

Language is null and void if it cannot be logical for Wittgenstein. We express all that we express based on a formulation of the logic that we have, and all forms of expression must entail a kind of logic that is intrinsic to itself. Is this 'logic' in its purest sense? Are all forms of logic similar to one which could be argued to be ideal? If so, does language not capture emotions as well as thoughts? Wittgenstein offers us a clear demarcation line around a perfect notion of what a thought is. In the thought of Jurgen Habermas, we see language playing a multiplicity of roles. It's a broader notion than it appears in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* of Wittgenstein: the discourse theory as well as the discourse principle both use a conception of language. It helps us to know about 'agreement' and for its construction. Diving into the social and the political, language for Habermas is a different but similar idea. In this paper, I offer to compare and contrast logic and language for Wittgenstein and Habermas.