

TOPOI CFP  
DISAGREEMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM ARGUMENTATION THEORY AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Call for Papers

**Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and Epistemology: a special issue of *Topoi*  
Submission Deadline Extended to: 31 January, 2018**

**Guest Edited by Patrick Bondy and David Godden**

*Topoi* <http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/11245> invites submissions to Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and Epistemology, a special issue edited by Patrick Bondy (Brandon University) and David Godden (Michigan State University).

The subject of this special issue is disagreement and how to rationally respond to it. The issue itself aims to bring together multiple perspectives bearing on the epistemological dimensions of disagreement broadly conceived.

Robert Fogelin's 1985 paper "The logic of deep disagreement" (*Informal Logic*) contends that "deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of argument, for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing." Chris Campolo (2007) characterizes this as the view that "there is a kind of disagreement which will always turn our spade." Similarly, Michael Lynch (2010) has remarked that "Where there is deep epistemic disagreement over some fundamental principle, the disagreement has hit bedrock, the spade has turned." The idea is that disagreements involving conflicting "framework" or "hinge" propositions are not susceptible to rational resolution, because framework propositions articulate *paradigms* of judgement: as such they are epistemically primitive and fundamental, and are entwined together with whole systems of beliefs, values, and practices. Argumentation theorists since Fogelin have grappled with problems such as whether rational resolutions are possible in cases of deep disagreement, and how one rationally ought to proceed in cases of apparently deep disagreements, and with what it means to say that a disagreement is "deep."

Other recent epistemological work on disagreement primarily concerns what one ought to do in cases of "peer disagreement"—i.e., cases of disagreement between rational agents judged to be roughly equally reliable and informed on some topic. Epistemologists have wrestled with what one ought rationally to do in such situations, as well as with what it means to call someone an "epistemic peer," and with whether a true situation of peer disagreement could ever really arise in practice.

Yet, despite their common interests, and with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Feldman (2005) and Siegel (2013)), work on disagreement in each of these literatures—argumentation-theoretic and epistemological—has occurred largely independently of work in the other. Our intention with this issue is to push research on these topics forward by encouraging authors to engage with the topic by drawing upon the scholarship and theoretical resources provided by both perspectives.

References:

- Campolo, C. (2007) Commentary on V. Memedi: "Resolving deep disagreement." In H.V. Hansen et al. (Eds.) *Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground*. Windsor, ON: OSSA.  
<http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/>
- Feldman, R. (2005). Deep disagreement, rational resolutions, and critical thinking. *Informal Logic*, 25, 13-23.
- Fogelin, R.J. (1985). The logic of deep disagreements. *Informal Logic* 7, 1-8. [Reprinted in *Informal Logic* 25 (2005): 3-11.]
- Lynch, M. (2010). Epistemic circularity and epistemic incommensurability. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard (eds.), *Social Epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford UP.  
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0013
- Siegel, H. (2013). Argumentation and the epistemology of deep disagreement. *Cogency*, 5, 135-170.

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Possible topics include (but are not limited to):

- Are there meaningful disagreements which, in principle, presuppose conflicting framework propositions?
- How can recent work in epistemology and argumentation theory be combined to answer practical, “real-world” problems surrounding (deep) disagreement and its management or resolution?
- How one should rationally proceed in the face of “real-world” disagreement, including apparently deep disagreements?
- Does a concession that some disagreements are deep involve a limit to reason and reasoning itself and a concession to misology?
- What sorts of social factors contribute to the depth of disagreements?

Confirmed Invited Contributors: **Andrew Aberdein** (Florida Institute of Technology); **Scott Aikin** (Vanderbilt University); **J. Adam Carter** (University of Glasgow); **Bryan Frances** (Lingnan University) and **Zoe Cocchiaro** (University of Hong Kong); **Michael Hoffmann** (Georgia Institute of Technology); **Catherine Hundleby** (University of Windsor); **Moira Kloster** (University of the Fraser Valley); **Martin Kusch** (University of Vienna); **Michael Lynch** (University of Connecticut) and **Paul Simard Smith** (University of Windsor); **Jonathan Matheson** (University of North Florida); **Duncan Pritchard** (University of Edinburgh); **Harvey Siegel** (University of Miami).

#### SUBMISSION PROCESS

Papers must be in English, should not exceed 8,000 words, and should follow *Topoi*'s formatting guidelines which can be found at <http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/11245>.

All manuscripts should be prepared for double-blind peer-review and be submitted exclusively through the Online Manuscript Submission System (Editorial Manager), accessible at <http://www.editorialmanager.com/topo/>. When making a new submission, ensure you select the correct article type – “**S.I. : Disagreement: argumentation and epistemology (Godden/Bondy)**” – from the scroll-down menu for article type.

For further information please contact:

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Submission deadline: **31 January, 2018**