

**!!!UPDATED!!! CONFERENCE PROGRAMME
2022 EEN MEETING**

COGITO Epistemology Research Centre
University of Glasgow
15.6. – 17.6.2022

WEDNESDAY, 15.6.2022

	Debating Chamber 32 University Ave	Bridie Library 32 University Ave	Reid Room 67 Oakfield Ave 1 st Floor	Hutcheson Room 67 Oakfield Ave Ground Floor	Schaper Room 69 Oakfield Ave Basement	Murray Room 65 Oakfield Ave 1 st Floor	Jebb Room 65 Oakfield Ave Ground Floor	Walsh Room 65 Oakfield Ave Basement
9:00 – 9:30	REGISTRATION							
9:30 – 9:40	WELCOME							
9:45 – 10:25 PLENARY 1		Robin McKenna Medina on Epistemic Responsibility	Thirza Lagewaard An agonistic response to deep disagreement	Alexander Belak (w/ Dominik Gerstorfer) Restructuring Understanding's Object	Sebastian Schmidt Conflicts within reason: in defense of the epistemic 'ought'	CANCELLED Azita Chellappoo and Michel Vargas Philosophy of Science and Epistemology: Sketching Connections	Lukas Schwengerer Epistemic Bystander	Pawel Grad Epistemological Disjunctivism and Rationality of Perception
10:30 – 11:10 PLENARY 2		Eva Schmidt How Might the Use of Opaque Artificial Intelligence in Medical Contexts Undermine Knowledge?	Job de Grefte Safe (in)fallibilism	Adam Bricker Knowledge and the Brain	Benoit Guilielmo Two states or one? Doubt and Suspended Judgement	Giacomo Melis Justification, Excuses, and the Epistemic Status of the Beliefs of Victims of Sceptical Scenarios	Dominik Jarczewski A New Bullshitting Demon. Epistemic Trust in a Polluted Epistemic World	Paweł Zięba Smithies on the epistemic role of consciousness
11:20 – 12:20 KEYNOTE 1	Sanford Goldberg What Is a Speaker Owed?							
12:20 – 14:15	LUNCH							
14:15 – 14:55 PLENARY 3		Anne Meylan Suspension of Judgement	Roger Clarke 50 Ways to Believe Your Lover	Joao Miranda Conversational Internalism	Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro The irrationality of scientists	Guido Melchior Justification and Inquiry: Resolving the Easy Knowledge Problem	Angela O'Sullivan Context, Scepticism and Metaphor	Russell Ming The Problem of Warranted Objections

15:00 – 15:40 PLENARY 4		Mikkel Gerken Communicating Scientific Uncertainty	Mikael Janvid Against Normative Defeat	Isabelle Kessels The Need for a Taxonomy of Epistemic Thought Experiments	Geertjan Holtrop The Plausibility of Epistemic Conservatism	Chris Ranalli Personalism about the Ethics of Belief	Domingos Faria Knowledge-first account of group disagreement	Lara Jost Countering White Scepticism
15:50 – 16:50 KEYNOTE 2	Mona Simion and Christoph Kelp Justification as the Proper Route to Knowledge							
17:00 – 18:00 KEYNOTE 3	Ernest Sosa Epistemology Under the Dawning Light							
From 19:00	CIVIC RECEPTION by The Lord Provost, City Chambers, 82 George Square, Glasgow, G2 1DU							

THURSDAY, 16.6.2022

	Debating Chamber 32 University Ave	Bridie Library 32 University Ave	Reid Room 67 Oakfield Av 1 st Floor	Hutcheson Room 67 Oakfield Ave Ground Floor	Schaper Room 69 Oakfield Ave Basement	Murray Room 65 Oakfield Ave 1 st Floor	Jebb Room 65 Oakfield Ave Ground Floor	Walsh Room 65 Oakfield Ave Basement
9:00 – 9:40 PLENARY 5		Lilith Newton Irrational doubts, virtuous anxieties	Joel Yalland The Duty to Object and Duties <i>Not</i> to Object	Petronella Randell The value of risk in transformative experience	CANCELLED Michael Bruckner Friendship, Forensics, and Favoritism.	Joseph Blado Title: Does Mainstream Epistemic Externalism Entail Steadfastness?	Simon Barker Why mental health is epistemic health: a case-study of self-trust and bipolar disorder	Leon Assaad How Should We Listen? Epistemically privileged groups in epistemic networks
9:45 – 10:25 PLENARY 6		Cameron Boulton Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability	Emilia Wilson Mis-Interpretive Resources and Epistemic Corrosion	Marie van Loon 'How can you even believe this?': <i>Disappointment</i> as a blaming reactive attitude	Michael Markunas Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Luck	Sophie Keeling An Experiential Theory of Epistemic Basing	Valentin Teillet Is Knowledge sufficient for Mindreading?	CANCELLED Leonardo Flamini Incoherent inquirers and degrees of inquiring states of mind
10:30 – 11:10 PLENARY 7		Rene van Woudenberg The Epistemology of Reading	Charles Cote- Bouchard	Miriam Bowen Comparative Beliefs and	Silvia De Toffoli Successful Transmission of Justification	Alexander Dinges On Group Epistemology	Sara Chan Testifying for	Morgan Adou Wittgenstein's hinge propositions and the skeptical

			Can science tell us what to believe?	Imprecise Credences	Across Fallacious Arguments			debate: a sociological insight
11:20 – 12:20 KEYNOTE 4	Annalisa Coliva More and Happier Women. On the Political Significance of Wittgenstein and Hinge Epistemology							
12:20 – 14:15	LUNCH							
14:15 – 14:55 PLENARY 8		Aiden McGlynn Deep Disagreement Reconsidered: Lessons from Testimonial Injustice	Christos Kyriacou How Not To Be a Fallibilist	Anna Giustina The epistemic significance of introspective acquaintance	Marc Andree Weber Don't Ignore Extreme Cases!	Jesus Navarro Secrets: an Epistemological Account	David Austin Assertion & Expectation: the epistemic import of assertoric speech	Natascha Rietdijk Post-truth Politics and Collective Gaslighting
15:00 – 15:40 PLENARY 9		Clayton Littlejohn What is rational belief?	Eleni Angelou An Epistemological Account of Intuitions in Science	Lixiao Lin The Knowledge-why Norm for Aesthetic Assertions	Francesco Praolini The Revenge Lottery Paradox	CANCELLED Martin Grajner In Defense of Skepticism about Epistemic Dilemmas	Frederik J. Andersen Logical Akrasia	Javier Gonzalez de Prado Good players in epistemic games
15:50 – 16:50 KEYNOTE 5	Jennifer Lackey A Radical Expansion of Epistemic Blame							
17:00 – 18:00 KEYNOTE 6	Susanna Schellenberg Perspectival Variance							
From 18:30	CONFERENCE DINNER, Glasgow University Union, Dining Hall							

FRIDAY, 17.6.2022

	Debating Chamber 32 University Ave	Bridie Library 32 University Ave	Reid Room 67 Oakfield Ave 1 st Floor	Hutcheson Room 67 Oakfield Ave Ground Floor	Schaper Room 69 Oakfield Ave Basement	Murray Room 65 Oakfield Ave 1 st Floor	Jebb Room 65 Oakfield Ave Ground Floor	Walsh Room 65 Oakfield Ave Basement
9:00 – 9:40 PLENARY 10		Matt Jope Evidentialism and Non-evidentialism for Rational Trust	Giulia Luvisotto What inquiry?	Léna Mudry Don't Rush to Judgement. On Profiling and	Mario Santos-Sousa Basic Number Knowledge:	Megan Ritz Gullibility, Skepticism, and the Testimonial Environment	Nuno Venturinha A Problem for Greco's Anti-Reductionism	Arnon Keren The Functional Response to Skepticism: The Case of

				Morally Relevant Alternatives	Recovery of a Humean Insight			Testimonial Skepticism
9:45 – 10:25 PLENARY 11		Michel Croce Cognitive Experts and The Problem(s) of Their Public Exposure	Glenn Anderau Fake News and Epistemic Flooding	Katharina Bernhard The scientist qua scientist asserts	Michael Vollmer Suspension of Belief and Suspension of Acceptance	NEW TALK Murali Ramachandran Sensitivity First Epistemology	Ravi Thakral Knowledge of Normativity	Dani Pino Distributed Group Assertion
10:40 – 11:40 KEYNOTE 7	Jack Lyons Showing and Telling in Epistemology							
11:45 – 12:45 KEYNOTE 8	Jessica Brown Group justified belief							
12:45 – 14:45	LUNCH							
14:45 – 15:25 PLENARY 12		Martina Fuerst Closing the conceptual gap in epistemic injustice	Benoit Gaultier The Nature (and Rationality) of Suspension of Judgement	Paolo Savino From Evidence to Underdetermination Without Infallibilism	Michael Wilde Bird on abduction, reliability, and knowledge	Nathaly Ardelean Garcia Stereotype Threat, Self-Doubt, and Knowledge: A Double Epistemic Harm	Ross Patrizio Productivity and Balance in the Epistemology of Testimony	Abida Malik The Transmission of Tacit Knowing
15:30 – 16:10 PLENARY 13		Joey Pollock Testimonial Scepticism	Guido Tana Dogmatism, Knowledge, and Factivity	Nick Kuespert Will the Real Moral Experts Please Stand Up?	Tom Schoonen Similarity and the Necessity of Origins	Paula Keller Why Know about Injustice	NEW TALK Chris Willard-Kyle Evolving Questions	Moises Barba A non-reductive account of collective epistemic virtues
16:25 – 17:05 PLENARY 14		Arturs Logins The Erotetic View of Reasons and Inquiry	NEW TALK Adam Carter Intentional action and knowledge-centered theories of control	Nastasia Müller An occurrent-state approach: towards the combination of responsibilist and reliabilist virtue		Endre Begby Opportunity Costs and Resource Allocation Problems: Epistemology for Finite Minds		
17:10 – 17:50 PLENARY 15		Karl Landstorm Tyranny of the Buzzwords: Gatekeeping and Epistemic Injustice in the Social Sciences	Filippo Riscica Lizzio Pluralistic Ignorance and Group Beliefs	Andrew Sherrod A New Approach to Wittgensteinian Hinges		Basil Mueller Epistemic Conflicts of Interests and Social Epistemic Norms		

