**Republican Independence as Equality and Virtue**

**Part 1: Internal Diversity**

 **I**

One way to capture the differences between the republican and liberal approaches is by considering the central imagery associated with each.[[1]](#footnote-1) A recognisably liberal model might be captured in the ideal of the initially free individual who contracts with others to form the state which derives its on-going legitimacy from the consent of those it governs. Republicans start with the ideal of the citizen as a freeman of a free state that is required to govern in the acknowledged common good. It is not consent that is fundamental here but a particular power relationship understood through the model of the master and the slave. Each of these images is underpinned by its own understanding of freedom, and it is this, as a many commentators have observed, that generates certain differences between the two theories. Freedom of the first kind is understood as the absence of non-interference by others without one’s consent. Freedom of the second represents an absence of a relationship of domination by (or dependence on) others. In the first case, individuals are free where they do not experience any unwanted interference. In the second, individuals are free where their status protects them against being arbitrarily coerced. This status is conferred by membership in a political community that is itself free in the same sense, namely that it is protected against arbitrary interference. An important difference between these two approaches, then, is that whereas the liberal conception of freedom focuses on the individual and builds towards the state and communal life, the republican conception works from both directions, simultaneously building outwards from the individual and inwards from the community.

The dual republican focus is evident in the notion of ‘arbitrariness’ that is central to its definition of freedom. What is considered arbitrary is determined by the citizens collectively and will vary between particular populations. It will represent the people’s considered idea of what is in the common good where this must reflect everybody’s shared interests. Where coercion can be justified against this standard, it is non-arbitrary and, therefore, no threat to freedom. However it is eventually understood, the accepted definition of arbitrariness must be both subjectively justifiable to each citizen and objectively determinate enough to serve as a criterion for law-making and government (a philosophically demanding task, to say the least). On this account, individuals will be considered free where they are governed by a law that is (1) sovereign and cannot be bypassed which (2) treats all those in its power alike subject to the condition (3) that it acts always in the common good. The first condition protects the state itself from powerful individuals or factional groups within its borders from threatening to circumvent or usurp its position. This protection is granted only insofar as the state does not in turn threaten the citizens and is secured by the second two conditions.

In reflecting both individual and collective perspectives, republican freedom is able to embody within a single but complex ideal several other political concepts that remain distinct on a non-interference account. Freedom entails inclusion in and membership of a body of citizens who are of equal standing and are governed by the rule of law and public reason. Inclusion secures protection but also carries obligations of reasonableness (or virtue). Exclusion in this case means to be subject to the coercive and intrusive power of the community or its members but without being counted as one of them, thereby lacking a voice, an input and the relevant protection. Historically, this was equated with slavery, a normatively powerful term. Significantly, slaves in having no protection cannot be expected to exhibit the restraint and virtue of citizens, making them potentially very dangerous. Traditionally, each of these parts of freedom has been regarded as essential to freedom such that the absence of any one is said to have a ‘corrupting’ effect undermining the freedom not only of the individual but also of the state, since these are related. The implication of this is that freedom for republicans is not only underpinned by a concern for individuals but also by the self-interested motivation of security for the whole body of citizens.

The structure of republican freedom has implication for the policies it can adopt both within the state towards its citizens and residents and externally towards potential migrants and the citizens of other states. Since republican freedom is understood in relation to arbitrary power, its central question concerns how this is to be defined in manner that is not itself arbitrary. The key, I shall argue, is to be found in the relationship between equality and virtue embodied within republican independence. Where either of these values is not maintained, the result is a potentially serious instability. In this draft I confine myself to the internal relations between citizens and state, focussing on the question of social and cultural pluralism within the political community. (A separate paper follows addressing the matter of external relations and border control.)

