

# CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

## 2022 BSTK CONFERENCE

COGITO Epistemology Research Centre  
University of Glasgow  
5.9. – 7.9.2022

**Monday, 5.9.2022**

|  | Reading Room<br>32 University Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor   | Bridie Library<br>32 University Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor           | Reid Room<br>67 Oakfield Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor                  | Hutcheson Room<br>67 Oakfield Ave<br>Ground Floor                            | Murray Room<br>65 Oakfield Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 9:20 – 9:30                            | Welcome  |  |  |  |  |
| 9:30 – 10:30<br><b>Plenary 1</b>       | Alexander Bird<br>Evidentialism, Justification,<br>and Knowledge-First   |  |  |  |  |
| 10:35 – 11:35<br><b>Plenary 2</b>      | Richard Pettigrew<br>Believing is said of groups in<br>many ways (and so it should<br>be said of them in none) |  |  |  |  |
| 11:45 – 12:25<br><b>Parallel 1</b>     | Joel Yalland<br>The Role of Testimony in<br>Agreement and Disagreement   | Nastasia Mueller<br>Combining Responsibilist and<br>Reliabilist Virtue | Dani Pino<br>Constitutivist Virtue<br>Reliabilism                      |  | Andrew Sherrod<br>Procedural Common<br>Knowledge: A critique of<br>Greco's approach to hinge<br>epistemology |
| 12:25 – 14:20                          | Lunch  |  |  |  |  |
| 14:20 – 15:00<br><b>Parallel 2</b>     | Avram Hiller<br>Structure in Non-Summative<br>Social Knowledge   | Joyce Fungo<br>Is Inquisitive Truth Monism<br>Truly Monism?            | Joao Miranda<br>A New Fragmentalist Account<br>of Epistemic Akrasia    | Christopher Willard-Kyle<br>Evolving Questions:<br>Eliminating Wrong Answers | Jack Herbert<br>Reliabilism and Testimonial<br>Discriminations   |
| 15:05 – 15:45<br><b>Parallel 3</b>     | Lilith Newton<br>Doubt as the inquiry-starter  | Massimo Renzo<br>Wrongdoing and wrongdoers<br>in the epistemic domain  | Jamie Collin<br>Abstractionism, Inferentialism,<br>and Jack the Ripper | Mariangela Cocchiaro<br>Credal (peer) disagreement:<br>why should I care?    | Frederik Andersen<br>Logical Akrasia   |
| 15:55 – 16:55<br><b>Plenary 3</b>      | Mona Simion & Christoph<br>Kelp<br>Knowledge and Justified<br>Credence   |  |  |  |  |
| 17:00 – 18:00<br><b>BSTK Lecture 1</b> | Ernest Sosa<br>Dawning Light Epistemology  |  |  |  |  |

## Tuesday, 6.9.2022

|  | Reading Room<br>32 University Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor              | Bridie Library<br>32 University Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor                                  | Reid Room<br>67 Oakfield Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor  | Hutcheson Room<br>67 Oakfield Ave<br>Ground Floor             | Murray Room<br>65 Oakfield Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor                          |
|--|---|---|--|---|--|
| 9:50 – 10:50<br><b>Plenary 4</b>       | Timothy Williamson<br>Overfitting in Epistemology                       |   |  |   |  |
| 11:00 – 11:40<br><b>Parallel 4</b>     | Jesus Navarro<br>The Ethics of Scepticism.                              | Roman Heil<br>How to rely on what you know  | Markus Seethaler<br>Intellectual Humility and the<br>Epistemic Significance of<br>Disagreement | Esa Diaz-Leon<br>On two ways of engineering a<br>concept      | Minkyung Wang<br>Credence and Belief:<br>Epistemic Decision Theory<br>Revisited  |
| 11:45 – 12:25<br><b>Parallel 5</b>     | Vittorio Serra<br>A problem for unanalysable<br>notions in epistemology | Benoit Guilielmo<br>Legend of Two States in<br>Epistemology: Doubt and<br>Suspended Judgement | Tamaz Tokhadze<br>Stochastic Evidence<br>Processing and Uniqueness                             | Valentin Teillet<br>Neo-Moorean Core<br>Knowledge             | Rivkah Hatchwell<br>Epistemic (Im)Politeness – Re-<br>Diagnosing Epistemic Harms |
| 12:25 – 14:20                          | Lunch   |   |  |   |  |
| 14:20 – 15:00<br><b>Parallel 6</b>     | Michael Wilde<br>Alexander Bird on Abductive<br>Knowledge               | Amber Riaz<br>Moral Knowledge: Beyond the<br>A priori-A Posteriori<br>Distinction             | Ignacio Gomez-Ledo & Dani<br>Pino<br>Group Hinge Epistemology                                  | Paul Irikefe<br>The Vice of Nepotism                          |  |
| 15:05 – 15:45<br><b>Parallel 7</b>     | Paul Silva<br>The Structure of Factive States                           | Neri Marsili<br>Better safe than sorry: silence,<br>carefulness, and the norm of<br>assertion | Adham El Shazly<br>Trust for Understanding   | Taylor Matthews<br>The Genealogy of Intellectual<br>Character | Matt Jope<br>Risk Pluralism and Anti-Risk<br>Epistemology                        |
| 15:55 – 16:55<br><b>Plenary 5</b>      | Paul Faulkner<br>Communicating your point of<br>view                    |   |  |   |  |
| 17:00 – 18:00<br><b>BSTK Lecture 2</b> | Ernest Sosa<br>Clifford Versus James                                    |   |  |   |  |
| 18:30                                  | Conference Dinner, Glasgow University Union, 32 University Avenue       |   |  |   |  |