ABSTRACTS: KEYNOTE TALKS

Annalisa Coliva **More and happier women. On the political significance of Wittgenstein and hinge epistemology**

Much of contemporary analytic feminism is carried out under the aegis of a broadly Carnapian take on concepts and conceptual engineering. On that view, which finds its clearest and strongest supporter in Sally Haslanger, philosophers should engineer a concept of woman useful to expose the subordinated role of women, thereby playing a critical role with respect to society. The success of this project would consist in helping us bring about a day when there won't be any women, so reconceived.

While I agree with the critical sentiment that animates such a project, I am skeptical of its political feasibility and relevance. The main faults I find in it are its top-down approach and its potential consequences. I therefore propose to look at an altogether different approach, to be traced back to Wittgenstein's discussion of family resemblances, which is distinctively bottom-up and such that, if successful, it will help us bring about a day when there will be more women (i.e. more individuals subsumed under that concept, such as transgender women) and less subordinated and therefore happier ones – whence the title of my talk.

Ernest Sosa **Epistemology Under the Dawning Light**

For Wittgenstein, "... when we first *believe* anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)" For Quine, "our statements about the external world meet the tribunal of sense experience not individually, but only as a corporate body." Such holism has implications for traditional epistemology that have been insufficiently appreciated, as will be argued; and corresponding lessons will be drawn.

Jack Lyons **Showing and Telling in Epistemology**

Two frequently recurring metaphors in epistemology invoke perception and testimony. We "see" that $2+2=4$, but we also talk about the "testimony" or the senses. Seeing and being told are quite different, but how does this difference matter, epistemically? Most of us think that, for example, following a proof is epistemically better than having very good evidence for the soundness of that same proof, and more generally, that firsthand knowledge is somehow better than secondhand knowledge. These sorts of thoughts have supported internalist epistemologies and/or internalist elements in externalist epistemologies. Here I try to shake loose the idea that seeing is better than trusting—that showing is better than telling—in favor of the simpler idea that having more and stronger warrants is better than having fewer and weaker. Seeing isn't better; it's just (usually) more. And when it isn't more, there's no reason to prefer it.

Jennifer Lackey **A Radical Expansion of Epistemic Blame**

Jessica Brown **Group justified belief**

It's routine to ascribe beliefs and knowledge to groups. For instance, we might say that the government knows that interest rates are rising, or that a company knows that it's polluting the local environment. Here I assume that at least some groups have beliefs to investigate the conditions under which those beliefs are justified. I focus on one main way in which organised groups form beliefs, namely by aggregating the beliefs of their members. So far two main epistemological models have been proposed of when group beliefs formed by aggregation are justified, an inferential model (e.g. Goldman) and a perceptual model (e.g. Dunn). Here I argue that each of these existing models faces problems and propose that we should model the epistemology of group

belief formed via aggregation not on perception or inference but instead on testimony. Unlike the inferential model, the testimonial model properly takes account of the fact that aggregation is an inter-personal process in which the outputs are beliefs in the mind of a different cognizer than the input beliefs. Furthermore, I argue that when properly developed, the testimonial model makes the conditions for group justified belief more demanding than the perceptual model, yet without making them too demanding. In the final section, I show how the proposed view is compatible with a variety of epistemological approaches including process reliabilism, evidentialist-reliabilism, and virtue epistemology.

Mona Simion and **Justification as the Proper Route to Knowledge**

Christoph Kelp Virtue epistemology and proper functionalism have been among the leading approaches in epistemology. This paper focuses on the relation between the two approaches. Crucially, it takes a closer look at the relation between the two normative frameworks that underpin the two views. In particular, we will argue that virtue epistemology's framework of 'telic normativity' is a species of functionalist normativity. In addition, we will consider two ways of unpacking the resulting view—one traditionalist, the other along knowledge first lines—and we will provide reason to think that the knowledge first option is preferable.

Sanford Goldberg **What is a speaker owed?**

Under what conditions do you owe it to a speaker to accept what she's said? After clarifying what is at issue and arguing that (so understood) this question is philosophically significant, I argue for what I call a *hybrid* answer. Its hybridity is seen in the fact that there are both epistemic and ethical or justice-based parameters governing when an audience owes it to a speaker to accept her say-so. This can seem curious, as it implies that there are ethical or justice-based parameters on *the proper acceptance of another's testimony* – something usually taken to be the exclusive domain of epistemology. But I argue that acknowledging such parameters is the cost of having an adequate account of what speakers are owed on those occasions on which they testify. I conclude by briefly suggesting how this case is both different from and stronger than another case for such parameters, from the allegation of the phenomenon of “doxastic wronging”.

Susanna Schellenberg **Perspectival Variance**

This paper discusses parameters for accounting for variance and invariance in perception by distinguishing between external, mind-independent perspectival properties and mind-dependent appearance properties, on the one hand, and between external, mind-independent intrinsic properties and mind-dependent constancy properties. It discusses several ways of accounting for perceptual variance in terms of external, mind-independent perspectival properties and shows their implication for perceptual evidence.

ABSTRACTS: CONTRIBUTED TALKS

Abida Malik **The Transmission of Tacit Knowing**

The transmission of knowledge has been debated vividly in contemporary epistemology and more recently, also non-classical types of knowledge transmission are being discussed. However, a very special case has been neglected so far: the transmission of tacit knowing.

Characteristic for this type of knowing is that it cannot be made (sufficiently) explicit by the subject, which could lead to difficulties in transmission. Still, transmission is possible as we can see when expertise is successfully transmitted. In my presentation I aim to bring some clarity to this process by proposing a systematic virtue-theoretic account of the transmission of tacit knowing.

Adam Bricker **Knowledge and the Brain**

By now it's quite clear that brains are something like knowledge-first epistemologists. A wealth of converging evidence all indicates that the knowledge states of others are represented just like mental states in their own right. Here I'll provide a survey of this evidence—including new experimental findings—before addressing a more controversial question: Do these neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution actually tell us anything about what knowledge is like? I'll argue not only that they do, but that it's surprisingly straightforward to motivate this conclusion.

Aiden McGlynn **Deep Disagreement Reconsidered: Lessons from Testimonial Injustice**

In a recent paper T. J. Lagewaard holds that deep disagreements involve a disagreement about (relatively) fundamental epistemic principles. Using this conception, Lagewaard argues that disagreements about the nature, scope, and impact of oppression will often be deepened by testimonial injustice, since the people best placed to offer relevant testimony will be subject to testimonial injustice, pushing the disagreement into one about the bearing of certain epistemic sources on the original debate. I take issue with this conclusion, but contend that this doesn't show that Lagewaard's argument is mistaken; rather, the argument points to unappreciated and worrying ways in which a disagreement can be *surreptitiously* deep.

Alexander Belak **Restructuring Understanding's Object**

(w/ Dominik Gerstorfer) The nature of understanding is a burgeoning topic in recent epistemology. Given the debate's nascent state, some of understanding's central elements—e.g., its specific object, are only faintly understood. This paper motivates a novel approach to understanding's object. We argue that recent accounts ultimately fail because they rest on misleading metaphysical assumptions. Instead, we draw on analogies with mathematical structuralism to identify *structured systems* as understanding's fundamental object. We then utilize the notion of *shared structure* to establish a view holding out the prospect of settling common puzzles in epistemology—e.g., how to resolve the tension between understanding and factivity.

Alexander Dinges **On Group Epistemology**

A growing body of literature addresses the question of what group beliefs, group justified beliefs and group knowledge are. However, this question seems easily solved. A group belief, for instance, is a belief held by a group. Moreover, we know what groups and beliefs are from the independent debates on these phenomena. So, what is the group belief debate about? I reject various conservative responses to this question and then suggest a revisionary response in terms of metaphysical grounding. On this response, extant theories of group belief, group justified belief and group knowledge are useful starting points, but they are false.

