



## Special Issue

### Meta-Philosophy of Science

*Guest Editor:*

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#### **Message from the Guest Editor**

Dear Colleagues,

How should we conceive of science as an historical entity over time? Is it a cumulative, progressive process, as various forms of scientific realism might suggest? Does it display cyclic developmental patterns with radical discontinuities, as Kuhn famously argued? Is it just one thing after another subject to historical contingency and perhaps methodological anarchy, as Feyerabend appears to have advocated? What categories are proper and adequate to describe its development? Or is the very idea of theoretical history of science misguided to begin with?

Is theory change continuous or discontinuous, or does it depend on the level of resolution? Are there micro-patterns and macro-patterns? Should particular phases in the history of science traditionally regarded as paradigmatic or revolutionary be reevaluated and reclassified? Can resources from evolutionary biology be tapped to explain scientific development or change?

Prof. Dr. Robert Rynasiewicz  
*Guest Editor*

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