





**International Symposium of the Plato Society of Zagreb  
in cooperation with  
the Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb and the City of Hvar**

***Bildung and paideia: Philosophical Models of  
Education. Bildung i paideia: Filozofski modeli odgoja i  
obrazovanja. Bildung et paideia: Modèles philosophiques de  
l'éducation. Bildung und paideia: Philosophische  
Bildungsmodelle. Bildung e paideia: Modelli filosofici di  
educazione***

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## *I. Symposium Lectures & Invited Papers*



# The Educational Role Played by Emotions in the Socratic Dialogues of Plato.

## The Case of Shame

Dr. Laura Candiotta

Ca' Foscari University of Venice

This paper proposes an analysis of Plato's *Sophist* (230b-230e5) that underlines the bond between the logical and the emotional level in the Socratic 'elenchus'. In particular, the present paper will examine the role of Socratic dialogue and Platonic texts in Athenian society following a "maieutic" interpretation.

As we shall see, the use of emotions characterizing the "*elenctic*" method described by Plato is crucial to influencing the audience and the public – accordingly, it provides the Platonic writing with an ethical, political and performative function. The "*elenchus*" aims at improving the interlocutor through a process of purification that is capable of changing his whole existence. In this perspective, the goal of the Socratic method is to give birth to a right mode of life, and it is precisely the literary aspect of Plato's dialogues that makes this possible.

By examining the text, it will be possible to individuate rhetorical strategies that aim at transforming the general public in the same way that – albeit to a lesser degree – Socrates' action transforms his interlocutors<sup>1</sup>. However, Plato's dialogues only rarely give testimony of a successful transformation occurring in the interlocutor. This is due to the interlocutor's attitude towards shame: the feeling of shame can be accepted as a means for self-transformation or hidden in order to protect one's social status. This paper will explore the way in which this fundamental difference is delineated within the dialogues by providing appropriate textual examples. Arguably, by outlining the distinction between these two types of shame, it is possible to notice how the purification of the interlocutor implies a turning point – or "break" – within the Socratic dialogue.

Shame, as a psychological mechanism triggered by the *elenchus*, can result in a positive outcome – the interlocutor's transformation – as long as the person accepts his faults and makes an effort to eliminate them in order to reach the Truth. However, in the dialogues shame is often concealed because the interlocutor is afraid that, by recognizing his mistakes, he will forego also his identity. It is therefore necessary to analyze the value systems and points of reference involved in these dynamics and in particular the concepts of identity and affiliation at the basis of the interlocutor's negative attitude. The process of purification requires a great effort from the interlocutor: he must be prepared to be criticized by Socrates within a social context that will judge his behavior. He must be able to abandon the traditional values that support his identity in order to adopt a mode of life coherent with the knowledge that he will come to acquire.

In the Platonic Dialogues, the rhetorical dimension is strictly related to the endorsement of a specific ethical and political model. Moreover, such a dimension is one key element through which Plato's philosophy becomes a form of praxis aiming at improving the citizens and the polis. The relation between the rational-dialogical and affective dimension therefore represents the basis for the constitution of a new "paideia".

The nexus between rhetorical and ethical-political levels will be further explored in the last part of the article by introducing a specific hermeneutic figure – the "outreach elenchus" – that allows a form of purification of the audience and the spectators witnessing

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<sup>1</sup>See *Soph.* 230c2-3.

the debate. This type of elenchus steps in at the very moment in which the Socratic interlocutor attempts to protect his social image, concealing his shame. The audience, thanks to Plato's literary strategy, realizes the failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social image becomes tarnished.

#### R.S. Peters on Liberal Education and the Humanities

Prof. Dr. Stefaan E. Cuypers

Leuven University, Belgium

From time to time, Peters himself asks whether he is equating the concept of education with that of liberal education. Sometimes he deems the requirements for liberal education stronger than the basic normative and cognitive requirements he singles out for education simpliciter. Yet at other times, he does not object to treating both concepts, as well as the concept of moral education, as fundamentally the same concept.

Although the analysis of liberal education might thus be used as an effective and concentrated summary of his own educational criteria, Peters in his later work explicitly returns to the issue of the ambiguities and dilemmas surrounding liberal education. Not only because of its intrinsic interest, but also because Peters has, on my interpretation, something original to add to the discussion about liberal education, it is worthwhile to take up this issue.

After reviewing Peters' disentanglement of the ambiguities of liberal education, I reconstruct his view on the status and the foundations of the humanities. Surprisingly perhaps, what emerges from my reconstruction is a kind of justification of liberal education as general education in the sense of initiation into the human heritage or the humanities.