Andrew Sherrod **A New Approach to Wittgensteinian Hinges**

The hinge propositions Wittgenstein introduces in *On Certainty* have been the focus of recent studies. Much of the attention they have received has concerned their relationship to propositional knowledge. Namely, there is considerable disagreement on whether they count as propositional knowledge. What has yet to be explored is whether a knowledge-how approach to hinges is either plausible or if it offers any explanatory advantages. My aim here is to formulate hinges in terms of knowledge-how. I will argue that a knowledge-how account of hinges retains the key characteristics of hinges and while also providing good explanatory value.

Anna Giustina **The epistemic significance of introspective acquaintance**

Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is (roughly) knowledge we acquire just in virtue of being directly aware of our experiences. Unlike most contemporary acquaintance theorists, and similarly to Bertrand Russell, I think that knowledge by acquaintance is *sui generis* and cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge. In this talk I argue that, although non-propositional, knowledge by acquaintance is nonetheless epistemically significant. My argument consists in isolating a mark of epistemic significance, namely information acquisition, and showing that introspective knowledge by acquaintance displays it: it involves acquisition of information about the phenomenology of the introspected experience. Therefore, there are good reasons for thinking that knowledge by acquaintance is epistemically significant.

Angela O'Sullivan **Context, Scepticism and Metaphor**

Use of sentences of the form "S knows that p" varies according to context. Semantic theories such as contextualism explain this variability in terms of context determining which semantic content 'knows' picks out, while pragmatic theories such as pragmatic invariantism explain it in terms of context determining which content is pragmatically conveyed. While semantic theories account well for the phenomenological experience of using knowledge talk and apply general and recognised conversational principles to explain variability, pragmatic theories better cohere with retraction data, in particular as concerns retraction in response to sceptical arguments. This paper defends a view which, I argue, preserves the key insights of both views: knowledge talk is typically non-literal. In particular, it is metaphorical. To speak metaphorically is to say one thing in order to express another (Camp 2006). Sentences of the form "S knows that p" say that S is infallible with regards to p, to express that S is a good enough informant for present purposes with regards to p. I argue that this explains contextual variability in a way that charitably handles the phenomenology of using knowledge talk, that makes use of general conversational principles and which accounts well for retraction data.

Anne Meylan **Suspension of Judgement**

The view defended in this paper is that to suspend judgement is, first and foremost, to perform a specific kind of action, what I call *a preventing action*. Preventing actions are not simply omissions. When we suspend judgement as to whether p, we do much more than simply omitting to judge that p. We resist the inclination to judge that p. One virtue of this view is that it vindicates the intuition that suspension of judgement is (at least to some degree) difficult to achieve in a way that belief is not.

Arnon Keren **The Functional Response to Skepticism: The Case of Testimonial Skepticism**

A number of philosophers inspired by Craig (1991) have recently advocated a new functional approach to the evaluation of forms of skepticism (Weintraub 2018; Hannon 2019). In this paper, I study the prospects of a functional evaluation of skepticism about testimonial knowledge (STK). STK is the skeptical position that denies that we can have testimonial knowledge, but does not deny that we know based on other sources. I argue that a functional investigation of STK has a number of advantages over more familiar approaches to skepticism; moreover, such a functional investigation provides us with good reasons for rejecting STK.

Arturs Logins **The Erotetic View of Reasons and Inquiry**

According to the Erotetic view of reasons, normative reasons are appropriate answers to normative Why-F? questions. Given that Why? questions in general can be interpreted as either requiring an argument/a premise in a reasoning or an explanation, normative reasons too can either be premisses in (good) patterns of reasoning or parts of an explanation of the relevant normative facts. The aim of the present paper is to present the view in more detail and to show how it can be fruitfully applied to shed light on the aims and norms of inquiry.

Azita Chellappoo and **Philosophy of Science and Epistemology: Sketching Connections**

Michel Vargas There tends to be limited crosstalk or exchange between work going on within philosophy of science and general epistemology, exceptions notwithstanding. Perhaps this is partially due to fundamental differences between science and other spheres. However, if one takes the position that there is no strict demarcation between scientific inquiry and other forms of inquiry, the potential for philosophy of science research to have productive applications or connections with broader discussions within epistemology. We sketch two cases where work within philosophy of science could be fruitfully drawn upon to advance debates or outstanding questions within epistemology more generally, focusing on cases of feminist epistemology: resolving tensions within standpoint epistemology, and the role of epistemic values.

Basil Mueller **Epistemic Conflicts of Interests and Social Epistemic Norms**

Recent work in social epistemology relies on or argues for the claim that (at least some) epistemic norms are social norms. I propose that we can employ the notion of an epistemic conflict of interest [ECOI] to address an explanatory gap in this literature, namely why there's a need for these norms to arise in the first place. In ECOI an agent is subject to a normatively more weightier interest — roughly to form and share true beliefs — that stands in conflict with normatively less weightier interests. I focus on secondary interests documented in empirical research on cognitive irrationality and show how 'ECOI' might be used to account for norm regulation failures.

Benoit Gaultier **The Nature (and Rationality) of Suspension of Judgement**

I shall argue that one suspends judgement when one judges one's doxastic state on a certain issue not to be sensitive enough to certain reasons not to be in this state that one judges to defeat those to which it is sensitive. I shall then argue that suspension is, metaphysically, a *process* rather than an act and/or a state. And, more specifically, that suspension is the *effort* to resist some of the dispositions that being in the doxastic state in question involves, rather than the effort to resist being in this state. This is sufficient for suspension to be agential in a way in which belief is not.

Benoit Guilielmo **Two states or one? Doubt and Suspended Judgement**

I shall argue for the "no-difference" view. (ND) There is no substantial difference between being in a state of suspended judgement about whether P and being in a state of doubt about whether P.

I will first rely on historical considerations, and then examine views positing a difference in *kind*, e.g. doubt is an enduring state whereas suspension is essentially a mental act or episodic process. Finally, I will argue that the "no-difference" view can accommodate the intuition that doubt seems to come in degrees contrary to suspension.

Cameron Boulton **Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability**

In virtue of what sorts of factors can one epistemic failing be worse than another? The paper develops a dual-factor view of degrees of epistemic criticizability. According to the view, degrees of epistemic criticizability are i) an inverse function of degrees of doxastic justification, and ii) a function of degrees of agent culpability. The paper develops an account of each factor, and explains how they should be weighted. The paper also explains the importance of modelling degrees of epistemic criticizability in a broader context. I focus on the role that such a model can play in the *ethics* of epistemic criticism.

Charles Cote-Bouchard **Can science tell us what to believe?**

Can science contribute substantially to the elucidation of epistemological questions, as methodological naturalists claim? Many say 'no' because of the essentially normative character of epistemology. I reject a standard naturalist response to this objection, according to which normative epistemological questions are instrumental questions about how to achieve cognitive ends. I then formulate an alternative response. Granted, epistemology is centrally

about elucidating epistemic norms. However, science can contribute substantially to the elucidation of epistemic norms. It can do so, I argue, by describing and explaining the natural phenomena that manifest epistemic norms, like patterns of epistemic judgments, reactions, expectations, and practices.

Chris Ranalli **Personalism about the Ethics of Belief**

What should the impact of theoretical reasons, such as those from philosophy or theoretical psychology, be for our personal beliefs, e.g., that you love your spouse, or that your children have value? It is widely assumed that theoretical reasons can be evidence which bears on what we rationally ought to believe. However, I argue that we can permissibly ignore theoretical reasons; that the maintenance of many kinds of personal belief permits us to bracket theoretical reasons, or even outright ignore them. Following the argument where it leads is sometimes wrong and bad for oneself and others. Call this *Personalism*. Personalism is a plausible *via media* between traditional Pragmatism and Evidentialism. It counts some kinds of practical and theoretical reasons as the wrong kind of reasons to bear on what personal beliefs we ought to have. One might worry that Personalism can permit *bad beliefs*, like racist, extreme, or immoral beliefs. I argue that Personalism grants no such permission. However, it can prudentially license irrationality. Fortunately, I argue, personalist irrationality can be morally praiseworthy.

Christos Kyriacou **How Not To Be a Fallibilist**

I describe a general pattern of fallibilist reasoning in light of the influential heuristics and biases approach to cognition (cf. Kahneman 2011; Thaler and Sunstein 2008) and suggest that this reasoning is methodologically dubious because it involves a vicious circularity. I apply this analysis of fallibilist reasoning to ordinary language philosophers such as Moore (1939), Austin (1946), Wittgenstein (1969) and Chisholm (1982). I conclude that this is not the way to be a fallibilist.

Clayton Littlejohn **What is rational belief?**

The aim of this paper (which is similar to the aim of Goldman's influential paper on justification) is to sketch a theory of rational belief. The theory offered here has two parts. We can start by identifying the properties that belief (or suspension) might have that make that response desirable or undesirable. (Here, we can plug in our preferred theory of aims, goals, standards, norms, or values.) We then explain how, in light of this, we can distinguish rational belief (and suspension) from alternative responses that are not rational. My preferred approach in spelling out this second part is similar in some respects to the risk-minimisation picture criticized by Martin Smith (amongst others). I'll explain how this approach might seek to explain some of the same observations that his account is designed to explain (e.g., the difference between testimony, say, and lottery cases) and how the account might handle a variety of puzzles (e.g., Moorean absurd thoughts, the difference between good and bad preface cases, the difference between the preface and the lottery). The key to 'solving' the various puzzles about rational belief is not (as some have argued) to reject the risk-minimisation picture, but to reject the veritistic picture of epistemic desirability. In the course of this discussion, I shall argue that the account of rational belief defended in this paper compares favorably to some familiar truth-centered theories of rational belief (e.g., the Lockean view, Smith's normic support view) and to some recent knowledge-centered theories of rational belief (e.g., Schroeder's reasons-first approach, Ichikawa and Bird's knowledge-first theories of justification).