## Wednesday, 7.9.2022

|                                    | Reading Room<br>32 University Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor                           | Bridie Library<br>32 University Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor  | Reid Room<br>67 Oakfield Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor | Hutcheson Room<br>67 Oakfield Ave<br>Ground Floor | Murray Room<br>65 Oakfield Ave<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Floor           |
|------------------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|
| 9:10 – 9:55                        | BSTK AGM   |   |   |   |   |
| 10:00 – 11:00<br><b>Plenary 6</b>  | Daniel Whiting<br>Is Margaret Cavendish a naive realist?                             |   |   |   |   |
| 11:05 – 12:05<br><b>Plenary 7</b>  | Martin Smith<br>Decision Theory and De Minimis Risk                                  |   |   |   |   |
| 12:05 – 14:00                      | Lunch  |   |   |   |   |
| 14:00 – 14:40<br><b>Parallel 8</b> | Boaz Miller<br>I Know, We Know: Brining Individual and Collective Knowledge Together | Kim Davies<br>Transcendental Arguments and Hinge Epistemology |   | Alice Monypenny<br>Once a vice, always a vice?    | Cayla Clinkenbeard<br>A Network Model of Epistemic Responsibility |
| 14:50 – 15:50<br><b>Plenary 8</b>  | Alessandra Tanesini<br>Scaffolded Knowledge  |   |   |   |   |
| 15:55 – 16:55<br><b>Plenary 9</b>  | Anandi Hattiangadi and Joe Roussos<br>A Sceptical Puzzle for Truth-Seeking Bayesians |   |   |   |   |
| 17:00 – 18:00<br><b>Plenary 10</b> | Adam Carter<br>The Normativity of Trust  |   |   |   |   |

## ABSTRACTS: BSTK LECTURES

Ernest Sosa     **Dawning Light Epistemology**

Wittgenstein rejects Moore's foundationalist epistemology with his claim that "light dawns gradually over the whole." This talk will present an epistemology that fits with that rejection on that basis. This has interesting and welcome implications for our understanding of armchair philosophy and of perceptual knowledge.

**Clifford Versus James**

James rejects Clifford's rigorist evidentialism. This talk will present an epistemology that fits with that rejection by expanding the scope of epistemic assessment beyond the traditional restriction to knowledge and belief.

## ABSTRACTS: PLENARY TALKS

Alexander Bird     **Evidentialism, Justification, and Knowledge-First**

This paper concerns the relationship between evidentialism, knowledge-first epistemology (E=K in particular), and justification. I argue that the combination of evidentialism, E=K, and some plausible principles leads to the scepticism familiar from the Agrippan trilemma. I develop an Evidentialist Knowledge-First view of justification that avoids scepticism. I contrast this with an Anti-Evidentialist Knowledge-First view of justification and argue that the latter is preferable to the former.

Adam Carter     **The Normativity of Trust**

A widespread assumption in debates about trust and trustworthiness is that the evaluative norms of principal interest on the trustor's side of a cooperative exchange regulate trusting attitudes and performances whereas those on the trustee's side regulate dispositions to respond to trust. The aim here will be to highlight some unnoticed problems with this asymmetrical picture – and in particular, how it elides certain key evaluative norms on both the trustor's and trustee's side the satisfaction of which are critical to successful cooperative exchanges – and to show that a symmetrical, 'achievement-first' approach to theorising about trust and trustworthiness (and their relation to each other) has important advantages by comparison.