Several impressive and useful full-scale contemporary articulations of republicanism have been developed. The most influential by far is Philip Pettit’s model structured around his notion of freedom as non-domination (1997), although more recent varieties by Laborde (2008) and Lovett (2010) are also widely discussed.[[2]](#footnote-2) Pettit defines freedom in strictly negative and non-normative terms as a function of the choices an individual is in a position to make. I have argued elsewhere that his republican theory does not include a number of the features I have just outlined (Coffee 2013b). Although instantiated in a social context, freedom as non-domination is primarily an individual ideal in which the ideas of membership and inclusion are secondary, following from the manner in which a person’s relevant interests are respected and tracked. Virtue, where it appears at all, is not a part of freedom but a separate, if instrumentally useful ideal. While Pettit has his critics, his approach casts a long shadow over contemporary republican theory. For this reason, I base my analysis on a historical approach grounded in the late eighteenth century Commonwealthman tradition, although I will make appropriate adjustments to show it is current relevance. These ideas are prominent in the writings of Richard Price, Joseph Priestley and James Burgh amongst many others. I shall, however, draw most heavily on Mary Wollstonecraft. Although she is most often associated with early feminist thought, she is a powerful republican writer in her own rights, and I shall adapt her arguments about the power of social domination to the issue of securing independence for all in culturally diverse populations.[[3]](#footnote-3)

**II**

Historically, the term ‘freedom’ has been used interchangeably with ‘independence’. To be independent was to be capable of acting, and authorised to do so, in one’s own right without depending on the will or favour of any other person. Two parts to independence were identified, reflecting the two republican perspectives. The first concerns the individual’s capacity to act in a self-directed manner, while the second addresses the terms upon which independent agents interact with others. Both were considered necessary for freedom. To be capable of acting a person needed ‘independence of mind’. This was the capacity to reflect on one’s actions and beliefs for oneself rather than simply following the opinions and values of others. It is not enough to be able to make one’s own decisions, of course, unless one is also able to act upon those decisions. One must, therefore, be recognised as having this capacity by others and have the appropriate legal rights and protections that prevent others from inhibiting one’s actions.[[4]](#footnote-4) Each of these twin components to independence was associated with a separate value. To have independence of mind was to display virtue, while political independence required an equality of standing and protection. The absence of either of these was said to create dependence.

Equality, in this context, indicates an equal protection against dependence. Each person must have sufficient control over certain relevant resources to preserve their independence, whether this is in the form of rights, education, wealth, influence or social standing. The aim is not distributive justice in sharing out society’s common resources fairly (although the citizens may themselves agree to do this, there is no requirement to do so on republican principles). The state does, however, have a strict duty to prevent any citizen coming to depend on the arbitrary will of another. Everyone must receive adequate protection appropriate to the different ways in which they vulnerable through measures such as employment rights, income support, housing benefits, medical services, disability allowances, legal advice and childcare provision. Although this does not necessarily entail the levelling of resources across society, republican logic is away from large disparities towards more even distributions since the state’s mandate is to prevent the accumulation of any form of power – media influence, political access, financial capital, market share – that might threaten people’s independence.

Inequality leads to dependence, for where we lack any basic protections we are exposed to the power of others which may be used arbitrarily. Furthermore, it is an unfortunate feature of dependence that has the tendency to spread from one area of our lives to others so that we end up being completely controlled. Wollstonecraft often notes, for example, how their lack of a legal standing of their own placed women under the control of their husbands or fathers. Legal and political equality, she adds, would be of little advantage to women if they were also financial dependent on men for their basic needs. Economic rights, in turn, would not be effective unless women had an equal access to education and social opportunity. Until women were equal with men in all areas of communal life, she concludes, any vulnerability would risk undercutting their other protections leaving them still dependent (Coffee 2013a). A similar observation is made by Frederick Douglass in the face of intense opposition to the granting of full civil rights to black Americans proposed in the *Civil Rights Act* of 1875. Although struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the act had required that all citizens, regardless of race or colour, be entitled to full and equal access to public accommodations and facilities, including accommodation, recreation and transport. Anything less, Douglass argued, would leave black citizens exposed to the power of whites who had greater legal protection (*LBLOL*).