#### *Paideia Platonikê*: Does the Later Platonist Programme of Education Retain any Validity?

Prof. John Dillon

Trinity College, University of Dublin

During the Middle Platonic period, from the 2nd cent CE on, and in a more elaborately structured way from the time of Iamblichus (early 4th cent. CE) on, the Platonist Schools of later antiquity took their students through a fixed sequence of Platonic dialogues, beginning with the Alcibiades I, concerned as it was with the theme of self-knowledge, and ending – at least in the later period – with the Timaeus and Parmenides, representing the two 'pinnacles' of Platonic philosophy, concerned with the physical and intelligible realms respectively. There seems also have been a preliminary period of study, in which one mastered the techniques of logic, with the help of Aristotle's Organon. It may be also that, at least in Iamblichus' school and later, some attention was paid to the life and teachings of Pythagoras, including Pythagorean mathematics and numerology, and perhaps a degree of observance of the Pythagorean way of life, e.g. periods of silence, meditation, dietary restrictions.

The question I wish to address on this occasion is whether such a course of study retains any validity in the modern world. I shall argue that some version of it indeed might, though by no means for everybody. A course of education, after all, which begins with the rules for rational thought and argumentation, then turns to the question of the true nature of the self, and then considers the nature of ethics, politics, physics and metaphysics, should serve very well for developing well-rounded and rational persons. It would work, best, though, in conjunction with, rather than in lieu of, more traditional forms of education.

## Ultimate Meaning and the Game of Games: Toward a Model of Individualized Paideia

Dr. Jonathan Doner, Ph.D.

Virginia, USA

According to Werner Jaeger, in *Paideia*, Vol. II, “Paideia for Plato is the soul’s lifelong struggle to free itself from ignorance of the greatest goods, which bars its way to its true welfare.” Furthermore, Jaeger points out, “what Plato means by paideia ... is not merely a stage in a man’s development, where he trains a certain number of faculties; its meaning is extended to connote the perfection of his character, in accordance with his nature.” But Plato “did not think of nature ... as raw material out of which education was to form a work of art; he thought it was the highest areté, which is only incompletely manifested in individual man.” And, “Areté is the soul’s health; so it is man’s normal state, his true nature.” It is the task of education to complete the manifestation of man’s true nature and thus fulfill the promise of areté. Yet, “all education is spiritually a function of the community. ... It is actually the influence of the state and society that educates men and makes them into whatever society wants.” Jaeger’s account thus identifies two distinct, yet necessarily interrelated, perspectives. Paideia is the manifestation of one’s own individual nature, and it is a function of the community, molding the person according to the ideals of the state. For Plato, there is no conflict between these two because the true nature of the individual and the ideal of the community are held to be one and the same. This identity is, in fact, the foundation of paideia, both in its classical and more recent manifestations. However, in our post-modern, pluralistic society, such an approach can result in clashes between cultural, racial, religious, ethnic, and gender-based perspectives. We can no longer assume a strict agreement between the ideals of the individual and that of the dominant culture. These difficulties tend to drive the educational system away from paideia and toward the training of “a certain number of faculties.” Yet this need not be the case. This paper presents a perspective and a set of tools which can be utilized in its revitalization. The core perspective concerns the author’s theory that, given the inherent complexity of the symbolic capability of human beings, the generation of symbolic forms, which the philosopher Ernst Cassirer argued was the foundation of culture and self, requires an inherent canalizing system within the human brain which can be termed the archetype of ultimate meaning. What this means for present purposes is that, in accord with Plato’s view, the pursuit of ultimate meaning is an indelible part of our nature. The archetype of ultimate meaning entails three aspects. The first is an ontology of the Good, especially as it relates to world, to community, and to the self. The second is a set of moral imperatives. And the third component is a dual praxis consisting of two divergent yet interrelated approaches to the manifestation of ultimate meaning. The application of this perspective in the development of a modern, individualized paideia is made possible through a specialized educational system, a game of games. Such a tool must

embody four critical criteria. Ultimacy means that the content and organization of the educational system does, in fact, promote the pursuit of ultimate meaning. Adaptability means the system is capable of full customization according to the needs and demands of the individual. Transferability means that the individual's participation in the system must actually help them in the pursuit of areté in their own life. And finally, scalability means that the system should, without loss to any of the other three characteristics, be capable of being scaled from an individual game to an institutionalized system and on to life itself. This paper presents an example of such a tool and discusses its structure and potential development.

## Exegese und Polemik. Die Dialoge Platons im Kontext hellenistischer Paideia

Prof. Dr. Michael Erler

Universität Würzburg

In diesem Beitrage, möchte ich darauf hinweisen, daß die Lektüre der platonischen Dialoge und die damit verbundene Polemik (Dekontextualisierung von Stellen, Sinnvekehren) zum (unkritischen) Umgang mit Platon-Texten in hellenistischen, epikurischen Texten passe. In diesem Kontext wird zudem über die diesem Vorgehen zugrundliegenden hermeneutischen Prinzipien reflektiert, welche – wie ich glaube, zeigen zu können – aus der Rhetorik stammen.

