Elizabeth Ashford: Responsibility for structural human rights violations

Although the right to subsistence has been widely ratified, the persistence of severe poverty (understood as lacking the means of subsistence) is not generally classified as a human rights violation. I argue that the interactional and institutional accounts of responsibility for human rights violations do not fit the nature of the complex causal chains that result in persons’ being deprived of the means of subsistence. I explore ways in which it could be understood as a structural human rights violation, responsibility for which is shared by the international community.

Gunnar Björnsson: Further reflections on essentially shared moral obligations

In previous work, I have argued that the ordinary notion of obligation applies straightforwardly to some groups of agents, independently of individual member obligations, and independently of whether the group itself constitutes an agent. The distinction between such shared obligations and individual obligations arises because moral obligations (of the sort that interests me) are a matter of what follows from the assumption that the putative obligation bearer cares appropriately about what is morally important. In cases where some members do not in fact care, what follows from one individual’s appropriate caring will often be different from what follows from all members’ appropriate caring. In this talk, I further explore the differences and similarities of individual and shared obligations, comparing demands of moral concern directed at single individuals and demands directed at groups, and comparing the ways in which such demands ensure action on part of individuals and groups.

Bengt Brülde: Shared responsibility for unstructured collective harms

Many of the harms that befall sentient beings can be regarded as “unstructured” collective harms. The existence of these harms gives rise to several questions about moral responsibility, e.g. how we should determine what actors (individual or collective) that are jointly responsible for a certain collective harm, how responsibility should be distributed between these actors, and what they ought to do.

In response to the first question, it is typically argued that an agent is in part responsible for a collective harm if she contributes to the bad outcome (e.g. by way of some harmful system), at least if her contribution is voluntary and the harm foreseeable. This is a plausible view, but it is not clear e.g. what actions should count as contributions, and how exactly the avoidability and epistemic conditions should be formulated. My purpose is to make the standard view more precise by answering these questions, but also to argue that we need a notion of moral taint to deal with the some of cases where the traditional conditions of responsibility are not satisfied, e.g. where our contributions are “unavoidable”. I also ask what duties an agent might have in virtue of being responsible or tainted.

Stephanie Collins and Holly Lawford-Smith: Are the Citizens of a Democratic State a Collective Agent?

If the citizenry of a democratic state is a collective agent, then each citizen partly authors the actions of the collective agent (and, thereby, is partly responsible for those actions). If it’s not, they might not be. The aim of this paper is to give the fullest possible articulation of the considerations in support of, and against, a positive answer to the title question, and leave it to the reader to decide which bullets they're happy to bite. We group these considerations under four central headings: control (including joint control and several difference-making), voluntariness, influence (including scope, directness, robustness), and unity (including equality and shared purpose). We work through each of the four central considerations in turn, explaining how they work in favour of or against the idea that the citizenry of a democratic state is a
collective agent. We discuss the relative weight of each of these four considerations in determining an answer to the title question.

Anton Eriksson: Consumers as Beneficiaries of Climate Change
When production companies manufacture certain products, they emit large amounts of greenhouse gases, thus contributing to harmful climate change. In so doing, they seem to be morally at fault. The role of consumers, however, should not be diminished—in making their purchases, they place demands on companies to manufacture the products in the first place. We might therefore reasonably ask how responsibility ought to be divided among producers and consumers. I'm going to focus on whether consumers can be implicated in the climatic harms that result from the production of goods they purchase. I will argue that there are moral obligations not to buy certain products because we thereby benefit from the harms of climate change. Specifically, I will make the case that we have a negative duty to refrain from making those purchases that make us better off than we would have been, had there been an effective climate agreement in place.

