: Mark Satta, Wayne State University	
1:30-2:25 Speaker: Commentator:	Audential injustice and epistemic exclusion Josué Piñeiro, UGA Talhah Mustafa, University of Nebraska - Lincoln	
2:30-3:25 Speaker: Commentator:	Testimonial Injustice as Testimonial Mistreatment Jonathan Weid, Northwestern William Bell, WUSTL	
3:30-6:30	**Business Meeting, Awards, & Keynote** Kresge Auditorium	
3:30-4:10 4:10-4:20 4:20-4:30	*Business Meeting* *Paper Prize Announcements* *Break*	

4:30-6:30	*Keynote* **"Stability and Equilibrium in Political Liberalism"** **Paul Weithman, Notre Dame**	
Saturday, 12 November	**Session A** Kelley Student Center Room 130AC	**Session B** Kelley Student Center Room 130B
8:30-9:00	*Registration*	
9:00-12:00	**Democracy & Market Economics** Chair: Christopher Buckman, IU Kokomo	
9:00-9:55 Speaker: Commentator:	Democracy's Unpluckable Feathers Mark Satta, Wayne State University Joshua Paschal, IU Bloomington	
10:00-10:55 Speaker: Commentator:	Neoliberalism and the economization of democracy Cade Franken, Bowling Green State University Graham Renz, WUSTL	
11:00-11:55 Speaker: Commentator:	In search of an argument against liberalism Grady Edward Stuckman, Bowling Green State University James Murphy, IU Bloomington	
12:00-1:30	Lunch	
1:30-3:30	**Moral Intention & Responsibility** Chair: Joshua Paschal, IU Bloomington	**Epistemology** Chair: Andrew Roche, Centre College
1:30-2:25 Speaker: Commenter:	Defensive Injuries and the Prorating of Punishments William Bell, WUSTL Neal Baird, Marian University	Brains in Vats and Skepticism about Objectivity James Murphy, IU Bloomington Mark Satta, Wayne State University
2:30-3:25 Speaker: Commenter:	Why we should not be a consequentialist about everything Rei Takahashi, The University of Tokyo Brian Schimpf	Awareness and Cognition in Perception Andrew T. Ramirez, WUSTL Marta Caravà, Purdue

IPA Executive Officers 2022-23

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Registration and Venue Information

Registration: there will be a registration desk in the lobby outside the conference room. Registration is also possible online here. Registration fees are $20.00 for faculty and $10.00 for graduate students; undergraduates are welcome to attend the conference at no charge. When prompted to "add a note" on the confirmation page, please enter your name and professional affiliation. If you are paying registration fees for more than one conference participant, please include the names and professional affiliations of everyone you would like to register.
(https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=UDJ8U7UKC7RPE)

Hotel recommendations: Kokomo Motels and Hotels

Click here for driving directions to Kelley Student Center at IU-Kokomo on Google Maps (2450 S. Washington Street, Kokomo, IN 46902). Note that there is a large parking lot adjacent to the student center. Parking passes will be distributed by e-mail to registrants; they will also be available the day of the conference at the registration table.

Click here for a campus map of IU – Kokomo.

Abstracts of Papers

Title: Audential injustice and epistemic exclusion
Author: Josué Piñeiro
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to identify and investigate a unique kind of epistemic injustice. Drawing from Miranda Fricker's account of testimonial injustice, I explore how negative-prejudicial identity stereotypes against a hearer's social identity can cause a speaker to deflate the level of intellectual competence they assign to a hearer, causing them to omit information they would have otherwise given. I call this account audential injustice. Firstly, I argue that audential injustice wrongs the hearer in their capacity as a knower and hence as a person. Secondly, I contend that it has at least two follow-up epistemic harms: (1) the hearer misses out on information they would've otherwise received; and (2) it may cause the hearer to lose confidence in their intellectual capacities. Finally, I argue that these harms contribute to the epistemic exclusion of marginalized people. This paper concludes by considering some potential strategies to counteract audential injustice.

Title: Awareness based cognition in perception

Author: Andrew T. Ramirez

Abstract: This paper provides a novel account that specifies when a cognitive-perceptual relation is a genuine case of cognitive penetration (CP). The view is built on the idea that the primary role of perception is to present to a subject information about the world. Thus in most cases perception is the way one becomes aware of worldly features. Debates surrounding CP ought to be concerned with whether or not cognition influences awareness. If awareness is affected by cognition, then we have grounds to think that perception is affected by cognition. This is what I call the awareness-based account of cognitive penetration (ACP). I show that awareness plays an important role in perceptual learning. Likewise perceptual experts have awareness advantages that novices lack.