Ich werde mich bei Darlegung dieses Verhältnisses auf die Spuria als Interpretationsdokument Platons im Paideia-Kontext konzentrieren, und zudem auf den Begriff der Aphorme verweisen, der sich bei vergleichbarem hermeneutischen Ansatz in epikurischen Texten der Zeit findet (z.B. in der Homerinterpretation bei Philodem, Polemik mit Kolotes bei Plutarch). Dieser Begriff - wie ich zeigen möchte - stammt aus der Rhetorik und spielt dann, wie auch einige Phänomene, die sich in den Spuria als ersten Zeugnissen der Platonlektüre finden, in der Hermeneutik methodisch (im Hinblick auf Dekontextualisierung, Startrampe für Eigenes, vor allem Polemik) eine Rolle. Ich finde in diesem Konzept eine Erklärung für einige Eigentümlichkeiten dieser Platonlektüre, z.B, warum in den Spuria bisweilen genau Gegenteiliges zu den jeweils evozierten Platonischen Vorlage gesagt wird – das ist nicht Folge tumben Missverstehens, sondern selbstprofilierender Auseinandersetzung mit Platonlektüre und damit Zeugnis hellenistischer Paideia (z.B. hat Horaz Homer so gelesen).

## Exegesis and Polemics: The Dialogues of Plato in the Context of Hellenistic Paideia (translation)

Prof. Dr. Michael Erler

University of Würzburg

In this paper, I would like to show how the reading of Platonic dialogues and the polemic connected to it (decontextualisation of passages, perversion of meaning) corresponds to the (uncritical) interpretation of Plato texts in Hellenistic, Epicurean texts. In this context,

the hermeneutic principles which form the basis of this approach, and which, as I believe I can show, stem from rhetoric, will also be considered.

I will concentrate in my presentation of these relationships on the spuria as documentation of Plato-interpretation in the paideia context, and also refer to the concept of aphorme which provides an example of a comparative hermeneutic approach as evidenced in Epicurean texts of the time (eg. in the Homer-interpretation of Philodemus, the polemic with Kolotes in Plutarch). This concept, as I hope to show, stems from rhetoric and, along with some other phenomena in the spuria as first witnesses of Plato-interpretation, plays a significant methodological role in hermeneutics (with respect to decontextualisation, as a platform for presenting one's own standpoint, above all in polemic). I discover in this concept an explanation for certain peculiarities of Plato-interpretation – for example, the question of why in the spuria sometimes exactly the opposite of the actual content of the Plato text under consideration is said. This is not a consequence of ignorant misunderstanding, but of a pretentious encounter and confrontation with the Platonic text, which thereby gives witness to [the character of] Hellenistic paideia (Horace, for example, read Homer in this manner).

### The Purpose of Education: Private or Public?

Prof. Dr. Frans de Haas

University of Leiden

In this paper I would like to consider a number of different aims that ancient philosophers set for education: e.g. citizenship, justice, development of the individual intellect, return to one's divine origin. Current developments in European education focus more and more on economical aims, and often fail to address the need for dialogue with non-European societies. Can the Western philosophical tradition in education provide the intellectual tools to position Europe well within the global community?

### Die Philosophie der Bildung beim frühen Fichte

Dr. Tamás Hankovszky

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Fichte ist vom Hauslehrer zum Professor in Jena geworden, und war später auch Rector der Universität in Berlin. Er beschäftigte sich immer wieder mit den theoretischen und praktischen Fragen der Bildung. Seine Thesen über die Erziehung des adligen Zöglings, der Studierenden, oder auch der Nation wurzeln tief in seiner Philosophie. Mein Vortrag schildert eine frühe Gestalt seiner Bildungskonzeption, wie sie in Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten erscheint.

In diesem Text von 1794 polemisiert Fichte von Anfang an mit Rousseau, obwohl eine offene Konfrontation nur in der letzten Vorlesung stattfindet. Der Einwand Fichtes kann in einem Satz zusammengefasst werden. Rousseaus „Zögling entwickelt sich von sich selbst.“ Dies bedeutet einerseits, dass der Erzieher nicht viel mehr zu tun hat, als die

Hindernisse seiner Bildung zu entfernen. Andererseits bedeutet es, dass die „gütige Natur“ selbst den Zögling entwickelt, oder auch, dass die Natur sich selbst in ihm entfaltet, also auch der Zögling nicht viel zu tun hat. Dagegen ist die Bildung nach Fichte ein ständiger Kampf und zwar ein Kampf gegen die Natur, die mit Hilfe des Begriffs des Nicht-Ichs interpretiert werden kann. Fichte erblickt in ihr keine gute Macht, die wir nur wirken lassen brauchen, um unser Ziel, das moralische Gute zu erreichen. Wenn nämlich die Natur in uns waltet, sind wir passiv. Das Gute im moralischen Sinne ist aber die Selbsttätigkeit, denn das Ideal, dem wir annähern sollen, ist das absolute Ich der Wissenschaftslehre, in dem es keine Passivität gibt, weil es reine Tätigkeit ist. Der Mensch kann das werden, was er sein soll, er kann gleich mit sich selbst werden, indem er die Natur sich selbst unterwirft, statt von ihr abzuhängen.