Johannes Himmelreich: Responsibility Grounded: What are the causal foundations?
Moral responsibility is, in part, grounded in causation. Agents can be responsible not only for what they do but also for the causal consequences of their actions. Yet, agents are not responsible for all causal consequences of their actions. The causal consequences of an action may extend almost indefinitely, which raises a question of demarcation about responsibility’s reach: Which causal consequences are agents responsible for and why? Questions about the causal ground of moral responsibility are central for understanding responsibility in the contexts of collective actions, complex systems, and artificial intelligence. In this paper, I argue that some of the answers that have been given to the demarcation question provide insufficient foundations for moral responsibility. Instead of grounding responsibility, they leave responsibility grounded. In particular, I present problems for those answers to the demarcation question that attempt to determine the reach of an agent’s responsibility with an eye to how the causal consequences are produced. In contrast, alternative theories that attempt to determine the reach of an agent’s responsibility by relying on counterfactual considerations seem more promising.

Avia Pasternak: Testing Intentional citizenship
This chapter is part of a larger research project, where I develop an account of collective responsibility in the state that is grounded in citizens’ participatory intentions. In this chapter I develop an account of ‘intentional citizenship’ and examine its Applicability to real world citizens. Part 1 of the paper develops a theoretical model of collective action in the state. Using Christopher Kutz’s model of participatory intentions, I argue that citizens of a state are the inclusive authors of its policies, as long as they view themselves as acting within the state, complying with the roles it assigns to them. Part 2 examines the applicability of the theoretical model to contemporary states. It analyzes various global attitude surveys that look into people’s perceptions of their social and national identity. These surveys lead to the conclusion that in many states, most citizens’ perceptions of themselves are compatible with the proposed model. The surveys also help to identify the type of groups to which the model is less applicable: national minorities with strong secessionist aspirations, and groups that are subject to state injustice.

Björn Petersson: Group Guilt and Complicity
Christopher Kutz refutes the idea that a collective as such can be guilty of wrongdoing, for the reason that collectives cannot respond affectively to blame and moral sanctions in the appropriate way. I discuss and
reject two possible responses to this refutation—Deborah Tollefsen’s Strawsonian defence of our holding collectives responsible for wrongdoing, and Margaret Gilbert’s theory of collective guilt feelings. I suggest that an essential function of blaming collectives is to evoke collectively tainted guilt feelings in individual group members. If this is the case, criteria for complicitous accountability become central. I defend a robust notion of co-responsibility in terms of causal involvement and intent against some common objections.

Felix Pinkert: When are collective obligations too demanding?

Simple consequentialist ethical theories are prone to making implausibly high demands on individuals to do all they possibly can about large-scale problems like climate change and global poverty and injustice. A common diagnosis of and response to this problem is to point out that fixing such large-scale and structural problems is not the duty of individuals, who would be hopelessly overburdened, but instead is the collective obligation of states or countries. This response gains further plausibility from the fact that in international negotiations, and in political activism, it is typically states that are addressed as the bearers of collective obligations. But while it is intuitive to hold that, due to their larger capacities, making moral demands of states is less prone to being overly demanding, it has so far not been clarified what appropriate demandingness of collective obligations amounts to. In this paper, I argue that ultimately, we can only answer whether an ethical demand made on a state is too demanding by investigating the practical and ethical implications of this demand on the state's citizens. We then find that some ethical demands turn out as overly demanding when they are addressed at unjust states that are likely to disproportionately burden their worst-off citizens with any cost incurred by the state's actions. Hence contrary to initial appearances, simply shifting consequentialist reasoning from individuals to states is not robust response to the demandingness objection.

Bill Wringe: Skepticism About A Human Right to Health: Do Global Obligations Offer A Way Out?

The existence of a possible 'human right to health' has been at the centre of a number of recent debates about health and global justice. In recent work, Gopal Sreenivasan has expressed particular skepticism about the existence of such a right. He argues that both considerations about the nature of rights and consideration about the nature of health give grounds for such skepticism. I shall also argue that some of the considerations that Sreenivasan raises about the nature of health simply fail to address what is at issue in debates about a human right to health. Others depend the assumption that if there is a human right to health there must be a correlative duty-bearer, namely the state. But by deploying a line of argument I have developed elsewhere I argue that we can find an alternative correlative duty bearer: namely, the collective consisting of everyone. The existence of such a correlative duty bearer undermines those of Sreenivasan's arguments which are based on the nature of rights. More interestingly, they also show that and how the arguments which he puts forward based on the nature of health which really are germane to the question of whether there is a right to health go wrong.