Paul Faulkner     **Communicating your point of view**

What is it like to give birth? Or have your first child? Or see red for the first time? Arguably, knowing how to answer these questions requires having certain experiences. Arguably you cannot get to know what it is like to give birth, for instance, by simply reading someone's birth story. If this is so, then there are certain limits on testimony as a source of knowledge. This claim is familiar: it has been argued that we cannot, or should not, rely on testimony when it comes to moral matters. And argued that we cannot, or should not, rely on testimony when it comes to aesthetic judgement. This paper aims to build an explanation of our pessimism about testimony as to what experiences are like that also covers moral and aesthetic testimony, about which we can be similarly pessimistic. And the explanation given is such that it can make good sense of the optimism we can demonstrate with respect to each of these domain.

Anandi Hattiangadi & Joe Roussos     **A Sceptical Puzzle for Truth-Seeking Bayesians**

Belief polarisation occurs when two agents' posterior beliefs diverge with respect to the same propositions. Polarisation is often attributed to a failure of rationality in at least one polarising agent. However, it has recently been shown that two perfect Bayesian agents can polarise despite receiving the same increasing and infinite stream of non-misleading evidence, unless their priors satisfy strong and unmotivated constraints. We argue that this raises a sceptical puzzle for Bayesians who aim for truth or accuracy in their beliefs, since it casts into doubt not only our confidence across the board, but the truth-conduciveness of Conditionalization itself.

- Richard Pettigrew **Believing is said of groups in many ways (and so it should be said of them in none)**  
 In the first half of this talk, I argue that group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What's more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. In the second half, I argue that this ambiguity often has bad consequences when a group belief ascription is heard and taken as testimony. And indeed it has these consequences even when the ascription is true on the speaker's intended interpretation, when the speaker does not intend to mislead and indeed intends to cooperatively inform, and when the audience incorporates the evidence from the testimony as they should. I conclude by arguing that these consequences should lead us to stop using such ascriptions.
- Mona Simion & Christoph Kelp **Knowledge and Justified Credence**  
 This paper develops a novel account of the normativity of credences and its relation to the normativity outright belief. On this view, norms of belief and credence both, ultimately, derive from the knowledge goal of inquiry. More specifically, we distinguish between evaluative and prescriptive norms and argue that the knowledge goal of inquiry gives rise to an evaluative knowledge norm of belief. While good belief realises knowledge and is thus directly conducive to the goal of inquiry into whether p, good credence realises knowledge that probably p and is thus indirectly so to the goal of inquiry into whether p. We show that this account can explain a number of important data, including about beliefs/credences in lottery cases and in moral encroachment cases, and we consider how the view fits with various metaphysical views of the relation between belief and credence.
- Martin Smith **Decision Theory and De Minimis Risk**  
*A de minimis risk* is defined as a risk that is so small that it can be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming some of these difficulties. The key move is to introduce, into decision theory, a new non-probabilistic notion of risk known as *normic* risk.
- Alessandra Tanesini **Scaffolded Knowledge**  
 In this talk I argue that often propositional knowledge is acquired and retained by extensive reliance on physical and social scaffolds that create an environment or niche conducive to knowledge. It is incumbent on epistemologists to subject these aids to epistemic assessments. I show that several of the activities involved in the creation of niches within which inquiry can thrive are carried out by whole cultures. New generations benefit from inheriting these niches whilst being able to improve upon them to the advantage of their descendants. Finally, I highlight that the growth of human epistemic achievements is often due to increased outsourcing of cognitive effort and epistemic powers onto impersonal physical and social structures so that human beings can succeed more by contributing less to the solution of problems.
- Daniel Whiting **Is Margaret Cavendish a naive realist?**  
 In this paper, I argue that Margaret Cavendish holds a naive realist theory of perception, in contrast to the indirect and intentionalist theories that dominated the early modern period. According to Cavendish, having a (genuine) perceptual experience consists in being directly presented with objects in the environment, and the character of that experience is fundamentally explained by the objects so presented. Central to Cavendish's account, as I interpret it, is the notion of sympathy, which Cavendish borrows from the Stoics. Sympathy involves action at a distance. So, to defend the interpretation of Cavendish as a naive realist, I address David Cunnings's claim that Cavendish denies that there is such a thing as action at a distance. In closing, I show that my reading helps to make sense of the privileged epistemic status that Cavendish accords to perceptual experience.
- Timothy Williamson **Overfitting in Epistemology**  
 Overfitting is a pathology well-known in natural and social science where, in order to achieve a close fit with the 'data', one continually adds degrees of freedom to a model. This typically results in unstable theorizing and failure to identify errors in the 'data'. The treatment of counterexamples as data in analytic epistemology involves a serious risk of overfitting, even though it also serves as a crucial reality check on theorizing. A potential source of such errors in epistemological 'data' is our reliance on heuristics in applying epistemological terms. Some ways of mitigating these problems will briefly be discussed.

