UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
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METHODOLOGICAL TRENDS and challenges IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

Book of Abstracts

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Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts
University of Ljubljana

Contents

Introduction

Contemporary analytic philosophers have expanded their methodological toolkit beyond traditional philosophical inquiry, embracing a wide array of approaches that intersect with various disciplines. These methods include (but are not limited to) experimental approaches, which involve empirical testing and data collection to inform philosophical hypotheses; non-idealized and naturalized epistemology, which considers the real-world complexities of knowledge acquisition and justification; computer simulations and probabilistic modeling, which enable philosophers to explore complex systems and uncertainties in reasoning; neuroscientific methods, which offer insights into the neural underpinnings of cognitive processes and decision-making; formal ontology, which provides rigorous frameworks for analyzing concepts and categories; conceptual engineering, which involves the deliberate design and modification of conceptual frameworks to address philosophical problems; evolutionary modeling, which investigates the emergence and evolution of cognitive capacities and norms; and feminist perspectives, which critically examine power dynamics and social structures in philosophical discourse.

This workshop aims to delve into these methodological trends, showcasing recent research that employs these diverse approaches and addressing the challenges and opportunities they present for contemporary philosophy. Over the course of two days, the workshop features a total of 14 talks, evenly distributed with 7 talks scheduled for each day. This workshop seeks to enrich our understanding of contemporary philosophical inquiry and inspire new avenues of research.

Abstracts of Invited Talks

Semantic Modeling between Empirical Data and Norms of Rationality

Jan Sprenger
University of Turin

This talk uses current research on conditionals as a case study for methodological reflections on modeling and theory confirmation in formal semantics. Traditionally, such structures have been studied primarily by logicians and philosophers of language, but currently, they are also investigated by formal epistemologists, computer scientists, linguists and psychologists of reasoning. These groups model semantic phenomena in different ways, they have different ideas of what counts as data in favor of a specific theory, and they assign different weights to norms of rationality in semantic modeling. I will analyze these differences and highlight the respective role of truth conditions, probability and valid inference in various prominent theories of conditionals. The talk concludes with an evaluation of the prospects for a unified semantic theory of conditionals that could be attractive across disciplinary boundaries.

When Expert Judgment Fails: Epistemic Trespassing and Risks to Collective Inquiry

Dunja Šešelja
Ruhr University Bochum

In this talk I will first discuss the role of two social-epistemic reasons that have remained overlooked in the discussions on expertise: higher-order evidence and inquisitive reasons. Using this account of expert judgment, I will examine the phenomenon of epistemic trespassing, which happens when individuals engage in areas outside their expertise. While recent discussions in social epistemology have emphasized harms of epistemic trespassing in the context of public assertions, how trespassers may affect collective inquiry has been comparatively less explored. To address this question, I will present an agent-based model that simulates the involvement of trespassers in the scientific inquiry and their impact on the collective knowledge acquisition. The first part of the talk is based on joint work with Will Fleisher and Daniel C. Friedman; the second part is based on joint work with Matteo Michelini.

Abstracts of Contributed Talks

Making Porosity More Porous: An Open Call for Brainstorming After Tanya Luhrmann's Recent Findings

Juan De Jager
University of Ljubljana

In this presentation I set out to explore some of the methodological and theoretical potential of "porosity" in relation to "anomalous" or "supernatural" phenomena, particularly interactions with spirits and gods. Building on Charles Taylor's concept of the "porosity of the self," Tanya Luhrmann and her team set out to test the hypothesis that porosity, understood as a metaphorical characterisation of the mind-world boundary, is a key feature that enables the realisation of what would otherwise be considered supernatural or at least anomalous. According to this theory, a configuration of the self – or in Luhrmann's use, a Theory of Mind (ToM) – that displays a more "buffered" boundary between mind and world is less likely to integrate an anomalous experience – e.g. God or a ghost – than a "porous" one.