As inequality creates dependence, so dependence corrupts virtue. The phrase ‘to corrupt virtue’ has an archaic ring to it that seems, perhaps, to belong to the eighteenth century rather than contemporary political discourse. Possibly for this reason, the idea does not feature in the most prominent neo-republican accounts, such as those by Pettit, Lovett or Laborde, other than in a general way derived from the traditional observation that ‘power corrupts’.[[5]](#footnote-5) By ‘virtue’, however, I do not have in mind a moralised concept of ideal behaviour that is to be encouraged as part of the good life but a very specific concept. As I use it, virtue refers only to the employment of public reason in the appropriate deliberative contexts in which issues relating to arbitrary power and the common good are decided. I do not offer a precise definition of ‘public reason’ which has been the subject of intense scrutiny for several years.[[6]](#footnote-6) For my purposes, Pettit’s formulation will suffice, where he refers to discussion conducted using “cooperatively-admissible considerations” being considerations “that anyone in discourse with others about what they should jointly or collectively provide can adduce without embarrassment as relevant matters to take into account” (2001, 156, following Habermas 1984). Dependence ‘corrupts’ virtue not by tarnishing people’s moral character, but by impeding this particular capacity.

I shall argue that virtue is constitutive of republican freedom rather than merely being instrumentally helpful in bringing freedom about (see Pettit 1997, chapters 7-8; Laborde and Maynor 2008, chapter 1). It is only collective virtue that is necessary for freedom, in the sense of a functioning institutional system that is governed by a genuinely inclusive and non-arbitrary public reason. Nevertheless, although non-virtuous individuals can, in principle, be free, the republican position is that dependence, wherever it is found, has a corrosive effect that spreads from the individual parties directly involved in unequal relationships that threatens to undermine the operation of public reason across the political community. Although republicans have always employed the idea of ‘virtue’ with reference to upholding the common good and maintaining the institutions that preserve the citizens’ freedom, what this entails has been understood in a variety of ways.[[7]](#footnote-7) In defining it as the use of public reason, I distinguish this use from an alternative conception of virtue as behaviour that conforms to a network of public-spirited norms that support the laws and institutions of the republic (Pettit 1997, 245). This behaviour is not part of freedom or independence itself, but it is instrumentally valuable for its preservation. Although my focus is on virtue as reason, both senses play an important role in republican theory since institutions of any society will only be as effective as its people make them. For clarity, I shall refer to the instrumentally valuable patterns of behaviour as ‘civic virtue’. Dependence, as we shall see impedes both sorts of virtue with potentially threatening implications for the collective freedom.

The historical justification underpinning my approach is drawn from Wollstonecraft for whom virtue means to be guided by reason rather than by passion or unreflective opinion.[[8]](#footnote-8) “The right use of reason alone”, she says, “makes us independent of everything” where this represents “perfect freedom” (1992, 230). Some of Wollstonecraft’s own arguments are grounded in an eighteenth-century, or Enlightenment, rationale that has little resonance in contemporary discourse. Individuals, she held, are only free where they are guided by reason. People’s passions, emotions and subjective inclinations originated outside of their ‘true’ or rational selves, and to follow these rather than reason is to be led by an external power.[[9]](#footnote-9) This framework is not necessary for my argument and I make no use of it. However, in the opening chapter of her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, Wollstonecraft identifies the breakdown in men’s ability to argue rationally and impartially as the root cause of women’s subjection and lack of freedom. The common good can only be identified through the combined efforts of citizens, deliberating rationally and sharing their knowledge. Together, they devise and “direct the laws which bind society” (91). Reasoned argument represents the last line of defence against domination, oppression or dependence is the use of reasoned argument through which the arbitrary use of power can be exposed and challenged. I start from this position.