## ABSTRACTS: CONTRIBUTED TALKS

- Frederik Andersen **Logical Akrasia**  
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept *logical akrasia* pace analogy to epistemic akrasia. Second, §3 and §4 present a dilemma based on logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano Arithmetic and Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem it's shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano Arithmetic or akratic in our logical theorizing. It will then be left as an open question for future research what consequences the dilemma has for epistemic rationality.
- Cayla Clinkenbeard **A Network Model of Epistemic Responsibility**  
Individuals are often unable to make credible complex claims on their own. For this reason, bolstering claims with support from others is a frequently used epistemic tactic. Supporting a claim can include providing additional evidence, but backing from individuals who appear not to have stakes in whether the claim is true is especially effective at increasing credibility. In this paper, I raise the question of how we should understand the allocation of epistemic responsibility when individuals invoke such backing. I argue that the proper object of responsibility is not the individuals themselves but the epistemic networks they lean upon.
- Mariangela Cocchiaro **Credal (peer) disagreement: why should I care?**  
As the so-called 'Defeat' assumption in the epistemology debate suggests, peer disagreement often functions as a sort of litmus paper for detecting the presence of a defective attitude. In this talk, I scrutinize the exact nature of this defective attitude – and of the credal version of 'Defeat' stemming from it – when we operate in a fine-grained model of belief and the disagreeing agents are rational. Firstly, I show how the question as to the nature of the defectiveness of the credences in these cases falls within the scope of the epistemology debate. Then, after claiming that the fairly obvious appeal to inaccuracy comes with philosophically heavy commitments, I turn to what credences are taken to be for a principled answer.
- Jamie Collin **Abstractionism, Inferentialism, and Jack the Ripper**  
A family of objections to neo-Fregeanism trades on the conceptual gap between referential *purport* and referential *success*. It is not in general the case that definitions that succeed both in introducing new terms, and establishing proprieties of inference required to understand those new terms, will also be such that the singular terms so introduced will pick out unique objects. There is, apparently, no guarantee that the cardinal number terms introduced through Hume's Principle succeed in referring to cardinal numbers. This grounds a longstanding objection to the claim that one can gain epistemic entitlement to arithmetical claims via Hume's Principle. I argue that the problem does not apply to semantic inferentialists; a closer look at the deontic scorekeeping practices introduced by Hume's Principle shows that referential failure is not here an intelligible possibility.
- Kim Davies **Transcendental Arguments and Hinge Epistemology**  
Reflecting on Annalisa Coliva's work I will show how the development of hinge epistemology parallels, and is partly motivated by, that of transcendental arguments. Each history comes up against objections from Barry Stroud and takes similar avoiding action. Focusing on 'inescapable' hinges such as 'There is an external world' I will sketch a truth-related transcendental argument (full version available [here](#) and [there](#)) that overcomes Stroud's objections and shows that 'There is an external world' is true. This allows us to avoid much of the discussion of hinges and our epistemic relations with them.
- Esa Diaz Leon **On two ways of engineering a concept**  
In this talk, I want to argue in favor of the significance of a distinction between two notions of *amelioration* of concepts or meanings, That is, when we say that we aim to *engineer* a concept or meaning, we can mean at least two different things. On the one hand, we may be interested in the project of changing or revising the *information* associated with the term/concept. On the other hand, we might be interested in the project of changing or revising the very *referent* of the term (that is, changing its intension and/or extension). This distinction is relevant because these two projects (or these two ways of understanding amelioration) have different consequences. On the one hand, the information associated with the term is the relevant target of amelioration regarding the project of mitigating hermeneutical injustice. For that is the dimension of meaning that is accessible to the subject who suffers from hermeneutical lacunas and is trying to understand herself Furthermore, the body of information associated to the term/concept is (arguably) more easily revisable– so proposals in conceptual engineering of this sort can be more easily implementable. On

the other hand, I will argue that the second notion of ameliorating, concerned with changing or revising the intension or extension of the term, is the most relevant target of amelioration with regard to other purposes that the conceptual engineer might have. Firstly, when we are concerned with issues having to do with inclusion and exclusion, projects of this second sort are more crucial. For what is at issue is the intension/extension that the term/concept should have. Finally, this sort of conceptual engineering project is more relevant regarding questions in metaphysics of the form “Are Xs real?”.

Adham El  
Shazly

**Trust for Understanding.** Gaining knowledge from others requires trusting them. But what about gaining *understanding*? Whereas gaining knowledge concerns deferring to others to tell you whether *p*, gaining understanding concerns acquiring a perspective or a way of thinking. After arguing that the trust involved in gaining knowledge, conceived as a kind of reliance or assurance, is not suitable for gaining understanding, I propose a picture of a kind of trust grounded in *intellectual intimacy* and explain how it facilitates understanding. On this picture, trust for understanding doesn’t bear on a thinker’s reasons to believe a proposition, but the way they come to think about something. I conclude by highlighting some consequences this picture has for epistemic autonomy and value.