According to Luhrmann, some basic mind-world dualism is universally present throughout human experience and culture; in one way or another, humans set some boundary between the inner and the outer. The ways in which such configurations take shape are what Luhrmann refers to as local Theories of Mind. In Western culture, the configurations of this boundary tend to make the "buffered" aspects of the self more salient than the "porous" ones, resulting in more rigid dualisms and a monadic conception of the self. Besides dampening the chance of spiritual experiences, this shapes our worldview and has implications for science in general and for anthropology in particular, considering reflexivity challenges.

Sharing the transdisciplinary spirit of Luhrmann's research and its "comparative phenomenology", I will approach porosity in a transdisciplinary way, using it to address some reflexivity challenges after the ontological turn in anthropology. I will explore different possible meanings of the "porous" metaphor, proposing various heuristics the vernacular researcher can incorporate to assess the limits of "ontological flexibility".

I will also point out the need for porosity in the transdisciplinary dialogue, since some predominantly Western forms of dualism, e.g. Cartesianism, are being re-examined in a broader disciplinary perspective. Exploring the intertwined relationship between metaphors such as "porosity" and Theories of Mind can help to bridge some disciplinary gaps, towards a more intelligible and less siloed conceptual flow, especially trying to foster dialogue and collaboration between anthropology, philosophy and cognitive science. It can also shed light on some blind spots and biases the

anthropological project might be facing and prevent us from walking into dead ends. I will emphasize the need for transdisciplinary dialogue and the development of “peer reviewed” embodied practices, without which we underplay our capacity for insight.

Keywords: porosity, religious studies, transdisciplinarity, phenomenology, spatial metaphors

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What Would Methodological Naturalism in Ethics Be?

Thomas Engeland
University of Bonn

While forms of naturalism in ethics are very old, the term "naturalism" has not been use for nearly as long and is for many probably still mostly associated with what has many times been called the "naturalistic fallacy" ever since Moore (1903). In the context of the use of the term "naturalism" in ethics, it has mostly been understood as ontological naturalism about the objects of ethical discourse. Rarely has it been the object of study what it would mean to apply a sort of methodological naturalism in this field of inquiry. There have been some projects within X-Phi which tried to statistically record different intuitions about ethical dilemmas in various relevantly different groups. But talking about a topic in terms of what one can develop from intuitions, even when one considers the admirable step to go beyond one’s own particular intuitions, is still a very different project compared to trying to practice philosophy in a way which is continuous with and is able to give results comparable to those of the natural sciences. Hearing this, one might understandably feel a bit uneasy and think there must be something wrong in the very conception of such a science. After all, science is about how things are and ethics is about how they ought to be. It was this very problem after all which Hume saw in ethics even though he already wanted to approach philosophy through "the experimental method". But this all changes if one conceives of ethics through hypothetical instead of categorical imperatives, that is, if one does not think that ethics is mainly about demands that have authority over everyone independent of whether they are interested in acting morally or not, but instead as being an inquiry into what someone should do who already accepts and makes her own the so-called "moral point of view". In this presentation I don’t want to explore whether we should conceive of ethics in this way but show some of the possibilities it would seem to open up. Being about hypothetical imperatives, ethics would then be about what one should do given some form of correct behavior as a goal. The worry that one might have about this at first, namely that ethics would just be reduced to a sub-discipline of economics or something of that kind, is not justified since the investigation would not, for the most part, consist in finding out how to distribute some goods that one already knows should be distributed in a certain sense, but in finding out how the ethical thinking we already practice actually works and where the predictive is connected to the normative. In so doing, finding out about the origins of a societal taboo whose meaning we do not quite understand, tracking semantic patterns in moral speech, or even results in neurology about which moral judgments are connected to descriptive (mis-)representations of situations might help understand more clearly what the moral point of view we endorse consists of and what it involves.

End of Logical Positivism? #toosoon

Michal Hladky
University of Geneva

One of the notable changes in philosophy of science of the 20th century was the shift of focus from theories to models. While the philosophical literature on this topic is vast, if one would try to understand what scientific models are and how they generate knowledge, one would be confronted with an enormously fragmented picture.

