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Keynote Address
Saturday, October 10, 5:00-6:30pm
Online

The Right, the Good, and Our Ultimate Moral Concerns

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In this presentation, I'll argue that a complete moral theory should provide us not only with accounts of both what's right and what's good, but also with an account what our ultimate moral concerns should be. Such an account would tell us what we morally ought ultimately to care about and, thus, what we morally ought to be ultimately aiming to achieve or, at least, what we morally ought to be hoping will be achieved—and, if not by us, then by others. For one, the question of what we morally ought ultimately to care about is an important fundamental moral question and, thus, one that we should expect a complete moral theory to answer for us. For another, whether the ultimate moral concerns that a moral theory prescribes for us is consistent with our being motivated to do as its criterion of rightness directs us to act will determine whether that theory is incoherent—determine, that is, whether it gives us inconsistent moral motivations. In the process of arguing for this, I'll explicate this notion of an ultimate moral concern, explain why it's important, and speculate as to what our ultimate moral concerns should be.

Doug Portmore is Professor of Philosophy in the School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies at Arizona State University. He is an Associate Editor for *Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy*. He recently edited *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism* (2020). And he is the author of several journal articles and two books with Oxford University Press: *Commonsense Consequentialism* (2011) and *Opting for the Best* (2019). His research focuses mainly on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two, but he has also written on well-being, moral worth, posthumous harm, moral responsibility, and the non-identity problem.