Aber diese radikale Freiheit und Autonomie des Menschen scheint keinen Raum für den Einfluss eines Erziehers übrigzulassen. Jeder Einfluss von Außen würde die Autonomie des Menschen rauben. Auch Rousseau hat es so gemeint. Kann also der Erzieher auch bei Fichte nur so eine marginale Rolle spielen, wie bei Rousseau? An diesem Punkt gewinnt ein Aspekt der Wissenschaftslehre eine große Bedeutung, welche schon 1794 anwesend ist, aber nur 1796 in der Naturrecht völlig ausgearbeitet wird. Um uns freie Wirksamkeit zuschreiben zu können, brauchen wir ein anderes Wesen, das uns auffordert, ein "Gegenüber": „Die Aufforderung zur freien Selbstthätigkeit ist das, was man Erziehung nennt.“ (Daraus folgt u.a., dass die Erziehung nie mit Zwangsmittel ausgeübt werden kann.)

Weil das Nicht-Ich als Natur es ist, das durch seine je verschiedene Wirkungen auf uns verschiedene Fähigkeiten in uns, damit verschiedene Stände in der Gesellschaft hervorbringt, ist die Natur selbst für die Ungleichheit innerhalb des Menschen und unter den Menschen verantwortlich. Dementsprechend sind bei Fichte im Gegensatz zu Rousseau die Kultur und die Bildung die geeignete Mittel, die Gleichheit zu fördern. Wenn wir tätig gegen die Natur oder das Nicht-Ich kämpfen, können wir nicht nur mit uns selbst gleich werden, sondern auch mit den Anderen. Die Bestimmung der Gelehrten ist es, diesen Kampf als Lehrer und Erzieher anzuführen.

#### Philosophy of Education in Early Fichte (translation)

Dr. Tamás Hankovszky

Péter Pázmány Katholische University, Hungary

Fichte went from being a tutor to being a professor in Jena, and later rector of the University of Berlin. He dealt with theoretical and practical aspects of education (Bildung) time and again. His theses on the education (Erziehung) of the aristocratic pupil, student, or even of the nation are deeply rooted in his philosophy. My lecture portrays an early form of his concept of "Bildung", as it appears in "Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation."<sup>1</sup>

In this work from 1794, Fichte polemicizes from the start with Rousseau, although an open confrontation only occurs in the last lecture. Fichte's objection can be summed up in one sentence. Rousseau's "pupil develops on his own." This means, on the one hand, that the

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<sup>1</sup> "Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation." Trans. Daniel Breazeale. In Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, pp. 144-184. [Complete translation of *Einige Vorlesungen Über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten* (1794). GA, I,3, pp. 25-68. SW, VI, pp. 289-346.] (A slightly different version of the first four lectures was first published in *Philosophy of German Idealism*, ed. Ernst Behler, pp. 1-38. New York: Continuum, 1987.)

educator has very little more to do than to remove the obstacles to his education. On the other hand, it means, that "benevolent nature" alone develops the pupil, or also, that nature unfolds itself in him, that is, that the pupil doesn't have to do much. For Fichte, however, Bildung is a constant battle, and indeed a battle against nature, which can be interpreted with the help of the concept of "Nicht-Ich" (Not-I). Fichte sees in nature not a benevolent power, that we only need to allow to act in order to attain our goal of the moral good. If, namely, nature rules in us, we are passive. The good in a moral sense, however, is autonomous activity, for the ideal which we should approach is the absolute "Ich" of the Doctrine of Science, in which there is no passivity, because it is pure activity. The human being can become that which (s)he should be, (s)he can become one with her-/himself, by subjugating nature to her-/himself, instead of being dependent on it.

But this radical freedom and autonomy of the human being appears to leave no room for the influence of the educator. Every external influence would rob the human being of his/her autonomy. This was also what Rousseau meant. Can then the educator in Fichte play such a marginal role as in Rousseau? With regard to this point, a certain aspect of the Doctrine of Science, which was already present in 1794, but only was fully expounded in 1796 in Natural Law, gains great importance. In order to attribute free efficacy to ourselves, we need another being, which challenges us. A "vis-à-vis", or other. "The challenge to free autonomous activity is that which one calls education." (From this it follows, among other things, that education can never be implemented by means of force.)

Because it is the "Not-I" as nature which produces various effects upon us and various capabilities in us respectively, and therewith produces different classes in society, nature itself is responsible for the inequality within the human being and among human beings. In Fichte, accordingly, as opposed to Rousseau, culture and education are the appropriate means for promoting equality. If we actively battle nature or the Not-I, we can not only become equal to ourselves, but also with others. The vocation of the academic is to enter this battle as teacher and educator.