Dani Pino **Distributed Group Assertion**

According to Lackey, group assertion comes in two varieties, coordinated and authority-based. She rules out a third kind she dubs the *distributed group assertion* (DGA) (2018: 31, 2021: 150)—where it is an automated system that aggregates the member's views and submits a report with the group's view—on the basis that it is rather an *extended* than *distributed* assertion. I offer a model of DGA that questions Lackey's refusal. This model combines

Bird's account for social knowledge (2010) and Schmitt's account for group belief justification (1994). The result is a conception of DGA that is not extended.

David Austin **Assertion & Expectation: the epistemic import of assertoric speech**

Timothy Williamson's constitutive knowledge norm account of assertion is arguably the most popular account of assertion in the literature. Nonetheless, the very notion of a constitutive knowledge norm has recently been called into question, due to its conceptual and metaphysical opacity. In this paper, I put forward a novel Gricean account of assertion, one which utilizes the more conceptually and metaphysically transparent notion of expectation to characterize assertion's knowledge requirement. In doing so, I hope to show why this speech act possesses the status as a reason to believe.

Domingos Faria **Knowledge-first account of group disagreement**

When we think about paradigmatic examples of real-life disagreements, such as religious or political conflicts, we realize that the disagreeing parties are often not individuals but groups. However, the debate about peer disagreement has focused almost exclusively on disagreement between individuals, thereby overlooking the phenomenon of group disagreement. This paper purports to fill this lacuna, by offering a novel diagnosis of group disagreement and an original account of how to deal with such a phenomenon. The question that drives this project is the following: what ought a group do, from an epistemic point of view, before a case of disagreement with another group? To answer this question, we shall apply Williamson (2000)'s knowledge-first approach to group epistemology.

Geertjan Holtrop **The Plausibility of Epistemic Conservatism**

Epistemic conservatism—the view that if S believes that P, then S is justified in continuing to believe that P in the absence of defeaters—is considered to be implausible by various philosophers (Richard Foley, David Christensen, Michael Huemer). I argue that if one understand conservatism as a principle of belief maintenance rather than belief formation, then many supposed counterexamples and objections no longer hold and conservatism does seem plausible. Furthermore, conservatism so understood can be developed into a radically weak kind of foundationalism such that mere belief can serve as a (fallible) basic belief.

Dominik Jarczewski **A New Bullshitting Demon. Epistemic Trust in a Polluted Epistemic World**

The recent developments in social epistemology have shown that the main impact of the doubt is not necessarily on the first-order evidence, but higher-order evidence (Begby 2021; Levy 2021). Importantly, in contrast to classical demon scenarios, the new doubt does not simply happen, but is intentionally cast as a part of the political agenda (Cassam 2019). The paper studies the influence of the strategies that use doubt to artificially lower the reliability of social sources of beliefs. It spells the phenomena in terms of vicious/virtuous trust and distrust and asks about the agent's responsibility in an epistemically corrupted social world.

Eleni Angelou **An Epistemological Account of Intuitions in Science**

The role of intuitions in scientific practice and reasoning is understudied. My aim in this paper is twofold: to apply some ideas from the general epistemology of intuitions to the philosophy of science and cast light on what is unique about the role of intuitions in the scientific enterprise. Towards that end, I address two questions: (1) how do the intuitions of scientific experts differ compared to the intuitions of laypeople?, and (2) how do the intuitions of scientific experts ought to be reconciled with pre-scientific intuitions? Considering the two projects that stem from these questions, I conclude with a reflection on a series of socio-epistemological upshots.

Emilia Wilson **Mis-Interpretive Resources and Epistemic Corrosion**

Hermeneutic Injustice has primarily been characterised as arising from a ‘gap’ in our shared interpretive resources, neglecting the way in which dominant interpretive resources can obstruct understanding. In this paper I develop an account of how interpretive resources can furnish us with distorted interpretations. I argue that attending to the interpretive role of how information is organised reveals an overlooked dimension of epistemic harms. I show that this account of mis-interpretive resources offers a fuller account of paradigm cases of hermeneutic injustice and argue that they can have a *corrosive* effect whereby accurate information is interpreted in epistemically damaging ways.

Endre Begby **Opportunity Costs and Resource Allocation Problems: Epistemology for Finite Minds**

Philosophers typically think of epistemic justification as a normative status that supervenes on the relation between an epistemic agent, some body of evidence, and a particular proposition (or “hypothesis”). A different approach might focus instead on the fact that epistemic agents are typically engaged in multiple, concurrent epistemic pursuits (different “lines of inquiry”), each placing irreconcilable demands on their limited epistemic resources. This paper explores motivations and consequences of adopting the latter approach, developing an account of epistemic normativity centering on subjects’ management of the risks and opportunities involved in epistemic resource allocation across these many lines of inquiry.

Eva Schmidt **How Might the Use of Opaque Artificial Intelligence in Medical Contexts Undermine Knowledge?**

This paper raises the worry that, when well-working AI algorithms are used in a medical context, their opacity might undermine the ability of users – in particular, medical doctors – to acquire knowledge on the basis of their outputs. On the basis of a scenario of cancer risk, we argue that it is possible to make sense of the intuition that a medical doctor’s belief based on the output of an opaque algorithm is lucky, and thus not knowledge. To do so, we appeal to a perspective-relative version of the Safety condition on knowledge (cf. Whiting 2020).

Filippo Riscica Lizzio **Pluralistic Ignorance and Group Beliefs**

In this talk, I have two aims. Firstly, I shall argue that the Group Agent Account of group beliefs recently proposed by Jennifer Lackey gives unsatisfactory predictions in cases of pluralistic ignorance. These are cases where each member of a group privately believes that *p* but acts, speaks, and argues as if she believes that *not-p*. Secondly, I shall present an original account of group beliefs. I shall argue that my account gives the correct predictions in the cases of pluralistic ignorance and that it correctly distinguishes group lies and group bullshits from group beliefs.

Francesco Praolini **The Revenge Lottery Paradox**

A popular solution to versions of the lottery paradox is to deny consistency and closure principles for rational categorical belief. I argue in this paper that we can reach paradoxical conclusions from cases like or analogous to those presented in traditional versions of the paradox even without consistency or closure principles. We can produce these paradoxes when we assume standard Bayesian updating rules and we ask which beliefs, if any, belong to one’s body of evidence. Consistency and closure principles are therefore not to blame for the lottery paradox or other paradoxes in its vicinity.

Frederik J. Andersen **Logical Akrasia**

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept *logical akrasia* pace analogy to epistemic akrasia. Second, §3 and §4 present a dilemma based on logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano arithmetic or akratic in our logical theorizing. It will then be left as an open question for future research what consequences the dilemma has for epistemic rationality.

Giacomo Melis **Justification, Excuses, and the Epistemic Status of the Beliefs of Victims of Sceptical Scenarios**

Some recent discussions of the new evil demon problem purport to show that the beliefs about the external world of victims of sceptical scenarios are excused, but not justified. The arguments advanced rely on the claim that the distinction between justification and excuses must find space in epistemology. Moreover, they reject epistemic internalism by denying that justification supervenes on one's non-factive mental states. I aim to distinguish between epistemic justification and excuses without making internalist assumptions, while maintaining the traditional view that the beliefs about the external world of victims of sceptical scenarios are justified.

Giulia Luvisotto **What inquiry?**

A recent trend in epistemology laments that contemporary epistemology focuses on an overly narrow target and largely neglects other key areas—first and foremost, the study of inquiry. This would seem to suggest an expansive programme: epistemology should simply widen the pool of things it seeks to explain. This natural suggestion has encountered resistance by Jane Friedman, who argues that epistemology needs to move away from an investigation of synchronic norms and the rationality of doxastic states to instead look at the nature of diachronic norms and rational inquiry. I refer to this move as ‘the zetetic enterprise’. In this talk, I will grant for the sake of argument that we should embrace the zetetic enterprise. My goal is to raise some questions as to how that should look like, and make a case against a widespread instrumentalist take on it.

Glenn Anderau **Fake News and Epistemic Flooding**

This paper will focus on two different risks epistemic agents face online: being exposed to fake news and epistemic flooding. While the first risk is more widely known, the notion of ‘epistemic flooding’ is a novel concept introduced here. *Epistemic flooding* occurs when epistemic agents find themselves in epistemic environments in which they are routinely confronted with more information and evidence than they can diligently process. Epistemic flooding is one of the most significant risks epistemic agents run while using social media and one of the reasons why the first risk (being exposed to fake news) is especially pernicious.