In the first part of my talk, I will present a couple of examples of the fragmentation and explore the reasons, causes and assumptions that lead to such a state of affairs. In the second part I will argue that the methodological assumptions in philosophy of science, leading to such fragmentation are not adequate, especially in the domain of complex neuroscientific models.

Philosophy of science was marked by the logical positivism (and empiricism) and its paradigm of unity of science; regimentation of language through rational reconstruction of scientific theories into formal deductive systems of logic; explication of terms and epistemology focusing on justification. The second major import was due to the considerable development of formal sciences - logic, semantics and computability theory, which are not limited to be the tools of philosophy, but often inform philosophical positions and scientific methodology. Deeper understanding of formal tools came with better understanding of the limits or purely formal, syntactic treatment of scientific theories.

During the revolutionary 60s, the positivist picture came under attack from the proponents of the semantic view of theories (basis of various structuralist programs), organising a symposium on the topic. During the symposium, the paradigm was attacked on all of its major pillars. Paradoxically, structuralists seeming to be the most natural extension of the positivist project, rejoiced “the night it died” (Suppe 2000, p. 102). It is not entirely clear what was rejected and to what extent, as the rejected paradigm was not replaced by a new one (Suppe 1974, p. 116; Machamer 2002, p. 9).

The unity was replaced by pluralism opening the possibility to the study of scientific disciplines other than and independently of physics and to focus on their particular methods. The shift from rational reconstruction to description of scientific practices allowed to capture how scientists produce new theories. The shift in epistemology from justification to broader cognitive, possibly non-deductive and non-linguistic, process and inferential strategies allowed to study how practicing scientists and communities think about scientific problems. Sociological, historical, value and goal based analyses expanded the analysis of theory adoption and change to non-empirical factors.

In the stronger reading, the unity was replaced by disunity (Fodor 1974), the rational reconstruction and epistemic justification by a mere description of what scientists do; what arguments and inference they are inclined to accept. Especially in philosophy of biology, attempts at formal reconstruction of theories are met with resistance (see the reception of Woodger 1937 and his ‘apology’ by Nicholson and Gawne 2014). The disunity as a methodological principle motivates philosophers to i) ‘specialise’ in particular field of science; ii) find particularities in every case study in order to baptise their discovery as new scientific method; iii) neglect any systematic analysis of

different concepts and their relations.

The complex nature of modelling practices in neurosciences presents a direct challenge even to those seduced by the practice turn in philosophy of science.

The Value of Social Coherence in Science: An Agent-Based-Modelling Exploration

Martin Justin

University of Maribor

It seems that considerations of how scientific evidence and theories fit together play a role in scientific practice. But should they? Goldberg and Khalifa (2022) have recently argued that the role of coherence in science should first and foremost be of social and negative character. That is, in their view, if a scientist's beliefs do not cohere with the well-justified beliefs of the rest of the scientific community, then this provides a prima facie reason against the incoherent individual's beliefs.

Proceeding from this insight that epistemic coherence in science may fruitfully be assessed in a social context, this contribution attempts to make these notions more precise and operational and puts them to test. I consider probabilistic measures of coherence from formal epistemology which assess various aspects of what coherence could be. I pay special attention to a distinction between two types: partial and absolute (in)coherence. The former denotes information sets of varying degrees of coherence, and the latter considers the coherence of information sets relative to some threshold value.

I then explore the value of coherence among the scientific community by means of an agent-based-model (ABM) and generate various types of social networks, representing the communication pathways among scientists who investigate different parts of "the world" (an external generator of the evidence stream). These simulated scientists are then able to exchange arguments about what the world is like. I investigate whether the coherence of their beliefs in a social sense may be indicative of truth (in a positive, negative or both senses).

I thereby show how a precise measure of informational coherence and the described ABM of a scientific community provides an insight into the interplay of the social network structure and the type of scientific work (viz., different "worlds") with the value of social coherence in science.