### Werner Jaegers 'Paideia' und der 'Dritte Humanismus'

Prof. Dr. Christoph Horn

Universität Bonn

Werner Jaeger (1888-1961) gilt heute als der zentrale Repräsentant einer Bildungsbewegung, die unter dem (für unsere Ohren sehr fragwürdig klingenden) Titel ‚Dritter Humanismus‘ auftrat. Tatsächlich bildet sein dreibändiges Werk Paideia (1933-1947) das grundlegende Dokument dieser ‚Weltanschauung‘. Jedoch erweist sich die unter dem Titel ‚Dritter Humanismus‘ auftretende Strömung bei näherem Hinsehen als wesentlich komplexer, als dass man sie einfach mit dem Ideal einer an klassischen Vorbildern orientierten Bildung gleichsetzen könnte. In dem Vortrag soll es darum gehen, die auf das Wilhelminische Kaiserreich zurückgehende Strömung umfassender zu charakterisieren und Werner Jaegers Platz in ihr präziser zu bestimmen.

## Werner Jaegers 'Paideia' and 'Third Humanism' (translation)

Prof. Dr. Christoph Horn

Universität Bonn

Werner Jaeger (1888-1961) is considered today the main representative of a cultural and educational movement which appeared under the for our ears very dubious sounding name "Third Humanism". Indeed his three-volume work *Werk Paideia* (1933-1947) forms the foundational document of this 'world-view'. Nevertheless, the current which made its appearance under the title 'Third Humanism' proves on closer examination to be much too complex to allow it to be simply equated with an ideal of an education formulated according to Classical models. In this paper, the current of thought which traces to the Wilhelminian Empire is to be more thoroughly characterized and Werner Jaeger's place in it more precisely determined.

### The Socrates Treatment

Prof. Dr. Herbert Hrachovec

Universität Wien

The designator „Socrates“ refers to a more complicated philosophical figure than is usually acknowledged. Plato's version of his life and discursive strategies has had an irreversible impact on philosophy quite independent from how the historical Socrates actually fitted into his contemporary Athenian surroundings. Aristophanes counted Socrates among the so-called Sophists, precisely the group of post-traditional, utilitarian intellectual trainers that Plato took so much care to distinguish Socrates from. Platonic „paideia“ should be considered as closely linked to the concurrent development of educational resources offering social and rhetorical skills intended to succeed in an increasingly multifaceted city-state like Athens.

One of the best known Socratic moves is, in fact, a strategic device designed to startle his interlocutors and to confer an argumentative edge to the philosopher. Longstanding familiarity with this move impedes our ability to realize that asking for the essence of something started out as a ploy to confound narrow-minded, self-assured citizens and to nudge them towards a much more (pun intended) sophisticated position, the actual content of which remained unclear, to be revealed by further instruction.

The Platonic doctrine of „paideia“, derived from his theory of forms, is a highly effective instrument of social engineering. Take, for example, courage and consider how Socrates deals with this concept in Plato's *Laches*. Not to mince words, he employs a bad cop/good cop approach. His questions are designed to undercut ordinary expectations and to demonstrate the insufficiency of local know-how. „What is courage?“ is a move to disqualify established „wisdom“ to make place for higher-order considerations transcending, as well as governing, common preconceptions. The introduction of an unifying form of courage promises to reconstruct the shattered mastery of the concept resulting from Socrates' initial criticism. A closer look at the strategy designed by Plato is called for.



Instances of courage are said to participate in a quality which is claimed to be incommensurable to its singular tokens. The form of courage, to the modern reader, is an operative, paradigmatic template imposing order upon a confusing multiplicity of courage-related events. Forms are sublime, yet they are linked together in an elaborate pattern accessible to reflective thought. They share the characteristics of wordly instances; the idea of courage, for example, is said to exhibit courage first and foremost. How can this blatantly metaphysical construction be put to work as an educational program?

The basic mechanism is the two-step procedure of (1) abstraction and (2) reification of abstract entities. After dismissing popular accounts of courage a more prestigious construct, the *eidos* of courage, is introduced as ultimate point of reference. *Paideia* is precisely the sublimation conforming to this pattern. Doubtlessly this has proven to be a successful strategy to cope with the challenges of competitive, unordered environments. But it should not be presented as a remedy over and above the training tools offered by modern-time sophists. „Bildung“ is a time-tested personal development strategy based upon technological disregard for down-to-earth contingencies and promoted by a singularly powerful metaphysical imagery.

Wozu Philosophieren in der (Grund-)Schule?

Zur Begründung der Philosophie als Bildungsprinzip

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Philosophieren mit Kindern als in der Grundschule zu verankernde Praxis einer fachübergreifenden Methode des Lehrens und Lernens fördert die Gemeinschaftsbildung und zugleich die Selbstbildung in qualitativ ausgezeichneter Weise.