Title: Brains in Vats and Skepticism about Objectivity

Author: James Murphy

Abstract:

Skeptics about objectivity contend that, even if our beliefs are mostly true, we may still be radically mistaken about our objectivity. Perhaps there are true thoughts that we cannot presently think which would radically undermine our confidence in the objectivity of our beliefs if we could think them. Skeptics about objectivity aim to show that their challenge succeeds on the terms of those who endorse externalism and accept Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats. As externalists have argued, however, the skeptic has until now failed to do this. My aim in this paper is to defend skepticism about objectivity on the externalist's own terms. I begin by specifying a common reason why current defenses of skepticism about objectivity fail to challenge the externalist. I then forward a skeptical scenario that avoids this pitfall and establishes skepticism about objectivity on the externalist's own terms.

Title: Defensive Injuries and the Prorating of Punishments

Author: William Bell

Abstract: In my view, any plausible account of what justifies the visiting of defensive or punitive harms upon a wrongdoer must invoke the notion of rights forfeiture. However, insufficient attention has been given to how these different types of forfeiture relate to one another. In this essay, I seek to outline the various conceptual options for how the imposition of defensive harms might impact one's vulnerability to punishment. The question pursued is this: Does an injury sustained through the successful use of defensive force in averting a culpable attacker reduce the attacker's subsequent moral liability to punishment? Ultimately, I attempt to motivate the claim that *all* defensive injuries have some rights-reclaiming effect against punishment.

Title: Democracy's Unpluckable Feathers

Author: Mark Satta

Abstract: It has been said that Mussolini advised those seeking power to do so "in the manner of one plucking a chicken—feather by feather—so each squawk is heard apart from every other and the whole process is kept as muted as possible." Appealing to Mussolini's metaphor, I argue that in order to

establish a bulwark against autocracy, democracies ought to identify what I call unpluckable feathers of democracy. Unpluckable feathers of democracy are specific and nonpartisan core aspects of democracy that are treated as inviolable because of their importance in preserving democracy. An unpluckable feather's power comes from the citizenry's refusal to allow it to be violated. In this paper, I outline the characteristics of an ideal unpluckable feather, and then apply the theory of unpluckable feathers to presidential term limits, concluding that strict adherence to presidential term limits is a paradigmatic example of an ideal unpluckable feather.

Title: In search of an argument against liberalism
Author: Grady Edward Stuckman
Abstract: Religious anti-liberal movements, particularly so-called 'integralism,' perceive the failure of liberalism on account of them being too individualistic and denying the common good, as well as over-emphasizing the selfishness of human persons. However, liberalism, particularly the liberal perfectionism of Joseph Raz, can be concerned about the common good, and is correct in diagnosing human persons as selfish. Since both these arguments against liberalism fail on account of liberalism seeking the common good in light of the selfishness of each person, the anti-liberal must argue that liberalism has failed because it has produced bad consequences. This argument is unsuccessful, because such leads to a debate incapable of settlement. Because these typical arguments against liberalism fail, the anti-liberal should seek to engage with liberalism, particularly perfectionist theories of liberalism, and see if political perfectionism must necessarily be divorced from liberalism.

Title: Kant's Second Analogy on a Representational Reading
Author: Andrew Roche
Abstract: In Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, he argues that every event has a cause in the section entitled the "Second Analogy." In this paper, I defend a version of what I call a representational reading of this section. I explain how the "necessity" of the order of one's perceptions in the experience of an event plays a role in Kant's argument and how Kant can proceed to establish that the experiential representation of an event requires the experiential representation of causation.

Title: Malebranche's Occasionalism and the Freedom of the Intellect
Author: Joseph Graff
Abstract: Nicolas Malebranche's occasionalist philosophy paints the world in a way that seems arbitrary, if not scandalous, to many people. The main point of concern with his occasionalism appears to be focused on its conflictions with freewill. The purpose of the paper is to dive into Malebranche's occasionalism to see how it interacts with notions of freewill. Having a basic understanding of Malebranche's philosophy and tackling his thoughts on the ability of the human mind should ultimately clear up most confused notions directed at occasionalism. This should help establish occasionalism as less arbitrary and contradictory.

Title: Neoliberalism and the economization of democracy
Author: Cade Franken
Abstract: This paper defends the view that neoliberalism is a major cause of the decline of public support for democracy in the West. The reason for this is that neoliberalism embraces a weak conception of democracy, in which democracy is only viewed as instrumentally valuable, a useful way of safeguarding individual economic freedom. In contrast, a strong conception of democracy endorses the intrinsic value of democracy and the moral equality of all citizens. I argue that the weak conception of democracy is problematic and that we ought to prefer the strong conception. We should thus reject the weak neoliberal conception of democracy in favor of a strong conception that values the moral equality of all citizens. I suggest that by rediscovering the value of democratic equality, perhaps the tide of public support will turn back in favor of democracy.

Title: Reevaluating Longstanding Norms: The Case for Proto-Morality in Complex Non-Human Animals
Author: Samuel Berendes
Abstract: In this paper I argue that given the rise of modern cognitive science, we have acquired evidence to believe that non-human species have demonstrated rationality, empathy, and choice and are therefore candidates for a proto-moral status. This proto-moral status comes from an understanding of evolutionary morality; that through the course of evolution certain pro-moral and prosocial behaviors have been developed by our common ancestors. Through analyzing a Kantian view of rationality and a phenomenological approach to empathy, this paper seeks to demonstrate these characteristics in non-human animals through both philosophical and scientific literature. These characteristics, along with the evidence for a capacity for choice that is implicit in rationality builds the framework for moral agency in non-human animals.