The Roles of Philosophers in Interdisciplinary Research

Olga Markič
University of Ljubljana

Overspecialization in science is often seen as an obstacle to producing knowledge and scientific progress. Erich Jantsch introduced the term "interdisciplinarity" to a wider audience in 1970. Initially, it aimed to reshape the traditional scientific viewpoint about nature and society within emerging environmental studies. However, it has since been used primarily as an instrumental approach to solving problems by incorporating different disciplines.

Broadly speaking, philosophy enters interdisciplinarity in three ways: as a meta-theoretical approach to the research area, as philosophical investigation supported by empirical research from other disciplines in a specific domain, or as philosophical rethinking and self-reflexivity on philosophy and science. In this paper, I will examine the different roles philosophers play and argue that the instrumental, means-centered view—where scientists from various disciplines develop means and instruments to reach solutions—must be supplemented by a reflection on goals and values, including non-epistemic values such as ethical, social, cultural and personal considerations.

Integrating Empirical Research and Philosophical Theorizing on the Scientific Realism Debate for Science Reporting

Raimund Pils
University of Salzburg

In this presentation, I explore the integration of empirical research with the philosophical discourse on scientific realism and its implications for science communication within a consensus reporting framework. I collaboratively conducted an empirical study with a college that investigates the realist and anti-realist attitudes of scientists and science communicators. This study jointly with philosophical theorizing serves as a basis to rethink our science reporting practices. I claim that communicating scientific findings without any regard of the current expert views on scientific realism risks contributing to existing public misinformation about science.

I want to start with a few details about the study first. We argue that the societal consequences of the scientific realism debate, in the context of science-to-public communication are often overlooked and careful theorizing about it needs further empirical groundwork. As such, we conducted a survey experiment with 130 academics (from physics, chemistry, and biology) and 137 science communicators. We provided them with a 11-item questionnaire probing their views of scientific realism and related concepts. Contra theoretical expectations, we find that (a) science communicators are generally more inclined towards scientific antirealism when compared to scientists in the same academic fields, though both groups show an inclination towards realism and (b) academics who engage in more theoretical work are not less (or more) realist than experimentalists. Lastly, (c), we fail to find differences with respect to selective realism but find that science communicators are significantly less epistemically voluntarist compared to their academic counterparts. Overall, our results provide first

empirical evidence on the views of scientists and science communicators on scientific realism, with some results running contra to the theoretical expectations, opening up new empirical and theoretical research directions.

The implications of our research for science communication are significant. Both our study and a preliminary investigation by Beebe & Dellsén (2020) demonstrate a notable lack of consensus among key stakeholders—philosophers of science, scientists, and science communicators—on the interpretation of scientific theories. This contrasts sharply with the current approach to reporting scientific findings in science communication. I will propose a new model of science communication which better aligns with widely accepted communication norms, such as consensus reporting.

Ethics in Silico: Computer Modeling of Ethical Concepts in Autonomous AI Systems

Paweł Polak and Roman Krzanowski
Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow

This paper discusses the application of computer modeling (i.e., modeling in silico) in philosophy, specifically in the context of ethical problems. Computer modeling or simulation is a widely accepted method for researching, testing, and validating scientific theories, engineering models, and real-life scenarios in social sciences, urban studies, psychology or any other research involving mathematical models.

In this paper, we aim to:

1. Explore how our understanding of ethics could benefit from in silico studies.
2. Determine how research into the ethics of autonomous AI systems may benefit from in silico methods.
3. Examine how in silico methods can be used to model a branch of ethics, phronetic ethics, in autonomous AI systems.

The ethics of AI systems seem particularly well-suited for in silico studies, because of its inherent ambiguity and multivalence. Its realization in computing systems requires both a clear definition of ethical issues (such as value theory and the ontology of ethics), which are often controversial and poorly articulated in traditional ethical studies, and meticulous verification of (simulated) computerized ethical solutions in real-life scenarios. Dealing with inherent uncertainty and ambiguity of ethical problems, accounting for vast number of possible scenarios, along with the large-scale verification (implying numerous complex testing scenarios, game theories simulation scenarios, grounding of models in Big Data) of ethical solutions, are some of the problems where in silico methods may prove indispensable. It brings new perspectives and new analytic tools for philosophy.