Joyce Fungo

### **Is Inquisitive Truth Monism Truly Monism?**

In this paper, I argue that inquisitive truth monism (ITM) - the view that says *truth is epistemically valuable if it answers relevant questions* - is an insufficient attempt to salvage truth monism. Although it substantially addresses the question of epistemic value relative to inquiries in the scientific domain, the position collapses due to its insistence to remain monistic. While it obviously valorizes truth, there is no reason for it to value only truth. At the same time, it needs to clarify what doxastic attitude/s should be taken towards said true answers to relevant questions in order for epistemic value to obtain. Where *x* is a true answer to a relevant question, do we then know *x*, understand *x*, believe *x*, or accept *x*? I conclude the paper with a suggestion for ITM to be open to accepting the possibility of a plurality of epistemically valuable goods.

Benoit  
Guilielmo

### **Legend of Two States in Epistemology: Doubt and Suspended Judgement**

Are the state of suspended judgement and the state of doubt identical? Surprisingly, almost no connection has been established between these two notions in the expanding literature on suspension. I will show that there is a rich and ignored tradition of analysis of doubt according to which being *in a state of doubt* about whether *P* is identical with being *in a state of suspended judgement* about whether *P*. Let’s call it the “No-Difference” view. After exposing these accounts and their strong ties to the current debate on suspension, I will answer the most pressing challenges against the view that suspension cannot be distinguished from the state of doubt.

Rivkah  
Hatchwell

### **Epistemic (Im)Politeness – Re-Diagnosing Epistemic Harms**

There is a developing literature in the philosophy of medicine which argues that the common patient complaint of not feeling heard is best interpreted as instances of systematic testimonial injustice (Kidd & Carel, 2015; 2017). In this talk I challenge this interpretation of the common patient complaint of not feeling heard and use my challenge to motivate a wider inquiry into the limitations of diagnosing testimonial (dys)function in our social lives as testimonial injustice. I ultimately argue that there is a previously unidentified way, which I call epistemic impoliteness, that individuals can be harmed in day-to-day epistemic practice that in many cases could make better sense of other cases where testimonial injustice has been applied.

Roman Heil

### **How to rely on what you know**

A major challenge to the knowledge norm for practical reasoning (KPR) involves high stakes cases. KPR tells us that we may rely on known propositions in practical reasoning, yet when much hangs on whether we know, relying on our knowledge seems to lead to irrational action. I will argue for a novel response to this challenge that is based on the idea that stakes can affect how we rely on what we know. I will show that an independent virtue of my proposal is that it provides us with a knowledge-based account of when to simplify our reasoning.

Jack Herbert

### **Reliabilism and Testimonial Discriminations**

We don’t just accept whatever we are told; we *discriminate* between bits of testimony. If those discriminations were not truth-directed, by and large, then we would be unable to explain our wealth of testimonial knowledge. But why are our testimonial discriminations truth-directed? Several, mutually incompatible theories can be advanced to account for this. I focus on the *reliabilist hypothesis* that our testimonial discriminations are truth-directed because they demonstrate the operation of a reliable process / faculty. I will argue that this hypothesis is redundant and fails, therefore, to provide a satisfactory explanation of the truth-directedness of our testimonial discriminations.