Guido Melchior **Justification and Inquiry: Resolving the Easy Knowledge Problem**

Bootstrapping and the easy knowledge problem can be understood as puzzles about conflicting intuitions. These puzzles will be resolved by establishing two distinctions. First, untargeted cognitive processes of belief formation must be distinguished from processes of inquiry where we raise a question and intentionally use a method for settling it. Second, conditions on justification transmission must be distinguished from conditions on rationality understood as an internal criterion of coherence. Bootstrapping is an irrational process of settling the question about the reliability of a source, but this does not entail that justification cannot transmit via bootstrapping reasoning.

Guido Tana **Dogmatism, Knowledge, and Factivity**

Knowledge is factive. If one knows *p*, then *p* cannot be false. This has the paradoxical conclusion that for any instance of knowledge, one ought to be dogmatic and reject a priori as misleading any counterevidence to what is known. This presentation analyzes some attempts at avoiding dogmatism. These are: the idea that dogmatism might not be an irrational or illegitimate attitude to have, the possibility of defeasible knowledge, and the fallibilist rejection of subjective certainty. It is argued that all fail because they endorse ad hoc sotto voce clauses to avoid dogmatism. It is then analyzed which impact this result has on the factivity of knowledge.

Hilkje Haenel **Fragile Epistemic Subjects**

Using insights from standpoint theory and feminist epistemology, I argue for a theory of *fragile epistemic subjects*; showing that fragile epistemic subjects are positioned both advantageously as well as disadvantageously in epistemically charged situations. By doing so, I aim to show the dialectical relationship

between vulnerability and agency, drawing on examples from philosophy of disability, philosophy of children, and philosophy of migration. Finally, I argue that the dialectical relationship which fragile epistemic subjects have to navigate can be best explained by lessons from recognition theory.

Isabelle Kessels **The Need for a Taxonomy of Epistemic Thought Experiments**

In the post-Gettier decades, theories of knowledge were assessed by how successfully they capture knowledge's extension. More recently, philosophers have argued that theories shouldn't be expected to capture intuitions about each and every case (Weatherson 2003; Olsson 2015; Weinberg 2017). This raises the question of which case sub-sets are relevant to theory-assessment. I argue that case-complexity is a suitable criterion for assessing relevancy; with high case-complexity entailing decreased relevance. Building a taxonomy that systematises thought experiments based on shared features would allow us to determine cases' relative complexity and likely relevance.

Javier Gonzalez de Prado **Good players in epistemic games**

Are norms of inquiry in tension with epistemic norms (as recently argued by Jane Friedman)? I provide a (largely) negative answer, turning to a picture of epistemic practices as rule-governed games. The idea is that, while epistemic norms are constitutive correctness standards for the attitudes involved in epistemic games, norms of inquiry derive from the internal goals of those games. Moves that respect the rules of a game can be detrimental to the aims of that game. Correct epistemic attitudes that are inadvisable regarding the goals of some inquiry are just like bad (even if permissible) chess moves.

Jesus Navarro **Secrets: an Epistemological Account**

I define secrets as a particular kind of disturbance in the social flow of knowledge. I start by telling secrets apart from mere mysteries: a mystery is something hard to know, which produces epistemic frustration, whereas a secret is a particular kind of mystery that meets four additional conditions: it must be (1) known by someone (*knowledge condition*), and (2) ignored by someone else (*ignorance condition*) in such a way that (3) such ignorance is intentionally produced (*keeping condition*). I end up by showing in which way this epistemic structure underlies the problem of the moral and political legitimacy of secrecy.

Joao Miranda **Conversational Internalism**

Conversational Internalism is the kind of access internalism that argues that the reason why access is necessary is because it allows agents to answer questions in conversation, which is required for beliefs to be justified. I start by distinguishing internalism from externalist and motivating the project. The view is then defended by appealing to a contrastive account of reasons (Snedegar, 2017), which makes justification relative to questions. I explore some features of the theory, such as its ability to fulfill some desiderata for theories of the structure of justification. I finish by showing how Conversational Internalism fares better against some classical objections to internalism.

Job de Grefte **Safe (in)fallibilism**

Skeptics and recent infallibilists like McDowell (2009) and Williamson (2000) agree that knowledge requires evidence that entails that your belief is true. They differ in whether they think this kind of infallible knowledge is possible. In this paper, I present a problem for infallibilism that revolves around the epistemic basing relation. But I argue this should not leave us skeptics: we can evade the problem by adopting what I will call safe fallibilism, the condition that evidential knowledge requires our belief to be safely based on our evidence.

Joel Yalland **The Duty to Object and Duties *Not* to Object**

There are strong reasons, both epistemic and not, to think we have an imperfect duty to object to claims or behaviour we deem unwarranted or false. However, any such claim must surely admit that sometimes we are compelled not to (merely) object, and there are clearly other ways to respond to false or

unwarranted claims and behaviour.

As such, I argue that the duty to object may not go far enough, and that there may in-fact be competing duties *not* to object, or rather not to *merely* object motivated by the same considerations.

Joey Pollock **Testimonial Scepticism**

It is typically assumed that we gain a great deal of knowledge through testimony. However, an increasing number of views in philosophy of language, and even some in epistemology, appear to entail varying degrees of testimonial scepticism. Sceptical consequences have traditionally been seen as compelling reasons to reject the views that entail them. In this talk, I offer a framework for accommodating scepticism within a more optimistic view of the role of testimony in our epistemic ecology. I argue that a moderate degree of scepticism about testimony coheres better with several plausible theses about the nature and value of knowledge.

Joseph Blado **Title: Does Mainstream Epistemic Externalism Entail Steadfastness?**

The internalist-externalist (I-E) debate investigates what it means to be epistemically justified or rational in having a doxastic attitude. The peer-disagreement debate investigates whether it can be epistemically rational to refuse doxastic revision amidst (genuine) peer-disagreement. It's natural, then, to think one's theory of epistemic rationality will affect the truth conditions under which one can (if at all) rationally refuse doxastic revision amidst peer-disagreement. In this paper, I will argue that if *at least one* of the mainstream externalist views in the literature is true, then the steadfastness position in peer disagreement is true.

Karl Landstorm **Title: Tyranny of the Buzzwords: Gatekeeping and Epistemic Injustice in the Social Sciences**

In the literature on epistemic injustice within the social sciences little attention has been paid to the day-to-day interactions between individual researchers. This paper is concerned with two such common interactions: (1) When a researcher attempts to convey their findings to their research lead, and (2) when a researcher attempts to disseminate their findings to the wider academic field by submitting a paper to either a conference or a journal. Each of these activities involves the researcher engaging with gatekeepers, agents who have some power over the researcher's epistemic agency. Based on conversations with social scientists at different stages of their careers that have taken place over the last two years, I sketch and analyze a case of how such interactions can go both epistemically and ethically wrong.

Katharina Bernhard **The scientist qua scientist asserts**

Dang and Bright (2021) argue that the kinds of utterances scientists make when reporting results do not, cannot, and need not follow any familiar epistemic norm of assertion. They conclude that, therefore, scientists do not assert – instead, they avow. In this talk, I argue that Dang and Bright's discussion does not warrant this conclusion. I introduce and defend an alternative account according to which scientists do assert. Such assertions follow an epistemic norm of acceptance which, I argue, explains the idiosyncratic epistemic status of scientific reports Dang and Bright describe better than their avowal account.

Lara Jost **Countering White Scepticism**

In this paper I explain the argumentative mechanisms behind dialectical white scepticism, a form of resistance towards testimony about racial oppression which camouflages itself as being motivated by purely epistemic concerns, rather than white privilege. I draw a parallel between the case of scepticism about common knowledge and dialectical white scepticism based on their use of an initially plausible epistemic closure principle. I detail how it puts unsatisfiable demands for defence of assertions about racism on racially oppressed people, by building a structural parallel with scepticism about common knowledge. I conclude by highlighting strategies to counter dialectical white scepticism.

Léna Mudry **Don't Rush to Judgement. On Profiling and Morally Relevant Alternatives**

Demographic profiling consists in drawing inferences about particular persons from statistical generalizations about their groups. Someone engaged in demographic profiling is often liable to criticism. As the inference is often based on supposedly strong evidence, pragmatists argue that the belief is justified, but moral considerations require that we suspend our judgment. Others have argued that statistical evidence never justifies an outright belief. In this talk, I argue that there is an epistemic fault involved in demographic profiling. Nevertheless, moral considerations do play a role in determining the epistemically rational attitude. I will argue that moral considerations help determine which alternatives are relevant and thus which alternatives you ought to rule out for your belief to be rational.

Leon Assaad **How Should We Listen? Epistemically privileged groups in epistemic networks**

If a minority in a community is epistemically privileged, what structural features of the community are best suited for that group to be heard, i.e., for their consensus to be accepted by the majority? To approach this question, I use a (Zollmann-style) agent-based network model in which two types of agents try to determine which of two theories is better. One subgroup (typically the minority) has a higher probability of figuring this out (i.e., they are epistemically privileged). I examine which interventions increase the chance of a correct minority being heard by the majority. While some (obvious) interventions prove to be detrimental, a more sophisticated measure makes sure correct minorities are being heard.