Why phronesis? To improve the moral capacities of autonomous AI systems, we need to change the way we “compute” ethical decisions. In other words, we need a paradigm shift in AI systems. The new model we propose is based on the Aristotelian

concept of phronesis and aims to translate these principles into an autonomous AI decision-making system. A critical difference in ethics between autonomous AI systems and humans lies in the "inference/ascend method." This method involves ascending to an ethical decision based on the facts present, the objectives of an action, and past experiences and their outcomes. We do not claim that simulating phronesis in AI systems will realize "moral AI capacities", but it may bring AI systems closer to some level of acceptable realization.

In this paper, we posit that in silico studies of ethics will help us to (a) determine what information is ethically relevant to retain and what can be discarded—a process known as information reduction in in silico terms, (b) define generalizable ethical cases that can be used as reference models in AI systems, and (c) develop general recommendations on the use of computer simulation methods in the modeling of ethical concepts, particularly phronesis.

The Absent Elephant: Non-Western Methods in Contemporary Philosophy

Rafal K. Stepien

Austrian Academy of Sciences

While the organizers of the 'Methodological Trends and Challenges in Contemporary Philosophy' conference rightly observe that "Contemporary analytic philosophers have expanded their methodological toolkit beyond traditional philosophical inquiry, embracing a wide array of approaches that intersect with various disciplines," and while among these new approaches they include "feminist perspectives, which critically examine power dynamics and social structures in philosophical discourse," nonetheless, there remains discernible between the lines of their call a startling—yet telling—omission, one indicative of an even greater power imbalance and an even starker social exclusion operative within philosophical discourse than that besetting feminist and other approaches innovating upon yet originating within the Western philosophical tradition. I refer, of course, to that absent elephant in the room: the culturally diverse, historically important, externally variegated, internally complex, conceptually sophisticated, and methodologically, categorically, thematically, and disciplinarily significant philosophical traditions of the non-Western world.

Among these, this paper focuses on Buddhist philosophy. It begins with a survey of the current state of affairs. Based on the data I present, Buddhist philosophers active in philosophy departments in Europe turn out to constitute just 0.15% of the total. This near-complete absence of Buddhism from philosophy in Europe is all the more shocking given the sheer size and sophistication of the Buddhist philosophical canon. Spanning the diverse fields and sub-fields into which professional philosophy is customarily categorized in the contemporary West (e.g., metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, etc.), containing texts composed over some two and a half millennia and written in a wide range of languages—including Sanskrit, Chinese, Japanese, and Tibetan, among numerous others—and boasting a textual canon of immense proportions and unquestionable richness, Buddhist philosophy is one of the world's major philosophical traditions. Indeed, in terms of whichever parameter of quality or quantity one cares to

entertain—analytical sophistication, argumentative subtlety, conceptual scope, temporal or geographical span, or even sheer textual size—the Buddhist philosophical tradition is second to none. And yet, philosophy departments in Europe (and in the rest of the West) have been uniquely resistant to the inclusion of Buddhist and other non-Western philosophical traditions, even while other departments—notably those in area and religious studies—have proven to be relatively less so.

Having charted the current state of affairs, in the second portion of my paper I summarize arguments designed to justify the exclusion of Buddhist philosophy from professional philosophy by purportedly demonstrating that Buddhist philosophy is not and should not be counted as philosophy. I designate these arguments as:

1. The Historicist Argument, according to which philosophy has historically been practiced in the West, and therefore is a Western phenomenon (or, more strongly, a Western phenomenon alone);

2. The Terminological Argument, according to which since there is no (exactly) equivalent term for 'philosophy' in Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, etc., therefore there is no such thing as philosophy practiced in any of these language communities;

3. The Argument Argument, according to which philosophy is an activity defined by the use of argument for or against a given claim, and only Western philosophy deploys arguments in support of its conclusions; and

4. The Religion Argument, according to which philosophy as Westerners understand and practice it is not religion, whereas what some call non-Western 'philosophies' are in fact inveterately religious thought-traditions.

