

Two Pillars of Truth:
Celebrating Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten's
60th birthdays

Contents

Abstracts	1
The Difference Semantics for Conditionals (<i>Hannes Leitgeb</i>)	1
What is grounded abstraction? (<i>Øystein Linnebo</i>)	1
The more infinite, the merrier (<i>Sylvia Wenmackers</i>)	2
Confessions of a Post-Truth Theorist (<i>Graham Leigh</i>)	2
Disquotation & Reasoning (<i>Johannes Stern</i>)	2
Nonclassical truth and determinateness (<i>Luca Castaldo</i>)	2
Truth classes via approximations (<i>Cezary Cieśliński</i>)	2
Probability filters and infinitesimals (<i>Catrin Campbell-Moore</i>)	3
Implicit Commitments and Epistemic Stability: Some Recent Develop- ments (<i>Matteo Zicchetti</i>)	3
Discovering Sources of Crowd Wisdom via Symbolic Search (<i>Igor Douven</i>)	3
A path from formal truth to predicativity (<i>Andrea Cantini</i>)	4
The Inner Life of Gödel Numberings (<i>Albert Visser</i>)	4
Open-Endedness and Rule-Following (<i>Xinhe Wu</i>)	4
Can a higher-order definition of truth justify an axiomatic theory of truth? (<i>Thomas Schindler</i>)	5
Revisiting Computational Structuralism (<i>Balthasar Grabmayr</i>)	5
Partial reflection is complete reflection (<i>Sam Roberts</i>)	5
Herbrand and completeness (<i>Marianna Antonutti Marfori</i>)	5
Urelemente Wrangling (<i>Philip Welch</i>)	6
Sponsors	7
Author Index	9

Abstracts

The Difference Semantics for Conditionals

26/03/2026
10.00-10.40

Hannes Leitgeb

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

After a couple of brief personal remarks, I will present a new semantics for conditionals according to which “if A then B” is true at a world w just in case (i) the corresponding Stalnaker-Lewis conditional is true at w , and (ii) the antecedent A makes a difference to the consequent B at w . The novelty of the semantics consists in the analysis of (ii), which is made precise as: the distance between the closest B-worlds and the closest non-B-worlds is smaller (at w) than the distance between the closest A&B-worlds and the closest A&non-B-worlds. I will explain how the required ordering of distances between worlds is captured in non-numerical terms, what the logic is like that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics, what a probabilistic version of the semantics looks like, and why the system is to be preferred over other recent semantics and logics of conditionals that analyse (ii) above differently. (This is joint work with Hans Rott.)

What is grounded abstraction?

26/03/2026
11.00-11.40

Øystein Linnebo

University of Oslo

In the period 2007-10, Horsten, Leitgeb and I were colleagues in Bristol. We were *very* excited about the idea of grounded abstraction. Horsten and Leitgeb (2009) outline a program for how to develop this idea; Horsten and Linnebo (2016) follow up. The program combines some semi-Aristotelian ideas with ideas from Kripke’s seminal work on truth. My talk will revisit those heady days with the wisdom of hindsight. In essence, I will argue that, while it was certainly good methodology to bring the semi-Aristotelian and Kripkean ideas to the debate about abstraction, the former proved more successful than the latter.

26/03/2026
11.40-12.20

The more infinite, the merrier

Sylvia Wenmackers
KU Leuven

On fair infinite lotteries: how it started and where it's going.

26/03/2026
13.30-13.55

Confessions of a Post-Truth Theorist

Graham Leigh
University of Gothenburg

26/03/2026
13.55-14.20

Disquotation & Reasoning

Johannes Stern
University of Bristol

We discuss the tension between ordinary reasoning and certain understandings of disquotation.

26/03/2026
14.20-14.45

Nonclassical truth and determinateness

Luca Castaldo
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Recently, determinateness-like predicates have been axiomatized alongside type-free truth. Field (2022) extends a nonclassical theory of truth with *strong classicality*, while Fujimoto & Halbach (2024) add *determinateness* to a classical theory of 'thoroughly classical truth'. The talk presents a third approach: an axiomatization of determinateness over a classical theory of nonclassical truth. The theory is shown to have a natural fixed-point semantics and to be proof-theoretically stronger than its extant alternatives.

26/03/2026
14.55-15.35

Truth classes via approximations

Cezary Cieśliński
University of Warsaw

The objective is to present a construction of a truth class for the language of first-order arithmetic. In the construction, the notion of a proof approximation will be crucially used. The technique of approximations will be developed as a part of proof theory.

Probability filters and infinitesimals

Catrin Campbell-Moore
University of Bristol

26/03/2026
15.55-16.20

Implicit Commitments and Epistemic Stability: Some Recent Developments

Matteo Zicchetti
University of Warsaw

26/03/2026
16.20-16.45

The Implicit Commitments Thesis (ICT) states that in rationally accepting a formal theory S , one is implicitly committed to accepting additional statements, such as S 's consistency. ICT captures the intuition that agents accepting S whilst failing to acknowledge S 's consistency are, to some extent, epistemically at fault.

However, ICT seems to be in conflict with another natural intuition: That for some theory S (completely) capturing some informal (mathematical) subject matter or type of reasoning, there is a coherent rationale to accept S without any further implicit commitments. Such a theory S is called epistemically stable. Dean (2015) argued that ICT should be rejected because it clashes with *epistemic stability* since, as he argues, some theories are clearly epistemically stable. In this talk, I discuss the issue of the purported tension between ICT and epistemic stability. I explain why the cases discussed in the literature are not counter-examples to ICT, and present an argument to support ICT for the acceptability of consistency. I conclude with some clarifications and future questions.