- Avram Hiller **Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge**  
 This paper clarifies and defends a form of *non-summative, non-supervenient* group knowledge (following Alexander Bird and others): A group can know that *P* even if none of its members knows that *P*, and group knowledge does not supervene on the mental states of its members. We argue that central to group knowledge is the group’s epistemic structure, which may include devices that retain or process information. We respond to recent criticisms from Jennifer Lackey, and show that these criticisms do not undermine the non-summative, non-supervenient view but instead highlight some ways in which group cognition differs from individual cognition. (Co-authored with R. Wolfe Randall)
- Paul Irikefe **Title: The Vice of Nepotism**  
 Nepotism forms a core part of our everyday moral and socio-political vocabulary, and yet we lack a coherent account of it. The aim of this paper is to supply that account. I argue that nepotism (i.e., nepotism proper) is a moral vice, which has a hitherto unnoticed epistemic counterpart, namely, “epistemic nepotism.” Further, I claim that both forms of nepotism arise from a vicious motive, morbid love of one’s “primordial private realm,” which makes individuals to assign undue weight to the side of the distributive equation they belong to, thus leading to distributive injustice. The result of the analysis is then applied to substantive debates in social epistemology, specifically, to addressing the question as to how vice explanation is appropriate in cases of individuals in “echo chambers” and cogent in cases of individuals whose epistemic conduct proceeds from value or ideology.
- Matt Jope **Risk Pluralism and Anti-Risk Epistemology**  
 Recent interest has grown in the philosophy and epistemology of risk. Challenges lie in offering a correct analysis of risk, determining whether a single conception or a plurality of conceptions of risk are needed, and in applying these conceptions to epistemology. This paper argues that risk pluralism is the correct analysis of risk, but shows that a more diverse plurality of conceptions is needed than has yet been acknowledged. It then shows that there are quite natural applications of this more diverse risk pluralism for epistemology.
- Ignacio Gómez-Ledo & Dani Pino **Group Hinge Epistemology**  
 In this paper we suggest a novel approach to two of the most discussed currents in contemporary Epistemology by combining them: Hinge Epistemology and Group Epistemology. On the one hand, we address the question mark of groups—a problem concerning the nature of group justification—by arguing that the conjunction rule is a rationality hinge that every agent ought to meet under certain conditions—which the group satisfies, as we shall lay out. On the other hand, we focus on the question mark of hinges—a problem on the source of hinges—and contend that hinges may be understood as resulting from dynamical systems, so the social anchoring of hinges may be envisaged just like Palermo’s integrationist account explains the supervenience of group properties.
- Neri Marsili **Better safe than sorry: silence, carefulness, and the norm of assertion**  
 According to factive norms of assertion (like the Knowledge-Norm and the Truth-Norm), one should assert a proposition only if it is true. Some find this too demanding: intuitively, *inadvertently* false assertions are permissible. Proponents of factive rules often reply that, if false assertions are not criticisable, it’s because they violate factive norms in an *excusable* (hence *blameless*) fashion. This paper challenges this kind of “excuse manoeuvre”, and discusses some alternatives to defend factive norms.
- Taylor Matthews **The Genealogy of Intellectual Character**  
 The focal point of responsibility virtue epistemology is arguably the concept of *intellectual character*. Despite this, the notion itself remains largely under-theorized. This talk sheds light on intellectual character by tracing its pragmatic genealogy (Queloz, 2022). In doing so, I claim that intellectual character emerges in a state of nature alongside what Bernard Williams (2002) called the Virtues of Truth but is importantly distinct from these dispositions. Specifically, I contend that it functions to flag the quality of participants in epistemic practice. I end by demonstrating how this thesis challenges the orthodox idea that intellectual virtues are intrinsically valuable.
- Boaz Miller **I Know, We Know: Brining Individual and Collective Knowledge Together**  
 What need an individual subject’s standing to be vis-à-vis her epistemic community for her to personally know? When does the community know? I argue that an individual subject personally knows only if three conditions obtain. First, the individual’s true belief is responsibly formed. Second, the overall available evidence within



the relevant epistemic community sufficiently supports her belief given a politically legitimate weighing of inductive risks. Third, her belief is objectively justified; namely, the evidence the community possesses distinguishes the real state of affairs from relevant alternatives, whether the community is aware of them or not.

Joao Miranda

#### **Title: A New Fragmentalist Account of Epistemic Akrasia**

Greco (2014) and Kearl (2020) have defended fragmentalist accounts of epistemic akrasia: there is not one unique belief-formation system, and the possibility of epistemic akrasia rests on the possibility of conflict between the different systems. I'll argue that both their versions fail, for their responses to pressing worries about the meta-epistemological theory that underlies them – epistemic expressivism – are unsatisfactory and no better alternative response seems to be available for them. I will then rescue fragmentalism by proposing a version that focuses, not on the linguistic/non-linguistic nature of the systems, but on the constraints under which beliefs are formed.

Alice  
Monypenny

#### **Once a vice, always a vice?**

Recent work in virtue and vice epistemology has suggested that the normative status of an epistemic character trait (its status as either a virtue or a vice) is contextually dependent. A trait which is an epistemic vice for one person in some context need not be an epistemic vice for someone else in a different context. In this talk, I will defend this claim and situate it within virtue and vice epistemology more broadly. I argue that some modifications must be made to the view in order that it is compatible with the ameliorative aims of vice epistemology.

Nastasia  
Mueller

#### **Combining Responsibilist and Reliabilist Virtue**

According to the traditional and dominant view of epistemic responsibilist virtue, virtues are understood as enduring, stable traits of character. An act only counts as virtuous if it issued from a virtue. The occurrence conception, in contrast, takes the performance of a virtuous act as primary, such that an act, if based on the right epistemic motives, is virtuous regardless of whether it issued from a virtue. I will defend a particular version of the occurrence view and argue that the view is not only able to understand virtues as dispositional but also able to combine reliabilist and responsibilist virtues.