Having debunked these arguments, in the final portion of my paper I present a case study of the methodological innovations to be gained by incorporating Buddhist perspectives into contemporary philosophical work. This centres upon philosophy of religion and attempts to reconceive the field through the diverse philosophical prisms of the Buddhist tradition. I thus theorize what forms a philosophy of religion structured according to Buddhist paradigms might take, address various theoretical and methodological considerations, and survey a range of candidate schemas under diverse rubrics.

The over-arching goal of my paper is to draw on Buddhist philosophical methods and models to, in the words of the conference call, "enrich our understanding of contemporary philosophical inquiry and inspire new avenues of research."

Open-mindedness and the Appeal to Ignorance

Danilo Šuster
University of Maribor

Absent evidence reasoning is sometimes described as an informal fallacy (appeal to ignorance) which is not always fallacious. We start with a negative epistemic claim (lack of evidence for p) which opens the space of epistemic possibilities (for all we know it might be the case that ...) and conclude with a positive epistemic claim in favor of non-p. Certain combinations of premises and conclusions are obviously fallacious: a weak premise (no ultimate proof that p) cannot establish a strong conclusion (knowledge, justification that non-p). The usual reconstruction of the scheme as a modus tollens with the insertion of the conditional (if p were true, we would find evidence for p) is a useful heuristic but not a decisive criterion. D. Walton introduces the notion of presumptive reasoning, but how to understand the insertion of plausibilistic conditionals? I suggest approaching these questions from the perspective of modern virtue epistemology and exploring its potential to address the real-world complexities of lack of evidence reasoning. Instead of unrealistic textbook examples, I focus on an initially reasonable pattern (Adler 2002): “There is no decisive proof that not-p. It is possible that p is true. Therefore, we should keep an open mind as regards p.” When is open-mindedness inappropriate? In two cases: when our epistemic position on an issue is so good that abstaining from judgement is not an appropriate stance. And when our epistemic position on an issue is so bad that inquiry is not a viable option. The schema has fallacious instances when we start with ignorance (in the normative senses: not being aware of facts and evidence one should be aware of), derive weak epistemic possibility (bare compatibility with the knowledge base), and conclude with mere openness. It is more difficult to untangle the conceptual net of acceptable inferences. A simple suggestion: “Ignorance about p which is not vicious allows for strong epistemic possibility (there is some positive evidence for the truth of p), which then entails suspension of judgment, allows for further inquiry and open-mindedness concerning the truth of p.” However, radical skeptical arguments are not fallacious (based on ignorance), but they are not cogent either, the first premise can be rationally refuted. I argue that even a weaker type of possibility, if serious, can justify genuine open-mindedness. The seriousness of an epistemic possibility depends on pragmatic factors of the epistemic situation of the agent (pragmatic encroachment). Suspension of judgment is not always connected with inquiry since some questions are plainly unresolvable. I explore the distinction between suspension (active, goal-oriented) and agnosticism (merely being neutral). Second-order evidence often determines whether ignorance is epistemically vicious and whether deep ignorance justifiably motivates open-mindedness.

Is Extensible Markup Language Perspectivist?

Timothy Tambassi
Ca' Foscari University of Venice

If someone were to argue that Extensible Markup Language [XML] and Formal Ontologies [FOs] have little in common, they would have many strings to their bow. The main one, for my part, is this. XML is, as its name suggests, a markup language – or rather, a metalanguage that allows users to define their own customized markup languages (Attenborough 2003). FOs are neither languages nor metalanguages; they are artifacts specified by ontological languages (Gruber 2009). And XML is not even one of those languages. As for the "little" that XML and FOs have in common, there is one similarity that caught my attention. Both XML and FOs have something to do with partitioning. XML partitions data using elements. FOs partition domains of interest by means of representational primitives. Precisely from the FOs partitioning, the philosophical debate has outlined an epistemological view on FOs, namely perspectivism. For this kind of perspectivism – which does not coincide with perspectivism in the philosophy of science – partitioning a domain means making a mental division between those entities on which we focus and those that fall outside our (domain of) interest. According to this view, such a partitioning provides a perspective on the domain. Moreover, as perspectivism holds, whatever domain we consider, there can in principle be multiple, equally valid and overlapping perspectives on the same domain.