Dabei geht es nicht um die inhaltliche Vermittlung von Philosophie(n), von theoretischen Konzepten oder ideengeschichtlichen Positionen, sondern um eine Praxis des (selbst-)reflexiven Nachdenkens als gemeinsames Philosophieren durch Einüben in sokratische Gesprächsführung und diskursives Argumentieren, das ausgehend von eigenen, aber allgemeinen Fragen individuelle, aber vernunft-begründete Antworten sucht im freien Raum eines „herrschaftsfreien“ Dialogs (Habermas). Der reflexive Grundzug des Philosophierens als ein „Gespräch der Seele mit sich selbst“ (Plato) fördert die Selbst-Bildung durch die freie Artikulation einer je eigenen Sicht und jeweiligen Meinung zu einem existenziell relevanten Thema, das einen als einmalige, individuelle Person und zugleich als Mensch im Allgemeinen betrifft („die Menschheit in meiner Person“, Kant). Die dadurch erfahrbare Gemeinsamkeit im Fragwürdigen und die prinzipielle Gleichrangigkeit (und damit Wertschätzung!) jeder einzelnen Perspektive, ist Voraussetzung für Wissensbildung und Entwicklung von Gemeinsinn – ein notwendiger Entwicklungsschritt, wie Hannah Arendt ausführt, um moralische Urteilskraft zu entwickeln und „von seiner Vernunft öffentlich Gebrauch machen“ zu können.

Durch das methodische Nachfragen als Kern des sokratischen Gesprächs erfolgt auch ein ständiger Abgleich von Selbst- und Fremdwahrnehmung, was „Selbst“-Bildung durch Bewusstwerden und Annahme seiner selbst erst ermöglicht, wie Kierkegaard darlegt. Mäeutisch bringt gemeinsames Philosophieren das je Eigene im Denken und Antworten im Hinblick auf eine die Menschen als solche verbindende Frage hervor. Damit wird dem

philosophisch Befragten ein hohes Maß an Wert-schätzung zuteil, das ihn als einmalig Antwortenden ernsthaft miteinbezieht, was der gegenseitigen Achtung im Schulkontext und der Selbstakzeptanz des Einzelnen zu Gute kommt.

Philosophieren mit Kindern ist also Einheitserfahrung, die Differenz nicht ausschließt, sondern ausdrücklich braucht und einfordert. Deshalb ist sie gerade eine Haltung und Methode der Wahl zu einer inklusiv-demokratischen Gemeinschaftsbildung. Dies gelingt durch die Übung des sich gegenseitig aufmerksam Zuhörens; durch gemeinsame Sammlung auf die in Frage stehende Sache, damit auf ein für alle zugleich Wesentliches (sonst hätte man sich nicht auf die Frage geeinigt, um die es geht!); aber auch durch die als freudvoll erfahrene Zusammengehörigkeit im Nichtwissen, durch das Gefühl in einem Boot zu sein mit Anderen, unterwegs im Offenen der uns allen gemeinsamen Grund-Dimension philosophischen Fragen; letztlich: durch die Notwendigkeit des Fragenmüssens im Hinblick auf gemeinsame Maßstäbe, Prinzipien und Werte, aber auch durch die so erfahrbare Freiheit des Antwortenkönnens in einer geschichtlichen Situation – als Gegengewicht zur Gefahr einer „Herrschaftsform des Niemand“ (Arendt) und zum Verfallen an das „Man“ (Heidegger).

Eine solche Praxis des Philosophierens erlaubt auch eine positive Konnotation des Unabgeschlossenen und Ungewissen mit Neugier und Denkfriede, lehrt Kinder von früh an das Unterwegssein mit Anderen im Denken und Urteilen als Grundform der Demokratie (und des Lebens überhaupt) zu schätzen. Der dadurch vermittelte Weg- und Wirklichkeitsbezug würde Kinder in ihrer Lebenskompetenz weit besser bestärken als die bislang anerzogene Verklärung des Ziels eines Ankommens im ‚gelobten Land‘ klarer Handlungsvorgaben und sicheren Wissens, das die Schule derzeit im Zeitgeist der Wissens- und Informationsgesellschaft propagiert.

### Why Philosophize in (Elementary) School?

Some Reasons for Philosophy as Educational Principle” (translation)

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Philosophizing with children as the practice of a transdisciplinary method of teaching and learning to be anchored in the elementary school encourages the formation of community and at the same time of the individual in a qualitatively excellent manner.