Dependence corrupts both virtue and civic virtue. Traditionally, two separate causes have been identified, concerning the structure of motivation implicit in dependent relationships, and the effect that his has on the habits that are formed as a result. The motivational arguments affect the civic form virtue most directly by weakening individuals’ commitment to show restraint and to act for the common good. As Pettit frequently points out, dependent people are not in control of their lives but are in the power of others. They do not have the luxury to act according to their consciences or to consider what is in the common good. Their concern is, rather, to ensure that their own needs are met by placating those around them in whose power they find themselves (1997, *refs*). Traditionally, this argument was used to exclude those who could not prove their independence from the benefits of citizenship, which was often restricted to only adult, propertied males (Machiavelli, Kant, *refs*). More seriously, however, republicans have long equated dependence with slavery. This was no figure of speech or rhetorical device, but meant literally. Wollstonecraft, for example, does not argue that without rights women are somewhat like slaves, but makes it her central claim that this is precisely what they are no less than their “poor African” counterparts (1992, 262). Although for Pettit dependence, or domination, is not a moralised notion but a factual assessment of a person’s choice-situation (1997, 54-5), it is difficult to escape the powerful normative weight that this term has carried in republican literature.[[10]](#footnote-10)

Slaves, having no rights, have no stake in the society in which they live. The common good is not defined with their or perspectives in mind and they cannot be expected to show restraint or act with civic virtue. If you take away a person’s rights, Wollstonecraft observes, their “duties become null” and so it become vain to “expect virtue from a slave, from a being whom the constitution of civil society has rendered weak, if not vicious?” (1992, 264, 135). Since their right to freedom has been denied, slaves are, in effect, in the state of nature with respect to society, placing them outside the constraints of law and civil norms (1995, 7). This makes them very dangerous. They have no reason to act with restraint and may become resentful and a threat to the security of the community as a whole. Moreover, since slaves are motivated at best by expedience and at worst by vengeance, this has an effect on the rest of the population who must remain ever suspicious and vigilant, looking for signs of discontent or rebellion.[[11]](#footnote-11) The effect this can have on a people once patterns of domination and dependence become entrenched should not be underestimated. In her analysis of the French Revolution, Wollstonecraft identifies as the chief factor in the scale and extent of its ferocity to France’s hierarchical social structure (1995b).

The breakdown of ‘civic virtue’, turning the interaction between dominator and dominated into a tactical game of mutual suspicion, one-upmanship and personal gain has a devastating and corrosive effect on the capacity of the population effectively to govern itself ‘virtuously’ in accordance with public reason (Coffee 2012). Wollstonecraft gives several reasons. First, rather than confronting falsehoods ruthlessly, and examining their own received ideas, individuals in a divided society are easily persuaded by what she calls prejudices – “fond obstinate persuasion[s] for which we can give no reason” (1992, 220) – that support or further their own interests. Over time, certain prejudices become so widely accepted that it minority and dissenting views cannot be heard. Wollstonecraft attributes the whole of women’s long subjection to the social breakdown in the ability to use and listen to reasoned argument. “Deeply rooted prejudices”, she says, “have clouded reason” such that “men, in general, seem to employ their reason to justify [them] rather than to root them out” (92). This process, she believes, is inevitable, for in an unequal and divided society, no group can afford to allow the best reasons to carry the argument if it means losing an opportunity. Public deliberation becomes characterised by rhetoric, emotion and eloquence rather than sound argument. In general, Wollstonecraft believes, it is the dominant groups that have the upper hand. She notes how societies institutions, such as religion, education and politics were dominated by men who use these channels, not to maintain freedom, but to secure their own advantage, citing the enormous influence that respected male writers have in forming opinion about the place of women (103).[[12]](#footnote-12) This process is very difficult to reverse and so she concludes that, once virtue, in the form of public reason, has broken down, its “effects seem to be transmitted to posterity” (181).