Leonardo Flamini **Incoherent inquirers and degrees of inquiring states of mind**

Some epistemologists agree that inquiring into questions while knowing their answers displays a form of doxastic incoherence or confusion about the goal of inquiry. Specifically, J. Friedman claims that one would be in a doxastic situation where one believes a particular answer but also suspends one's judgement about its truth. Other philosophers like P. van Elswyk and Y. Sapid, who conceive knowledge as the goal of inquiry, claim that one would aim at knowing something one already knows. In this talk, I dispute these perspectives by showing that inquirers can be in higher or lower inquiring states of mind: They can aim to settle a question in a more or less demanding way by achieving cognitive attitudes that can be higher or lower than knowledge.

Lilith Newton **Irrational doubts, virtuous anxieties**

I offer an account of doubt as epistemic anxiety: an emotional response to epistemic risk. Doubt, so understood, can be evaluated as we evaluate anxiety in general, in terms of rationality and usefulness. Sceptical doubts do badly along both axes of evaluation. They are irrational, because the risks that sceptical doubts represent are not genuine risks. They are useless, because subjects cannot do anything to reduce the risk of sceptical possibilities obtaining. Nevertheless, I argue, sceptical doubts have aretaic value: they reflect well on the sceptic's intellectual character. Thus sceptical doubts can be worthwhile doubts to have.

Lixiao Lin **The Knowledge-why Norm for Aesthetic Assertions**

This talk argues that aesthetic assertions — assertions that involve a predicate of personal taste or a properly aesthetic adjective — are governed by a special epistemic norm ("the knowledge-why norm"), according to which a plain aesthetic sentence S is assertable at c, only if you know the aesthetic reason why S is true at c. The main motivation for this view is that it accounts for some new versions of Moore's paradox and for different data surrounding the acquaintance inference — the inference that the asserter of a plain aesthetic sentence normally communicates that s/he has had the relevant first-hand experience of the object(s) under evaluation. A discussion of how this view compares with other proposals on the market is provided.

Lukas Schwengerer **Epistemic Bystander**

Epistemic bystanding occurs when an agent has all the competences, knowledge and opportunity to prevent another person from forming a false or risky belief, but does not prevent the belief-formation. I provide a definition of an epistemic bystander and propose an account of the mechanism of epistemic bystanding building on Ishani Maitra's notion of licensing. An epistemic bystander licenses a risky belief-forming process in another person and thereby performs a blameworthy epistemic action.

Marc Andree Weber **Don't Ignore Extreme Cases!**

Extreme cases of peer disagreement are cases in which some person who appears to be one's epistemic peer, i.e. who appears to be as competent and well informed as oneself concerning a specific subject matter, sincerely claims something absurd concerning that subject matter. Epistemologists who think that peer disagreements are epistemically significant have a hard time explaining what one should believe in such extreme cases: on the one hand, it appears absurd to treat extreme cases in line with non-extreme cases and claim that they should cause one to revise one's beliefs; on the other hand, it is difficult to find convincing reasons to treat them differently. The aim of my talk is to show how standard views about peer disagreement can be reconciled with a plausible treatment of extreme cases, and how thinking about extreme cases deepens our understanding of those views.

Mariangela Zoe Cocchiari **The irrationality of scientists**

Scientists often find themselves in disagreement with their colleagues and yet hold fast to their views. According to Conciliationism, a prominent position in epistemology of disagreement, this means that they are epistemically irrational.

In this paper we investigate how this bothersome conclusion could be blocked.

All attempts fail: scientific disagreements fall within the scope of the peer disagreement debate, they fall within the scope of Conciliationism, and their irrationality is not even a bullet worth biting in the name of an allegedly greater good -- at least in the real case of scientific disagreement concerning Covid-19 that we investigate. Some of our scientists seem to be irrational and inexcusably so.

Marie van Loon **'How can you even believe this?': *Disappointment* as a blaming reactive attitude**

Are deontic evaluations of beliefs ever appropriate? Here I shall focus on a specific type of reactive attitude, *disappointment*. I will defend the twofold claim that disappointment about S's belief is an epistemic reactive attitude which, 1) involves a negative deontic evaluation; and furthermore, 2) does not entail that S is any way responsible for their belief. I further defend my claim against two potential objections. First, that what is going on in cases of being disappointed by a belief can in fact be accounted for other views of epistemic blame, like the so-called Relationship-based view. Second, that disappointment is in fact not a blaming reactive attitude precisely because it does not entail doxastic responsibility

Mario Santos-Sousa **Basic Number Knowledge: Recovery of a Humean Insight**

This paper vindicates Hume's deep, but widely neglected, insight into the nature of our basic number knowledge and argues that this insight is borne out by recent empirical research on the topic. In his *Treatise* (1.3.1), Hume suggests that we have a natural, albeit limited, capacity for quantity discrimination, a suggestion largely supported by the available evidence. He even comes close to describing the discrimination thresholds observed in number comparison tasks and supplies a precise standard (in terms of one-to-one correspondence) for gauging exact numerical equality beyond these thresholds. It is to this standard, which has come to be known as 'Hume's principle', that most attention has been devoted in contemporary philosophy of mathematics—often at the expense of his broader views. This paper aims to set the record straight and cast new light on the epistemological status of Hume's principle against the backdrop of his original insight.

Martin Grajner **In Defense of Skepticism about Epistemic Dilemmas**

Epistemic dilemmas involving higher-order evidence have attracted a lot of attention recently. In this paper, I argue for a novel strategy in defense of the idea that apparently dilemmic cases involving higher-order evidence fail to give rise to genuine epistemic dilemmas. I will situate higher-order defeaters within a theory of intellectual self-trust and a corresponding theory of testimonial deference to others. I shall argue that there is a presumption that agents act rationally in case they rely on their evidence in dilemmic cases even when they acquire higher-order evidence which calls the rationality of their lower-level evidence into question. The strategy pursued in this paper enjoys crucial advantages over alternative proposals. In particular, it allows to deny the existence of epistemic dilemmas without having to assume that higher-order evidence is never in principle apt to defeat the lower-level evidence for a belief; or that there are distinct domains of rationality; or that it is indeterminate what an agent ought to do in dilemmic cases.

Martina Fürst **Closing the conceptual gap in epistemic injustice**

In her influential work on epistemic injustice, Fricker discusses *hermeneutical injustice*. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victims lack the interpretative resources to make sense of their experience and this lacuna is traced down to a structural injustice. In this talk, I provide a model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to capture the target experience, namely *phenomenal concepts*. Second, I show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from subjective, phenomenal concepts to novel, public concepts. To reach this aim, I analyze different ways of communicating knowledge about experiences. The proposed model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice, given that the powerful do not care about their predicament.

Matt Jope **Evidentialism and Non-evidentialism for Rational Trust**

Evidentialism for trust holds that trust is rational only if supported by evidence. Evidentialism is well-suited to capture the intuitive connection between trust and action, but it fails to make sense of the distinctiveness of trust. Non-evidentialism on the other hand is better suited to explain what is distinctive of trust but it appears unable to account for the trust-action connection. I argue that the impasse can be broken by distinguishing between beliefs that are the output of trust, which must be supported by evidence, and the trusting attitude itself, which need not be.

Michel Croce **Cognitive Experts and The Problem(s) of Their Public Exposure**

In the epistemology of expertise, it is widely shared that (i) experts are those who know more, and that (ii) experts are those whom laypeople might have reason to defer to. The plausibility of these intuitions has been recently challenged by the public exposure of experts, which led several experts to abuse of their epistemic authority. In this talk, I show that this recent phenomenon provides us with reasons to revise (ii). By relying on Greco's functionalist view of an epistemic community, I shall distinguish between knowledge-gathering and knowledge-distributing activities and argue that experts should be understood as knowledge-producers rather than knowledge-communicators.

Megan Ritz **Gullibility, Skepticism, and the Testimonial Environment**

I consider whether a recipient of testimony should form a belief on the basis of that testimony even in the absence of positive non-testimonial reasons to believe. Some say that belief without positive reasons is gullibility; others say that failing to believe testimony, even in the absence of positive reasons, may be undue skepticism. I argue that if the recipient of testimony ought to respond in a way that is truth-conducive, then whether they ought to believe without positive reasons depends on features of the testimonial environment, rather than on the nature of testimony itself.

Melanie Sarzano **Towards a social understanding of pragmatic encroachment**

According to *pragmatic encroachment*, what is at *stake* for a subject can be relevant to determining whether the subject is in a position to know, or justified in believing p. My co-author and I argue that in some cases what is at stake for an individual contrasts so drastically with what is at stake on a

global level, that believing p may be irrational for a subject, yet rational on a collective level (and vice-versa). If correct, this raises important challenges for our understanding of pragmatic encroachment, stakes and group justification in social epistemology.

Michael Bruckner **Friendship, Forensics, and Favoritism.**

Sarah Stroud and Simon Keller observe that friendship sometimes requires thinking better of one's friend than an impartial observer would. They infer from this that friendship is (1) epistemically partial and (2) in conflict with mainstream epistemology. I contest both of these inferences. Firstly, even if friendship sometimes requires thinking better of one's friend, it also sometimes requires thinking worse of them (lest one *idolize* them). Secondly, if *acquaintance* of the kind that has seen an upsurge in interest recently can obtain between an epistemic agent and their friend's character, then the norms of mainstream epistemology will license such behavior.