Now, in Tambassi (2023) it has been argued that perspectivism is not just one of the philosophical views that populate the debate on FOs, but an underlying assumption of FOs. In other words, FOs are perspectivist. In this talk I investigate whether the same is true of XML. I begin by defining FOs and presenting the main claims of perspectivism. The idea is not to show the perspectivism of FOs, but rather how these claims apply to FOs. This is also to avoid any overlap with Tambassi (2023). Then I move on to XML, showing both the perspectivism of XML and how the claims (of perspectivism) apply to XML. The argument is based on a parallelism between FOs and XML. More specifically, the facets of perspectivism on FOs that I present in the first part of this talk correspond to the facets of perspectivism on XML that I present in the second part. This is not intended to exhaust the ways in which perspectivism relate to FOs and XLM, nor the debate about FO and XML partitions. The only aim is to clarify whether and how XML is perspectivist. And on the grounds that XML and FOs have little in common, it is not even excluded the chance that perspectivism applies differently to FOs and XML.

The purpose is therefore purely speculative. I believe that discussing whether XML is perspectivist may help to clarify some of the theoretical assumptions of this markup metalanguage. More generally, the idea is that, since the creators of markup (meta)languages develop those languages under the guidance of some theoretical assumptions, for the sake of methodological accuracy those assumptions should be subjected to critical analysis rather than remain implicit and unexamined. The focus on XML is not accidental. First, XML is still widely used, and there are many other markup languages based on XML. This means that this critical analysis is, at least in principle, extendable to other markup languages. Second, XML not only supports the exchange of data, but it is also both human- and machine-readable. In other words,

XML – like FOs – supports communication between humans, between humans and machines, and between machines (Goy and Magro 2015). And while supporting this communication is certainly not the prerogative of XML and FOs alone, we cannot even rule out the possibility that determining whether XML is perspectivist may also shed new light on some of the theoretical assumptions behind such communication.

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Bounded Epistemic Rationality as a Link Between the Normative and the Descriptive

Nastja Tomat
University of Ljubljana

What does it mean to be epistemically rational is one of the core questions of epistemology. Epistemic rationality is a type of rationality aimed at achieving cognitive or epistemic goals, such as true beliefs, knowledge, or understanding. Rationality is often understood as adherence to a selected normative system, for example following the rules of logic, probability theory or decision theory. Epistemology as a normative discipline is primarily concerned with the question of how people should form and update beliefs to be rational, while disciplines such as psychology empirically investigate how belief formation, reasoning, judgement and other processes occur. The question of the relationship between normative and descriptive aspects of reasoning and rationality can be traced back to Hume and "is-ought" fallacy. It seems that empirical, descriptive research on human rationality cannot help us to answer the questions of genuine epistemic normativity. The aim of this paper is to propose an account of bounded epistemic rationality as a hybrid concept that encompasses both normative and descriptive elements, bringing us closer to bridging the gap between "is" and "ought". I argue that epistemic rationality should be understood in a way that is compatible with the concept of bounded rationality proposed by Herbert Simon and ecological rationality studied by Gerd Gigerenzer. Following the work of David Thorstad, I propose several features that should be included in the account of bounded epistemic rationality. Bounded epistemic rationality is directed towards an epistemic goal, such as truth, knowledge, or understanding, but dispenses with the requirement of optimization and requires solutions that are merely good enough. It recognizes that we are limited by our cognitive capacities, the features of the epistemic environment in which we are embedded, and the practical considerations of our daily lives. It is ecological, meaning that it does not aim to define a set of rigid, all-encompassing rules of rationality, but allows for different strategies to be rational

in different contexts. Finally, it focuses not only on the rationality of the final belief, but also on the process of belief formation. Such an account of epistemic rationality is grounded in empirical evidence about human cognition, employs "ought-implies-can" principle of normativity, is applicable to real human cognizers in the world they live in, and can be a good starting point for providing epistemic guidance.