**III**

The supreme goal of republican theory is to ensure that every member of the political community is independent. Where the population is socially or culturally diverse, there can be no group whose members, as a class are not independent with respect to the rest of the population. A full account of republican multiculturalism would have to consider a range of important issues.[[13]](#footnote-13) In this paper I am only concerned with the implications of diversity on the imperative to maintain collective equality and virtue. I shall not consider the empirical question of whether, or to what extent, diversity may undermine the unity and cohesion of a people, increasing the risk of instability or factionalism. Neither do I consider the question of group members having a right to their own culture, either normatively or instrumentally as supporting independence (Kymlicka 2001). Although my personal view is that a significant cultural pluralism can be accommodated within a republican framework with a suitable institutional arrangement (see Miller 2008, Habermas 1999) and that having access to a rich cultural context with which one identifies will contribute to individual independence, I do not rely on either claim. I only argue that in protecting and promoting the independence of its citizens, the republican state will be mandated either to support or to override cultural diversity within its borders as required.

The members of all social groups must be able to express and protect their interests if they are not to be dependent for their protection on the goodwill of others. The most basic condition of republican freedom is that people are governed non-arbitrarily by the law which acts only and always in for an inclusive idea of the common good which reflects everybody’s shared interests. What is in the common good is a matter for the citizens themselves to decide collectively and deliberatively. They can only do this using public reason, which is why republican multiculturalism, ultimately, turns on the issue of virtue. A second basic condition of republican freedom, then, is that the public culture must be sufficiently accommodating and inclusive to afford all citizens a voice in settling upon a notion of their common good. This is not to say that the citizens must in fact share a substantive way of life or set of values and references in common. Indeed, I shall argue that cultural homogeneity is itself no indicator of public virtue.

All citizens are required to be independent. The members of some minority groups may wish to participate in mainstream social and political life on fair terms, perhaps retaining their distinctive cultural identity or membership or perhaps merely wishing to avoid being stigmatised or discriminated against. Others may wish to distance themselves from wider society and live on their own terms as a separate group. In each case, however, the republican considerations are the same. No matter from what cultural or other background, all individuals must be able to use reasoned arguments in order to defend their relevant (‘common, avowable’ in Pettit’s phrase) interests against arbitrary power irrespective of whether they intend to do so. A republican government, therefore, has a heavy responsibility to ensure that its institutions are as open as possible to the ideas and perspectives of minority and non-mainstream groups. I shall argue that beyond the formal institutions, the background cultural context, including the set of available norms, values, ideas and traditions that provide the framework of meaning within which all discussions of arbitrary power and the common good are understood, must also be representative of the full range of cultural forms found amongst the population. This places an equally burdensome responsibility on the members of each social group to play their part in creating these background conditions. While those citizens who want to participate in wider society will perhaps welcome this, it should be noted that the condition is not relaxed for members of isolationist groups that do not wish to take an active part in civil society. It is no justification for permitting dependence that the people concerned, individually or as group members, consent to their condition. Contented slaves, after all, are still slaves.

In contrast to those who defend a negative account, I shall claim that there is a positive element to republican freedom that cannot be avoided. Independence is only possible in a virtuous republic in which an inclusive public reason is available through which all sections of the community can protect themselves from domination according to a shared idea of the common good. Furthermore, it is a condition of independence that it is resiliently rather than contingently held. In other words, it is not enough that individuals do not suffer arbitrary interference. To be independent, they must be guaranteed such protection. (In Pettit’s phrase, others must be ‘forced to track their common avowable interests’, 1997, 52-5.) This independence is secured primarily through republican institutions that are required to justify their decisions using the cooperatively admissible considerations that Pettit identifies.[[14]](#footnote-14) At this level, each individual citizen is able to challenge arbitrary power using reasoned argument and so resist domination. To this extent, republican freedom can be thought of in negative terms. Cooperatively-admissible considerations, however, are always applied in a particular social and cultural context. This context contains resources, symbols, concepts and values that are partially shared and mostly taken for granted by the citizens but which give meaning and shape to their arguments. The effect of this background is not neutral but can skew public deliberation in favour of some social groups rather than others. This introduces a second level at which citizens can be dominated. Here, however, the application of cooperatively-admissible considerations alone cannot guarantee independence because those very considerations may themselves be subject to the influence of the background.[[15]](#footnote-15)

Public deliberation, using considerations admissible by all as relevant, can only successfully guarantee individual independence where there is a sufficiently representative and inclusive social background in which everybody’s arguments have a reasonable chance of being heard and understood without prejudice. This requires collective the input of members of all sections of the community. Since no element within the citizenry can be permitted to be dependent because of the corrupting effect this has on public reason, we can conclude that there is a duty to participate in the forging of a new public culture in which everyone is accommodated. This will include a requirement for the members of groups whose ideas about their own interests are tied up with traditions or a cultural framework that is little understood to make their perspectives more widely accessible.