Title: Testimonial Injustice as Testimonial Mistreatment
Author: Jonathan Weid
Abstract: This paper challenges the dominant, internalist picture of a testimonial injustice that we currently find within the literature, and argues that from the perspective of those who are interested in social justice, we ought to focus less on the prejudices that inhabit the audience's mind, or on their irrational credibility assessments, and more on the potentially discriminatory treatment of another person's testimony in a conversational exchange.

Title: The Nature of Racial Powers
Author: Talhah Mustafa
Abstract: A plethora of interesting puzzles arise when we apply the concept of racial powers to various sociopolitical matters. For instance, what do racial powers, if at all, have to do with the redistribution of primary social goods, or in which capacity do racial powers influence racial categories such that an individual is a member of either this or that race, or whether racial powers are zero-sum? Of course all of these questions are interesting and of novel concern in their own right, but in order to adequately answer these questions, we need to first answer the "what's the nature of racial powers?" question. It

seems premature to take on issues like the ones mentioned above without first knowing the nature of racial powers. Thus, the aim of this paper is to do just that. In this paper, I will explore the core elements of racial power.

Title: Whence the form?
Author: Graham Renz
Abstract: Hylomorphists claim that substances are compounds of matter and form. If a house is a substance, then its matter would be some bricks and timbers and its form the structure those bricks and timbers take on. While hylomorphism is traditionally presented as a theory of change, it only treats the coming-to-be and passing-away of matter-form compounds. But many hylomorphists understand forms to be entities in their own right, as metaphysical parts or constituents of substances. So, a neglected question arises: how, when, and from where do *forms* come to be? I take up the theory of one prominent hylomorphist, Kathrin Koslicki, and argue she cannot answer the question satisfactorily; she must posit a bewildering number of formal parts and accept an odd sort of pre-established harmony. I close with a proposal for an account of the generation of forms based on machinery many hylomorphists already accept, namely, causal powers.

Title: Why we should not be a consequentialist about everything
Author: Rei Takahashi
Abstract: Global consequentialism evaluate not only actions but everything in terms of their consequences. My purpose is two-folded. First, I illuminate two structural principles shared by standard consequentialism. Second, applying the two principles, I offer a novel critique of global consequentialism. On the one hand, if global consequentialism preserves the two principles, there will be no specific agent who is responsible for the actualization of the object assessed, and this in turn means that global consequentialism fails to give practical guidance to relevant agents. However, jettisoning the two principles is no help: doing so would violate the spirit of consequentialism – i.e., we ought to bring about the best consequence possible – and the principle of 'ought' implies 'can'.
To avoid these problematic results, consequentialist theory must be formulated in such a way that assessments necessarily involve specific agents. I will call the group of theories capable of clearing this bar agential consequentialism.'

Keynote
Title: Stability and Equilibrium in Political Liberalism
Author: Paul Weithman
Abstract: Those of us who believe that liberal democracies hold out the best hope of free, prosperous and satisfying lives take their stability to be of obvious importance. John Rawls's treatment of the stability of just societies has received less attention than other parts of his work, but many of the concepts he used to study it -- such as inherent stability, self-enforcing agreements, dominant equilibria and overlapping consensus -- promise some help in understanding the conditions under which liberal democratic institutions can reproduce themselves even under non-ideal conditions such as our own.

But if we are to draw on Rawls's treatment of stability to address our current predicaments, we need to know what he meant by 'stability', and how he thought stability is achieved and maintained. In *A Theory of Justice* -- hereafter *TJ* -- Rawls equated stability with the basic structure's enduring satisfaction of his own conception of justice, justice as fairness. His treatment of stability was clearly inspired by early work in the theory of games and in *TJ*, we are told that stability would result from citizens "playing" strategies which combined for what was, in effect, a Nash equilibrium. For some time after his transition to political liberalism, Rawls continued to equate stability with the basic structure's satisfaction of his own conception of justice. He also continued to think that stability -- now effected by an overlapping consensus on that conception -- would be sustained by a Nash equilibrium. But what he had to say about how that equilibrium would come about was conjectural in a way that his earlier arguments had not been.

In his late writings, Rawls weakened his claim about what an overlapping consensus would be an overlap *on*. This move has recently attracted some attention in the literature, but its implications for stability are, I think, more often misstated than fully appreciated. I shall contend that Rawls's move requires a new conception of stability and that it implies Rawls cannot appeal to a Nash equilibrium to show how stability would be sustained. Because I think the weaker claim about an overlapping consensus is correct, I am worried about the gap that that claim forces open in the Rawlsian account of stability. I shall try to fill that gap by suggesting a different equilibrium concept that would serve Rawlsian purposes.