Jesus  
Navarro

#### **The Ethics of Scepticism.**

The radical sceptic blames us for being epistemically reckless, but she seems hard to blame her for her extremely cautious attitudes. My goal is to put epistemic blame back on her, paving the way for an ethics of scepticism. I start by formulating it as an ethics of belief *suspension*, a suggestion the sceptic may easily dodge. A longer way is proposed, requiring us to prove that epistemic suspension or denial downgrades doxastic states. My point is that the radical sceptic may not hold fully-fledged beliefs, but only degrees of credence or mere opinions, which implies that she is free riding on social cognition.

Lilith  
Newton

#### **Doubt as the inquiry-starter**

A function-first epistemologist aims to shed light on our epistemic concepts via an investigation of what they do for us. In this paper, I take a function-first approach to the concept *doubt*. I argue that this concept functions to meet our need for a concept that flags when inquiry should begin, and then explore what *doubt* must be like in order to serve this function. I argue that *doubt* must pick out an interrogative attitude that represents a question as open and in need of closing, which has an aversive affective aspect, and which consequently motivates one who has this attitude to try to close the question.

Dani Pino

#### **Constitutivist Virtue Reliabilism**

Virtue Reliabilism (VR) is the view that knowledge is an achievement that results from epistemic virtue manifestation—where virtue is understood in terms of competence. It is not clear what the nature epistemic virtue is though. I provide an answer in three steps. First, I assume the constitutivist template to approach this problem—according to which, the normativity of practical agency comes from certain constitutive features of action. Second, I elaborate on one particular constitutivist strategy, the Spinozist-Nietzschean Constitutivism (SNC), which holds that such a feature is the agent's desire towards what she finds intrinsically useful framed by the social context in which it manifests. Finally, I insert VR into the SNC framework to depict epistemic virtue, being the constitutive feature of epistemic agency, as the tendency built on the desire that drives the agent towards truth due to its epistemic usefulness, so that epistemic normativity comes from such an epistemic usefulness to which virtue is constitutively geared.

- Massimo Renzo **Wrongdoing and wrongdoers in the epistemic domain**  
Traditionally, moral and epistemic justifications have been conceived as relying on independent justificatory standards. However, there seem to be cases in which forming beliefs which are impeccable on purely epistemic grounds involves wronging others. Some argue that this should lead us to reject the traditional view that our beliefs should be determined exclusively by truth-related considerations. I offer an alternative account– one which aims to vindicate the thought that we can be wronged by racist or discriminatory beliefs, without giving up the idea that by following sound epistemic standards we do not wrong anyone.
- Amber Riaz **Moral Knowledge: Beyond the A priori-A Posteriori Distinction**  
What is the role of experience in the acquisition of moral knowledge? On the standard view, *moral rationalism* moral knowledge is ultimately a priori; experience at best plays a causal role in moral learning. I argue that often experience plays neither a purely causal, nor a strictly evidential role in the acquisition of moral knowledge; in many cases, past experience is constitutive of the skills acquired in moral learning. I argue that moral learning involves pattern recognition. Experience plays a crucial non-causal role in helping us develop pattern recognition; it also helps sort the good patterns from the bad ones.
- Markus Seethaler **Intellectual Humility and the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement**  
In this paper, I show that there is a reciprocal relation between intellectual humility and disagreement. I argue that disagreement provides us with higher-order evidence and that intellectual humility is the virtuous disposition to adopt appropriate higher-order epistemic attitudes. Therefore, it is an essential feature of intellectual humility to respond rationally to disagreement. However, since disagreement provides us with reasons to adopt appropriate higher-order epistemic attitudes, responding rationally to this phenomenon also presupposes intellectual humility. This speaks in favor of a strong structural connection between virtue epistemology and the epistemological debate about disagreement.
- Vittorio Serra **A problem for unanalysable notions in epistemology**  
While there are a number of plausible starting points for an inquiry in epistemology, it is here contended that it is a mistake to turn that starting point into an unanalysable, unexplained explainer, since that would seem to make it inexplicable, raising problems similar to those with Kant's thing-in-itself, a position Charles Sanders Peirce called 'nominalistic Platonism'. Such a position is undermotivated, it is here claimed, and results in a self-stultification of the inquirer as they attempt to refer to something that has no features by which it can be referred to.
- Andrew Sherrod **Procedural Common Knowledge: A critique of Greco's approach to hinge epistemology**  
In his 2016 and 2019 papers Greco proposes a novel way of understanding Wittgensteinian hinges. He proposes that hinges are best thought of as instances of procedural knowledge (2019) and instances of common knowledge (2016). While I am sympathetic to Greco's proposal, in this paper I will challenge this position by showing that both proposals, either separately or combined, fail to account for the essential hinges features. Finally, I will briefly show how a knowledge how proposal is able to retain the general move that Greco wants to make while avoiding the accompanying pitfalls.
- Paul Silva **The Structure of Factive States.** Natural language contains many epistemic factive *verbs*. Verbs like 'knows that', 'realizes that', 'recognizes that', 'notices that', 'understands that', 'sees that', and 'remembers that' are but some of these verbs. Natural language also contains epistemic factive *adjectives*. These include 'is aware that', 'is conscious that', 'is obvious that', and 'is clear that'. Semantic differences between the two kinds of factives will be leveraged to push forward the idea that 'is aware that' is used to refer to a more basic state than 'knows that'. It will also be argued that we can provide an account of the latter in terms of the former. For illustrative purposes, this paper will show how impure virtue epistemologies can advance our understanding of the states that epistemic factive verbs and adjectives refer to.
- Valentin Teillet **Neo-Moorean Core Knowledge**  
I argue that neither Wittgenstein's hinges nor neo-Moorean commonsense knowledge are satisfactory anti-skeptical arguments. Hinge propositions cannot have epistemic relevance while being insulated from epistemology. Commonsense knowledge cannot escape the skeptical challenge while being the product of belief-forming processes. However, recent research in developmental psychology has shown that some of our knowledge is innate and corresponds to a set of basic capacities (Spelke, 2000)(Carey, 2009). This core knowledge is not subject to the skeptical challenge since it is not acquired through belief-forming processes. My aim will be to show how this idea of an innate core knowledge can rescue the neo-Moorean anti-skeptical account.