**IV**

Just as the sovereign law that rules over everyone alike, the presence of the background is inescapable. However, in the same way that republican citizens remain free under the pervasive and coercive fact of law by ensuring that its influence is non-arbitrary, so too can the effect of the social background support (or instantiate) independence so long as its effects are non-arbitrary. The law is non-arbitrary where it is required to reflect our interests and perspectives without bias or prejudice. The same standard, then, must apply to the network of ideas and values in the background. This, too, must be required to reflect the interests of all the citizens, impartially.

There is an obvious difference between the law and the social background. Unlike the law, the background is not a defined and identifiable body of codified principles or rules but is, rather, amorphous, intangible and in constant and unpredictable flux. We are not able to control culture in the same way as the law. Nevertheless, it may be possible to create an open an inclusive culture that is receptive to new ideas and aware of the ever-present danger of hidden prejudices by ensuring that citizens from all social groups to have access to the important channels of influence, such as education, the arts, the media, law and politics. This would allow all sections of the population the opportunity to help reshape the way that their interests are presented and understood by others. Over time, and supported by a suitable institutional structure, an inclusive, diverse and representative background can be created and maintained in which virtue, as the effective operation of public reason, can support individual and collective independence. This condition is not only directed at culturally plural settings, but is a requirement of public virtue in any republican society. No matter how culturally homogenous a population may appear to be at a given time, its internal divisions can always become the source of disadvantage, stereotype or prejudice – based for example, on features such as gender, class, wealth, employment, region, sexuality or religion – that enters unnoticed into the deliberative process. Social and cultural change over time is, in any case, inevitable and on-going, as beliefs and attitudes shift in response to events and experiences. What is essential for independence is not what background cultural frames of reference people share so much its openness and flexibility towards new and divergent perspectives.

Virtue is constitutive of republican freedom. The use of public reason is not instrumental to the instantiation of freedom from arbitrary power. The meaning of what is arbitrary is determined with reference to a shared standard of deliberation and to live in a state whose affairs are regulated according to its dictates is integral to the very idea of independence. The duty to promote and maintain the conditions necessary for virtue is a collective one. I have not argued that each individual is required to practice virtue on pain of not being free. At the personal level, it is sufficient that we are able to challenge arbitrary power using the resources available. There is no other positive requirement. Republican freedom is, however, simultaneously an individual and a collective ideal. These two perspectives are causally related to the extent that it is the corrupting effect of individual lack of virtue that undermines collective freedom. To that extent, at least, non-virtuous behaviour by individual citizens is inconsistent with their presumptive interest in being independent. It also cannot be condoned by the collective population insofar as it threatens the freedom of the whole. In this sense, individuals can be said to have a duty to be virtuous. Referring to the two levels of independence identified in the previous section, if individuals wish to be negatively free at the first level (under the law) they must accept that this requires a degree of participation at the second level (against the social background).