Revisiting Epistemic Coherence from A Posterior-Probability Perspective

Borut Trpin

LMU Munich, University of Maribor, University of Ljubljana

According to a common view, a set of propositions is justified if it is coherent. Similarly, a new proposition should be accepted if it is coherent with the accepted set of beliefs. But what is coherence? And what in turn justifies the above claims? To answer these questions, various Bayesian coherence measures have been proposed. Most of these measures are based on a "static" conceptualization of coherence and use the prior probability distribution in question. In this talk, I criticize this conceptualization and replace it with a "dynamic" one based on the posterior probability distribution. This results in a challenge to a position called "scientific coherentism". I conclude with a discussion of possible answers to this challenge, including results from computer simulations.

Schedule

Friday, October 25 Modra soba (5th floor)
9.00 – 9.15: Registration
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Invited talk
Chair: Borut Trpin
9.15 – 10.30: Jan Sprenger (University of Turin): Semantic Modeling between Empirical Data and Norms of Rationality
10.30–11.00: coffee break
Formal approaches
Chair: Maja Malec
11.00–11.45: Olga Markič (University of Ljubljana): The Roles of Philosophers in Interdisciplinary Research
11.45–12.30: Timothy Tambassi (Ca' Foscari University of Venice): Is Extensible Markup Language Perspectivist?
12.30 – 14.00: lunch break
Ethics
Chair: Olga Markič
14.00 –14.45: Thomas Engeland (University of Bonn): What Would Methodological Naturalism in Ethics Be?
14.45 –15.30: Paweł Polak and Roman Krzanowski (Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow): Ethics in Silico: Computer Modeling of Ethical Concepts in Autonomous AI Systems
15.30–16.00: coffee break
Philosophical traditions
Chair: Martin Justin
16:00 – 16.45: Michal Hladky (University of Geneva): End of Logical Positivism? #toosoon
16:45 – 17.30: Rafal K. Stepien (Austrian Academy of Sciences): The Absent Elephant: Non-Western Methods in Contemporary Philosophy
19.00: conference dinner (Hiša Pod Gradom)

Saturday, October 26 Room 434 (4th floor)

Computational methods

Chair: Nastja Tomat

9.00 – 9.45: Borut Trpin (LMU Munich, University of Maribor, University of Ljubljana): Revisiting Epistemic Coherence from A Posterior-Probability Perspective

9.45 – 10.30: Martin Justin (University of Maribor): The Value of Social Coherence in Science: An Agent-Based-Modelling Exploration

10.30–10.45: coffee break

Empirical methods

Chair: Borut Trpin

10.45–11.30: Raimund Pils (University of Salzburg): Integrating Empirical Research and Philosophical Theorizing on the Scientific Realism Debate for Science Reporting

11.30–12.15: Juan De Jager (University of Ljubljana): Making Porosity More Porous: An Open Call for Brainstorming After Tanya Luhrmann's Recent Findings

12.15 – 13.45: lunch break

Reasoning

Chair: Olga Markič

13.45 – 14:30: Danilo Šuster (University of Maribor): Open-mindedness and the Appeal to Ignorance

14.30 – 15.15: Nastja Tomat (University of Ljubljana): Bounded Epistemic Rationality as a Link Between the Normative and the Descriptive

15.15 – 15.30: coffee break

Invited talk

Chair: Martin Justin

15.30 – 16:45: Dunja Šešelja (RUB Bochum): When Expert Judgment Fails: Epistemic Trespassing and Risks to Collective Inquiry

Organizers

- Olga Markič (University of Ljubljana)
- Maja Malec (University of Ljubljana)
- Nastja Tomat (University of Ljubljana)
- Martin Justin (University of Maribor)
- Borut Trpin (LMU Munich, University of Maribor, University of Ljubljana)

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