- Tamaz Tokhadze **Stochastic Evidence Processing and Uniqueness**  
 Many leading psychological models of human reasoning converge on the view that the processing of evidence involves chancy or stochastic elements. Building on this empirical evidence, Weisberg (2020) has argued that the stochasticity of evidence processing renders false a hotly debated thesis in epistemology called Uniqueness: the view that any given evidence justifies one, unique attitude towards any proposition. He argues that equally good reasoning on the same evidence can lead to opposing conclusions due to the chance elements involved in evidence processing. I defend Uniqueness from this objection by arguing that Weisberg's position individuates evidence too finely and neglects the shareability aspect of evidence.
- Minkyung Wang **Credence and Belief: Epistemic Decision Theory Revisited**  
 This paper uses epistemic decision theory to investigate the rationality of bridge principles between credence and belief. Assuming that consistent and logically closed belief can be determined from subjective probability by a binarization method, I develop Hempel and Levi's epistemic decision theories and critically evaluate Leitgeb's stability theory of belief and Lin-Kelly's camera shutter rules: they violate the convexity norm, and thus cannot do the job of expected epistemic utility maximization. Furthermore, I critically discuss Hempel and Levi's pioneering works incorporating content measure into the utility function and suggest new epistemic utility functions measuring the informativeness of belief.
- Michael Wilde **Alexander Bird on Abductive Knowledge**  
 Alexander Bird maintains that inference to the best explanation cannot generate knowledge; instead, abductive knowledge is generated by inference to the only explanation. I argue that Bird goes wrong by demanding an explanation of abductive knowledge in term of reliability. I provide an alternative interpretation of inference to the only explanation that drops this demand. However, I then argue that: (i) this interpretation provides no reason to think that abductive inferences ever proceed by inference to the only explanation; (ii) reconstructing knowledge-generating abductive inferences as inferences to the only explanation serves to obscure the ampliative nature of abductive knowledge.
- Christopher Willard-Kyle **Evolving Questions: Eliminating Wrong Answers**  
 Questions change via wrong-answer elimination. For example, students taking a multiple-choice exam might first wonder whether (a), (b), or (c) is correct, but after eliminating (c), wonder only whether the answer is (a) or (b). It would be satisfying if we could explain when it's (ir)rational to change questions via wrong-answer elimination by appealing to the ignorance norm for inquiry (Whitcomb 2010, 2017; Friedman, 2017). But we can't. Not directly anyway. In short, that's because inquirers often remain ignorant of the complete answer to a question after it has become rational to change questions by eliminating a wrong answer. The paper explores candidate solutions to the resulting puzzle.
- Joel Yalland **The Role of Testimony in Agreement and Disagreement:**  
 Testimony and disagreement both aim at roughly the same guiding question, but that there is some overlap that has largely gone unacknowledged. I argue that instances of agreement, disagreement, and various related exchanges involve at least some recognition or acknowledgement of a speaker's (purported) testimony. I contend that if pessimistic arguments against testimony hold, we likely cannot say anything meaningful about the weight of agreement, disagreement, etc. making dogmatic steadfastness a norm. We must therefore reconsider the relation between these phenomena, and make at least a neutral case for testimonial warrant in order to preserve the epistemology of disagreement.