Michael Markunas **Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Luck**

Acquaintance has undergone a recent resurgence of interest in the philosophy of mind and perception. What are the epistemic properties of this mental relation of acquaintance? Some theorists argue that acquaintance is a special source of (propositional) knowledge, while others argue that it is a special kind of knowledge that is distinct from propositional knowledge. In this paper, I examine the reasons for this latter view. I consider the ways the standard analysis of propositional knowledge can be transposed to non-propositional knowledge-by-acquaintance. I focus on anti-luck conditions for perceptual knowledge.

Michael Vollmer **Suspension of Belief and Suspension of Acceptance**

In my talk, I connect two topics which, by and large, have been investigated independent of each other: the suspension of belief and the distinction of beliefs and acceptance or reliance. For the very same reasons as in the case of belief and disbelief, I argue, there is a third flat-out reliance attitude of suspension. This form of suspension is not equivalent to the mere lack of reliance on a proposition and reliance on its negation. This observation, I maintain, has important upshots for the debate about the reasons for suspension of belief and the connection of suspension and inquiry.

Michael Wilde **Bird on abduction, reliability, and knowledge**

Alexander Bird thinks that an abductive inference can generate knowledge if and only if it is an inference to the only explanation. Bird provides an argument to the effect that an inference to merely the best explanation is insufficiently reliable to generate knowledge. I will argue that this case goes wrong by demanding an explanation of knowledge in terms of reliability, and that reconstructing successful abductive inferences as inferences to the only explanation serves to obscure the ampliative nature of the abductive knowledge.

Mikael Janvid **Against Normative Defeat**

This paper argues against the existence of *normative defeaters*, defeaters a subject *ought* to take on board indicating that one of her previous beliefs is either false or unjustified. Despite not being in possession of the subject, such defeaters still destroy her justification. In determining whether defeat occurs, the justificatory strength of the targeted belief is often left out of consideration, as well as the epistemic strength of the defeater, which I argue is a mistake. Once these parameters are specified, alleged cases of normative defeat either turn out not to defeat – the subject remains justified or was not justified to begin with – or can be subsumed under a uniform category of defeat. Incidentally, the same result is also reached for the contrast class to normative defeat: doxastic defeat.

Mikkel Gerken **Communicating Scientific Uncertainty**

Communicating scientific uncertainty to laypersons is a central challenge for science communication about politically divisive issues. In such cases, indications of uncertainty might fuel varieties of motivated cognition, such as identity-protective reasoning, which may contribute to selective science skepticism. Nevertheless, indicating epistemic uncertainty is widely regarded as desirable or even mandatory for public scientific testimony insofar as it seeks to contribute to a scientifically informed public and evidence-based policy. In this paper, I draw on social epistemology of testimony to articulate an empirically informed norm of public scientific testimony that is apt to incorporate indications of epistemic uncertainty.

Miriam Bowen **Comparative Beliefs and Imprecise Credences**

Degrees of belief are typically thought of as numerical. However, it's not clear what degrees of belief actually are - we don't literally have little numbers attached to our beliefs. I argue for a comparativist account of belief which claims that an agent's comparative belief relations are primitive and real and can explain numerical degrees of belief. A major appeal of comparativism is that comparative beliefs are more psychologically plausible, it is natural to talk about an agent simply lacking comparative beliefs between two propositions.

There are several challenges comparativism must address including whether we can have interpersonal beliefs, explain how we can get ratio information and how to model irrational agents. I address these questions and show how in addressing them we are pushed towards accepting an intersectionist interpretation of imprecise credences.

Moises Barba **A non-reductive account of collective epistemic virtues**

I provide a non-reductive account of collective epistemic virtues, i.e., epistemic virtues that are attributed to groups, conceived of as features different from the individual epistemic virtues of the group members. First, I argue that the existing accounts – distributed cognition and joint commitment models – are lacking in important respects. Second, I draw on what I take to be the intuitions underlying the latter kind of model to develop an original view. In my view, irreducible epistemic virtues are reliable group dispositions resulting from the group members appropriately responding to the epistemic obligations that bind them together as group members.

Morgan Adou **Wittgenstein's hinge propositions and the skeptical debate: a sociological insight:** The aim of my talk will be to give a sociological interpretation of the "über commitment" as it can be found in Duncan Pritchard's work. I shall argue that it is not an epistemological phenomenon which happens to be shared by all individuals, but a social necessity which rules our cognition. David Bloor gave numerous sociological interpretations of Wittgenstein's theory of knowledge. Based on some of his arguments, I will defend the thesis that the skeptical debate could find an answer in the association of Pritchard's reading of the hinge propositions and Bloor's strong program of sociology of scientific knowledge.

Nastasia Müller **An occurrent-state approach: towards the combination of responsibilist and reliabilist virtue**

According to the traditional and dominant view of epistemic responsibilist virtue, virtues are understood as enduring, stable traits of character. An act only counts as virtuous if it issued from a virtue. The occurrent-state conception, in contrast, takes the performance of a virtuous act as primary, such that an act, if based on the right epistemic motives, is virtuous regardless of whether it issued from a virtue. I will defend a particular version of the occurrent-state view and argue that the view is not only able to understand virtues as dispositional but also able to combine reliabilist and responsibilist virtues.

Natascha Rietdijk **Post-truth Politics and Collective Gaslighting**

Post-truth politics has been diagnosed as harmful to both knowledge and democracy. I argue that it can also fundamentally undermine epistemic autonomy in a way that is similar to the manipulative technique known as gaslighting. Using examples from contemporary politics, I identify three categories of post-truth rhetoric: the introduction of counternarratives, the discrediting of critics, and the denial of more or less plain facts. Like gaslighting, these post-truth

strategies aim to undermine epistemic autonomy by eroding self-trust, in order to consolidate power. Focusing on the effects on the victim allows for new insights into the specific harms of post-truth politics and can help to combat and resist it.

Nathaly Ardelean Garcia **Stereotype Threat, Self-Doubt, and Knowledge: A Double Epistemic Harm**

In this paper, I explore an epistemic phenomenon where a person is subject to a kind of testimonial injustice that is not based on the hearer's biases or prejudice toward the speaker; instead, the speaker is dismissed as a knower or giver of knowledge due to the speaker's self-doubt about her own epistemic capacities. I argue that a subject gets further victimized as a result of stereotype threat combined with a host of philosophical views in which the speaker's knowledge is a necessary requirement for assertion, action, and testimonial transmission. As a result, a person who suffers stereotype threat faces two wrongs: 1) being robbed of the possession of the knowledge in question, and 2) being robbed of the ability to make epistemic contributions to the community. Similarly, stereotype threat robs the community of deeply important knowledge.

Nick Kuespert **Will the Real Moral Experts Please Stand Up?**

Cholbi (2018) proposes theoretical knowledge—knowledge of the correct moral theory—as a central element of moral expertise. I argue against this position. I draw on Star's (2015) argument against a similar conception of moral worth. He argues against the common assumption that knowledge of fundamental moral reasons is required for an agent to perform a morally worthy action. Cholbi's argument fails in a similar vain. He rightly argues that predictive power is insufficient for the identification of moral experts. However, he overlooks a middle ground between predictive power and all-out knowledge of fundamental moral reasons—knowledge of (or responsiveness to) *derivative* reasons.

Nuno Venturinha **A Problem for Greco's Anti-Reductionism**

In his most recent work, culminating in *The Transmission of Knowledge*, John Greco adopts a new epistemological perspective, arguing that knowledge transmission cannot be viewed as reducible to knowledge generation. But while his framework convincingly addresses the individualism objection often levelled against virtue epistemology, it problematically incorporates a third kind of knowledge, that of “common knowledge” or “hinge knowledge”, which shares the property of irreducibility with generated and transmitted knowledge. In this paper, I will discuss the all-pervasive and inescapable nature of hinge commitments, raising difficulties for the anti-reductionism that characterizes Greco's “unified epistemology of generated, transmitted, and hinge knowledge”.

Paolo Savino **From Evidence to Underdetermination Without Infallibilism**

The underdetermination sceptic argues that one's evidence does not favour P over a competing sceptical hypothesis SH because one has the same evidence in the good and the bad case. Call this ‘the sceptical inference’ (hence: SI). It has been suggested that the underdetermination argument for scepticism is a bad argument because SI presupposes infallibilism about justification. Call this ‘the infallibility objection’ (hence: IO). In this talk, I shall argue that IO is mistaken: SI does not presuppose infallibilism. The key idea for my argument is that SI is analogous to some acceptable inferences that do not presuppose infallibilism.

Paula Keller **Why Know about Injustice**

What is the value of knowledge about injustice? I identify two values. First, knowledge about injustice is desirable, enabling knowers to work towards a more just world. This idea gives such knowledge instrumental value. Second, knowledge about injustice is desirable for us as social beings in an unjust world. This gives such knowledge non-instrumental value. Most of this paper will be concerned with making sense of the second value. What makes knowledge about injustice non-instrumentally valuable, especially when contrasted with other knowledge and other goods we value? Might this non-instrumental value excuse political inactivity in the face of injustice?