It is not thereby a question of transmitting the content of "philosophies", theoretical concepts, or positions from the history of ideas, but of a practice of (self-conscious) reflection as shared philosophizing by means of the practice of Socratic conversation and discursive argumentation, which beginning from one's own universally relevant questions searches in the free space of a "non-hegemonic" dialogue ("eines 'herrschaftsfreien' Dialogs", Habermas) for answers established on the basis of reason. The reflective characteristic of philosophizing as a "conversation of the soul with itself" (Plato) encourages self-formation through the free articulation of one's own point of view and opinion with regard to an existentially relevant topic which concerns us both as unique individuals and as human beings in general („die Menschheit in meiner Person“, Kant). The commonality of the questionable and the fundamental equality (and therefore equality in valuation!) of every individual point of view, is precondition for the formation of conscience and the development of a sense of solidarity – a necessary stage, as Hannah Arendt elaborates, in order that moral judgment might be developed and in order that one may be capable of "making public use of one's reason".

Through methodical investigation as core of the Socratic conversation follows also a constant assimilation of perception of oneself and of others which first makes possible formation of "self" through becoming aware and acceptance of oneself, as Kierkegaard makes clear. Shared philosophizing in a maeutic approach helps educe the individual's views by his thinking and answering with respect to a question which is binding for human beings as such.. Damit wird dem philosophisch Befragten ein hohes Maß an Wert-schätzung zuteil, das ihn als einmalig Antwortenden ernsthaft miteinbezieht, was der gegenseitigen Achtung im Schulkontext und der Selbstakzeptanz des Einzelnen zu Gute kommt.

Philosophizing with children is then an experience of unity, which does not exclude diversity, but explicitly requires and demands it. Therefore, it is precisely an attitude and method of choice for inclusive and democratic community building. This succeeds by means of exercise in mutually attentive listening; through shared concentration on the matter which is in question, thereby on something which is essential to all at the same time (otherwise one would not have agreed to the question, with which the discussion is concerned!). However, it also succeeds by means of the joyfully shared experience of not-knowing, through the feeling of being in the same boat with others, being underway somewhere in the openness of the fundamental dimension of philosophical questioning shared by us all. Finally, it succeeds through the necessity of having to raise questions regarding shared standards, principles and values, but also through the freedom of being able to venture to answer from within our particular historical situation, as the counterweight to the danger of a "form of dominance by the nobody" (Arendt) and deteriorating into the anonymous "one" ("Verfallen an das 'Man'" Heidegger).

Such practice of philosophizing permits a positive association of the incomplete and unknown with curiosity and the joy of thinking, teaching children from early on to value being underway together with others in thinking and judging, as a fundamental form of democracy (and of life as a whole) The connection with one's life's path and with reality transmitted thereby strengthens children's competency for life much better than the previously instilled glorification of the objective of arriving in the 'promised land' of clear prescriptions for action and certain knowledge that schools currently promote in the spirit of the age of the knowledge and information society.

L'éducation est mutuelle ou les relations entre l'artiste et son public

Judith Ingolfsson, Vladimir Stoupel

Berlin

Die Frage sollte man einmal anders stellen: hat jeder Künstler ein Publikum? Noch nicht weit zurück liegen die totalitären Zeiten, als viele Komponisten teilweise gar keinen bzw. sehr eingeschränkten Zugang zu ihrem Publikum hatten. Selbst solche bedeutende Komponisten, wie D.D. Schostakowitsch mussten - wie z.B. im Falle seiner Vierten Sinfonie - manchmal Jahre auf die erste Aufführung warten. Es lag aber nicht immer am politischen System sondern auch oft an der Unmöglichkeit, sich zu Lebzeiten Gehör zu verschaffen.

Im Idealfall bekommt ein Musikwerk die Möglichkeit, einem breiten Publikum vorgestellt zu werden. In diesem Moment hängt es ganz von der Interpretation ab, wie so ein unbekanntes Werk vom Publikum angenommen wird. Es muss sich dabei nicht zwingend um ein zeitgenössisches Werk handeln, es kann auch ein in Vergessenheit geratenes oder, aus welchen Gründen auch immer, noch nie gespieltes Werk sein. Jedenfalls befindet sich der

Zuhörer auf gänzlich neuen Pfaden und die Aufgabe des Interpreten in diesem Augenblick ist es, ihn durch diese unbekannte musikalische Landschaft zu führen.

Dies geschieht aber erst im Konzert und verlangt von Interpreten einen extrem hohen Vorbereitungsgrad und vom Zuhörer einen gehörigen Maß an Toleranz und Offenheit. Die Qualität des Werkes wird erst durch die Interpretation ersichtlich, und sollte sie nicht ausreichend vorbereitet sein, kann es dazu führen, dass die Premiere zu einem Desaster wird - wie z.B. im Falle der ersten Sinfonie von Rachmaninov in St. Petersburg im Jahre 1897, als sein älterer Kollege der Komponist Alexander Glazunow die Sinfonie für die Uraufführung kaum geprobt hat.