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1. Though neither tradition has a precise definition, as they are now identified or understood, republicanism and liberalism represent distinct approaches to political theory. The differences between them, however, are tempered somewhat by the fact that, while republicanism has much older philosophical roots that stretch back to the Roman republic, in the modern period many key political writers, from Locke and Montesquieu to Rousseau and Mill, can very plausibly be said to have both drawn upon and contributed to each school of thought. As a result, republicans and liberals share a range of preoccupations including an emphasis on individual freedom and political equality, the rule of law, public deliberation, democratic accountability and strong constraints on the power of the state. Both traditions also rely on an idea of public reason to regulate and order citizens’ interactions with each other and with the state. Within these broad parameters, however, the respective focuses of republican and liberal theorists do often diverge. For example, while liberals characteristically advocate state neutrality, individual rights and distributive justice, republicans are more likely to be associated with constraining arbitrary power and generating citizen participation according to a model of civic virtue. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See, for example, Bellamy 2007, Honohan 2002, Maynor 2003 and White 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See Coffee 2012 for a full textual justification for Wollstonecraft as a republican and a comparison with Richard Price. There, I set out this interpretation of republican doctrine in full. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Independence of mind and political independence each conform to the same basic structure, namely that a person is subject to a ‘law’ (reason or the law of the land) that is non-arbitrary in the sense of coercing us only in our acknowledged good. In the case of reason, it was axiomatic that it was always in one’s interest to act in accordance with its requirements. For Wollstonecraft, this is grounded in her Protestant faith. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Pettit, for example, notes the long history connecting power and corruptibility, arguing that this adds any further weight to the basic republican principle that power should be constrained, even in the hands of the virtuous, because it always has the potential to be used arbitrarily (1997, 211). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. *Numerous references* [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Livy notes that at the birth of the Roman Republic, the people were not ready for freedom, being little more than a “rabble of vagrants, mostly runaways and refugees” (1960, 105). They had not had time to develop the necessary character traits and patriotic values that would sustain a free state, including respect for the family and a love for the soil”. In his *Discourses on Livy*, Machiavelli develops this calling any action or behaviour that furthers the common good virtuous, no matter whether this might otherwise be considered immoral or underhanded. “One’s country” he says, “should be defended whether it entail ignominy or glory, and... it is good to defend it in any way whatsoever” (1983, 514). Castruccio Castracani is praised for possessing the following characteristics which, he says, embodied *virtù*: “he was kind to his friends, and to his enemies terrible; just towards his subjects, faithless to foreigners; never when he could win by fraud did he attempt to win by force – he used to say that it was the victory itself, not the way in which you had won the victory, which brought you glory” (2003, 33). Castracani’s virtue consisted in his doing whatever it took to defend and further the interests of the republic. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. I give a full account of Wollstonecraft’s conception of virtue and its relation to freedom in Coffee 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. We are free only when we govern ourselves in accordance with a non-arbitrary law that it was always in our best interests to follow. Only reason, which includes moral and religious considerations, could meet condition. Individuals must, moreover, determine for themselves what reason requires, since to follow tradition or received wisdom would be to allow others rather than reason itself to make their decisions (1992, *ref*). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See Skinner 1998 for a historical analysis of the imagery of slavery. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Frederick Douglass describes the attitudes of slaveholders: “knowing what they themselves would do if made the victims of such wrongs, they are looking out for the first signs of the dread retribution of justice. They watch, therefore, with skilled and practiced eyes, and have learned to read, with great accuracy, the state of mind and heart of the slaves” (*MBMF*, 202-3). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Wollstonecraft argues that the creation story in *Genesis*, where Eve is formed from Adam’s rib, is a case where men have played upon their superior physical strength to legitimate and perpetuate the mythical idea that the current relative gender-ordering was ordained by both God and nature (1992, 109). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. A number of prominent contemporary republicans have defended their theory’s multicultural credentials (Pettit 1997, Laborde 2008, Lovett 2010). Nevertheless, the relationship between multiculturalism and republicanism remains underexplored. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Pettit believes that this is sufficient for republican freedom. I challenge his view in Coffee 2013b. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Think here of the legacy of patriarchy on the way in which a simple and widely accepted principle such as ‘all citizens are to be treated as equals’ is understood. Terms such as ‘citizen’, and other political terms such as ‘individual’, ‘freedom’, ‘public’, ‘private’, ‘work’ and so on will each have their own particular history that determines how it is understood. Collectively these histories can amount to a substantial male bias that undermines women’s ability to ‘force’ their interests to be tracked (Pateman 1989). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)