Paweł Grad **Epistemological Disjunctivism and Rationality of Perception**

Several authors pointed out that Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED) has problems with successfully embracing internalist insights about rationalizing role of phenomenal character. I address this issue by discussing Susanna Siegel's claims (2017) and her critique of an unambiguously internalist view on epistemic role of perception, namely Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). My claim is that explanatory priority between veridical and falsidical experiences (Schellenberg 2018), which is entailed by disjunctivist account can be used to explain why even falsidical experiences provide some rational support for corresponding belief. In the paper I am developing such an explanation.

Paweł Zięba **Smithies on the epistemic role of consciousness**

Short abstract: In his recent book (*The Epistemic Role of Consciousness*, OUP 2019), Declan Smithies argues that phenomenal consciousness is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification. Smithies' proposal hinges on a number of assumptions in the philosophy of mind. In this talk, I explain why some of those assumptions are problematic, and argue that rejecting them leads to a superior account of the epistemic significance of consciousness.

Petronella Randell **The value of risk in transformative experience**

Risk is inherent in many, if not all, transformative experiences. For instance, the risk of losing our current values, our current selves, and important relationships. Transformative experiences carry significant risks to those who choose to undertake them. This aspect of transformative experience has thus far been ignored, but carries important consequences for those wishing to defend decision theory from the problem transformative experience poses to it. I will argue that the standard method of measuring utilities is unsuited for use in transformative contexts because the value of transformative experiences is at least partly rooted in the risks inherent to them.

Ravi Thakral **Knowledge of Normativity**

The field of modal epistemology is almost exclusively focused on the epistemology of metaphysical modality. In this talk, I aim to expand the purview of modal epistemology by connecting this field to epistemological problems in metaethics. In particular, I consider how we might adopt an imagination-based approach to our knowledge of metaphysical modality to an account of our knowledge of normativity.

Rene van Woudenberg **The Epistemology of Reading**

Epistemologists have distinguished many 'sources of knowledge'. But reading is not one them. In this talk I argue that this is a mistake—and that reading neither reduces to perception nor to the uptake of testimony. I offer an analysis of what it is to read something, and then use this as a basis for distinguishing and analyzing two kinds of reading-knowledge: 1) knowing what the author/text says, and 2) knowing that what the author/text says is true. I explain under what conditions reading-beliefs are justified. I will next offer a fuller characterization of the source that reading is.

Robin McKenna **Medina on Epistemic Responsibility**

Heather Battaly has argued that vice epistemology has what she calls a "responsibility problem". Roughly, the problem is how to reconcile a picture of ourselves as deeply socially situated and our characters as shaped by social forces beyond our control with the idea that we are responsible for our character traits. In this talk I argue that the version of virtue and vice epistemology developed by José Medina in his *The Epistemology of Resistance* has the resources to deal with the responsibility problem. For Medina, epistemic agency and responsibility are themselves socially situated. The social relationships in which we stand to others, and the social influences others can exert on us because we stand in these relationships, do not pose a challenge to epistemic agency and responsibility. They are rather the grounds in which epistemic agency and responsibility are based.

Roger Clarke **50 Ways to Believe Your Lover**

“Belief Is Weak”, say Hawthorne, Rothschild, and Spectre (HRS), at least in ordinary language. “No it isn’t,” I say. HRS say that “believe” and “think” in ordinary language pick out a weak attitude. I accept HRS’s tests for weakness, but I show that there are a plethora of other belief-attributing VPs in ordinary English which do not pass those tests. We can ground philosophical “belief” in ordinary language without grounding it in ordinary “believe”. I have some other arguments, too, but this is the fun one.

Ross Patrizio **Productivity and Balance in the Epistemology of Testimony**

Reductionists and anti-reductionists disagree over the appropriate doxastic response to testimony. In this paper I develop a novel formulation of anti-reductionism (AR) so as to explicate a hitherto underappreciated advantage it has over reductionism (R). More specifically, I argue that AR recommends a more *productive* testimonial belief-forming process than R. Drawing on Kelp et al. (2020), I countenance a particular kind of epistemic productivity and spell out its relevance to the epistemology of testimony. I then argue that AR does indeed enjoy a significant productivity-based advantage. Finally, I apply this to some familiar problems for AR and respond to potential objections.

Russell Ming **The Problem of Warranted Objections**

Consider a disagreement interaction as consisting of three different stages: at stage (I), A believes p, B believe not-p, and each believes the other to be an epistemic peer; at stage (II), A asserts p; at stage (III), B objects to A’s assertion by asserting not-p. What I will argue is that if one is committed to both the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) and Conciliationism about disagreement, then, in cases where B knows not-p at stage (I), one is committed to the claim that at stage (III) B has warrant to object and B does not have warrant to object. I call this the Problem of Warranted Objections. After showing why the Problem of Warranted Objections follows from KNA and Conciliationism, I note four ways of responding to the problem.

Sara Chan **Testifying for**

“Nothing about us without us”. Many social justice movements are founded on the importance of listening to testimony from minority voices. But what about the cognitively disabled, who may not be able to testify for themselves? Often, caregivers seek to speak up on behalf of their charges, but find their testimony dismissed as being due to being “blinded by love”. This paper is positioned against that position. I argue that far from undermining objectivity of testimony, love and intimate care can give caregivers privileged epistemic access to the wellbeing of their charge.

Sebastian Schmidt **Conflicts within reason: in defense of the epistemic ‘ought’**

What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something we ought *simpliciter* to believe, all epistemic and practical reasons considered, or by denying the normative significance of epistemic reasons altogether. I first carve out a challenge posed by these recent views. I then meet this challenge by drawing on the literature on epistemic blame. I argue that we can be blameworthy for epistemic failure even when we were practically required to fail epistemically.

Silvia De Toffoli **Successful Transmission of Justification Across Fallacious Arguments**

According to a widely held view in the philosophy of mathematics, direct inferential justification for mathematical propositions (that are not axioms) requires proof. I challenge this view. I argue that certain fallacious mathematical arguments considered by the relevant subjects to be correct can confer mathematical justification. But mathematical justification doesn’t come for cheap: not just any argument will do. I suggest that, in order to be successful in transmitting justification, an argument must satisfy specific standards, some of which are social. The picture I delineate is a hybrid form of phenomenal conservatism. Although in this talk I focus on mathematical inferential beliefs, the view on offer generalizes straightforwardly to other inferential beliefs.

Simon Barker **Why mental health is epistemic health: a case-study of self-trust and bipolar disorder**

This paper examines the relationship between *epistemic self-trust/distrust* and mental health via a case-study of *bipolar disorder*. The paper shows how the symptoms of depression and mania can be partly constitutive of unwarranted excesses of self-trust/distrust. When this is the case, I suggest, the person will be subject to a 1st-order *epistemic health disorder* (EHD). Whereby a person has an EHD if a mental disorder impugns the epistemic-normative status of acts such as believing or trusting and the EHD is 1st-order if the symptoms of the mental disorder *co-vary* with cognitive and affective states necessary to achieving one's epistemic ends.

Sophie Keeling **An Experiential Theory of Epistemic Basing**

Thirza Lagewaard **An agonistic response to deep disagreement**

Deep disagreement can be a problem for democratic policy making, but a rational solution is (seemingly) impossible due to a lack of shared epistemic principles. Michael Lynch proposed a *practical* solution. Lynch aims to provide a *practical public* reason for privileging the fundamental epistemic principles that underlie modern science. This paper challenges Lynch's 'Rawlsian' solution from within deliberative theory, focusing on recent work about consensus and the role of public reason. Then, this paper explores an alternative: an agonistic answer. This approach focuses on handling the disagreement in a practical way without striving towards consensus but by attempting to maximize the value of conflict.

Tom Schoonen **Similarity and the Necessity of Origins**

Similarity-based epistemologies of possibility extrapolate our knowledge of actuality through relevant similarity. However, such theories run into trouble with regards to the necessity of origins. The solution, I argue, relies on the fact that successful similarity reasoning depends on there being a causal relation between the properties that the objects involved share and the property that we are extrapolating. As we reason with cause and effect, directionality and ordering are significant. I suggest that similarity reasoning relevant to the epistemology of possibility is only justified if it does not violate the relevant temporal ordering.

Valentin Teillet **Is Knowledge sufficient for Mindreading?**

According to the factive theory of mind, knowledge is the new hallmark of mindreading (Nagel, 2017)(Phillips, J et al., 2021). Based on what we know, we can track and separate what others know or do not know (Phillips, J. & Norby, A., 2019). The binarity of knowledge (knowledge v. ignorance) makes mindreading simple, whereas the opacity of belief made it confusing. However, this idea faces two main issues. Ignorance does not seem to be a mental state and mindreading requires second-order representations (Jacob, 2020) that are incompatible with the non-transparency of knowledge (Williamson, 2000). I shall answer these two objections by arguing that the factive theory of mind need not consist of an opposition between knowledge (factivity) and belief (non-factivity). I shall argue that mindreading is factive because our attributions (of belief or knowledge) are necessarily based on our knowledge. In other words, the factivity of mind does not lie in the nature of our mental attributions, but in the aim of mindreading.