This is based on the article 'Implicit Commitments, Epistemic Stability, and the Acceptability of Consistency' (with Maciej Głowacki), *Erkenntnis*, 2025, online first, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-025-00985-x>.

Discovering Sources of Crowd Wisdom via Symbolic Search

Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

26/03/2026
16.45-17.25

Douven, Kriegeskorte, and Stinson (2026) found that neural networks can aggregate probability judgments from crowds with great accuracy, outperforming classical methods and even the best individual forecasters. The question of what these networks learn was left open in that paper. Using a form of symbolic search (symbolic regression), we answer this question by showing that the peak performance of neural aggregators is achieved by selecting a small subset of individuals and combining their judgments through complex functions, and not by discovering general principles of aggregation. As a result, networks trained on one group of forecasters perform worse than simple averaging when applied to a different group. Using a different form of symbolic search (symbolic optimization), we find new aggregators – dispersion-adaptive means – which are sensitive to the statistical structure of disagreement

rather than to participant identity. Although these new aggregators are somewhat less accurate than the neural aggregators, they outperform all classical aggregation methods while also generalizing perfectly. Our findings suggest that there are at least two distinct sources of crowd wisdom: one – exploited by neural networks – which focuses on *who* is in the crowd, and one – exploited by structure-based methods – which focuses on *how* the crowd disagrees. Which source to tap depends on context, such as whether one’s participant pool is stable or rotating. This is joint work with Nikolaus Kriegeskorte.

27/03/2026
10.00-10.40

A path from formal truth to predicativity

Andrea Cantini
University of Florence

This paper briefly surveys some of Weyl’s ideas about logic, infinity, and the epistemology and ontology of mathematics. More specifically, it discusses some connections between formal theories of truth and predicativist ideas, arising from Weyl’s *Das Kontinuum*, but also connected with Weyl’s original writings (especially on the philosophical side). In a nutshell, it sketches ideas for formalizing a Weylian theory “in truth-theoretic mood”. The truth-theoretic approach might offer a possible nominalistic reinterpretation of the power set operation.

27/03/2026
11.00-11.40

The Inner Life of Gödel Numberings

Albert Visser

Gödel numberings associate numbers to syntactical objects. We have also Interpretations of a designated syntax theory in an arithmetical theory. These two notions do not automatically match. Not all Gödel numberings give rise to such an interpretation, and not all such interpretations deliver (precisely) a Gödel numbering. Moreover, different interpretations may deliver the same external Gödel numbering. Rather than give a systematic account of these issues, we will provide a freewheeling discussion and have a brief look at some examples.

27/03/2026
11.40-12.05

Open-Endedness and Rule-Following

Xinhe Wu
London School of Economics and Political Science

Can a higher-order definition of truth justify an axiomatic theory of truth?

27/03/2026
12.05-12.30

Thomas Schindler
University of Amsterdam

In a series of interesting papers, Ian Rumfitt has argued that one can derive the axioms of PKF from a Strawsonian definition of truth (using propositional quantifiers). This derivation is taken to provide a justification of PKF. In this work-in-progress talk, we 1) present Rumfitt's project, 2) show that there is a technical problem with Rumfitt's definition and suggest one way to fix it, and 3) offer a (preliminary) evaluation of the claim that the derivation provides a justification of PKF.

Revisiting Computational Structuralism

27/03/2026
13.40-14.05

Balthasar Grabmayr
Tübingen University

Partial reflection is complete reflection

27/03/2026
14.05-14.30

Sam Roberts
University of Wisconsin–Madison

The orthodoxy is that (consistent) partial set-theoretic reflection principles are in general significantly weaker than their complete counterparts. In this talk, I will argue that, understood in the right way, this is mistaken. Partial and complete reflection principles are equivalent.

Herbrand and completeness

27/03/2026
14.30-14.55

Marianna Antonutti Marfori
Institut d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques

Bernays once remarked that Herbrand's theorem is "the central theorem of predicate logic". The theorem provides a kind of reduction of first-order logic to propositional logic. The result prefigures many subsequent developments in mathematical logic, establishing the equivalence of provability in a formal system with satisfiability in a particular type of finitary semantics. In this talk I will examine the connection between Herbrand's theorem and Gödel's completeness theorem for first-order logic, and assess whether Herbrand can really be said to have proved the completeness theorem. In doing so I will highlight the crucial role played by Herbrand's finitism in his development of metamathematics.

27/03/2026
15.15-15.55

Urelemente Wrangling

Philip Welch

How to deal with them

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Author Index

Antonutti Marfori
Marianna, 5

Campbell-Moore
Catrin, 3

Cantini
Andrea, 4

Castaldo
Luca, 2

Cieśliński
Cezary, 2

Douven
Igor, 3

Grabmayr
Balthasar, 5

Leigh
Graham, 2

Leitgeb
Hannes, 1

Linnebo

Øystein, 1

Roberts
Sam, 5

Schindler
Thomas, 5

Stern
Johannes, 2

Visser
Albert, 4

Welch
Philip, 6

Wenmackers
Sylvia, 2

Wu
Xinhe, 4

Zicchetti
Matteo, 3