Aber wie bereitet man als ausübender Künstler die Aufführung von einem für ihn auch unbekannten Werk vor? Was sollte der Künstler beachten und was erwartet der Zuhörer von einem neuen Werk, der des Öfteren in einem Programm zwischen den altbekannten und leicht zugänglichen Kompositionen versteckt wird, damit möglichst viele Besucher ins Konzert kommen? Der Ansporn und der Anspruch der absoluten interpretatorischen Perfektion, mit der ein Interpret aufgewachsen ist, und die er ständig anstrebt, kann in diesem Fall eine Hilfe oder auch ein Hindernis sein. Denn die Perfektion existiert nicht in einem luftleeren Raum, das heißt, in einem künstlerischen Raum ohne Vergleichsmöglichkeiten. Solche Möglichkeiten sind für ein neues Werk aber noch nicht vorhanden. Was in dieser Situation einem Künstler zur Perfektion verhilft, ist lediglich sein Anspruch an sich selbst.

#### Education is Mutual, or the Relationship between the Artist and his Public (translation)

Judith Ingolfsson, Vladimir Stoupel

Berlin

The question should actually be put the other way around: does every artist have an audience? It was not long ago that in totalitarian regimes, many composers had no access or only limited access to their audience. Even such important composers as D. D. Schostakowitsch had to, as in the case of his 4th Symphony, wait sometimes many years for the first performance of a new work. It was however not always the fault of the political system, but rather the impossibility of gaining acceptance during one's own lifetime.

Ideally, a musical work should have the possibility of being presented to a wide audience. At this moment, it is entirely a matter of the interpretation, whether such an unknown work will be accepted by the audience or not. It need not necessarily be a contemporary work, it can also be one that has been forgotten, or one that, for whatever reason, has never been played. In any case, the listener finds himself in uncharted territory and the task of the performer in this moment is to lead him through this unknown musical landscape.

This takes place for the first time in the concert, and demands from the performer an extremely high degree of preparation and from the listener an appropriate measure of tolerance and openness. The quality of the work only becomes visible through the interpretation, and if this is not sufficiently well prepared, the premiere can end in disaster, as was for example the case with the 1st Symphony of Rachmaninov in St. Petersburg in 1897, when Rachmaninov's older colleague, the composer Alexander Glazunow barely rehearsed the symphony for the premiere.

But how does one as performing artist prepare the performance of a work that is unknown to him? What must the artist take into consideration and what does the listener

expect from such a work, often hidden in a program between well-known and easily accessible compositions, so that as many visitors as possible attend the concert? The motivation and the demand for absolute interpretative perfection, with which the performer has grown up, and which he constantly strives to attain, can in this case be a help or a hindrance. For perfection does not exist in a vacuum, that is, in an artistic space without any possibility for comparison. Such possibilities, however, do not yet exist for a new work. The only thing that helps an artist in this situation to attain perfection are his own aspirations and the demands he places upon himself.

Critique of the University in Lyotard, Freire and their Successors in  
Radical Educational Thought

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‘the ethos, not just the institutions, of society ought to be deschooled’  
Ivan Illich

The radicalisation of educational and political thought in the 1960’s, especially centred on the French context leading up to May ’68, furnishes us with some paradigmatic examples of the critique of the university both as a very notion and as a lived praxis. The most prominent example here is that of Jean Francois Lyotard, whose experience of the events at Nanterre most especially provide a fascinating example of the university in crisis. In this paper, I will look to some of Lyotard’s seminal writings from this time in Nanterre to explore the irreconcilable tensions at the heart of the notion of education itself. My guiding question here will be ‘to what extent can the critique of the university lead to a renewed conception of the university?’

I will also refer to the writings of Henri Lefebvre on this thematic (Lefebvre also taught during this tumultuous period of Nanterre). The second part of the paper will address the problematic of what succeeded ’68 and Nanterre, from a university perspective. With some reference to the emancipatory vision of Vincennes, I will also draw on the evolution of the critique of the university and education thematic into the later periods of the ’90s and up to the present, in thinkers such as Jacques Ranciere. Here, I will draw particularly on the work of Paulo Freire, while also cautioning against the sometimes overly complacent ‘positivist’ critiques of education in Freire’s successors in Critical Pedagogy (McLaren and Giroux). In the present context of university crisis, how can the thinking of Lyotard, Lefebvre and Freire help us to progress the contemporary discussion and practices of education?

Deep-Citizenship: Lessons from Bildung and Paedeia

Prof. Byron Kaldis

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(abstract pending)

# Into the Global Learning Community: A Tripartite Learning Model Integrating Humanism, Religion and Science

Prof. Daniel Kolak

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From the standpoint of contemporary game-theoretical epistemic logic and information theory, a tripartite learning model integrated over Pyrrhonian skepticism, methodological solipsism and transcendental idealism provides a sound *Bildung* for STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) programs in higher education. This rapprochement between our humanistic, religious, and scientific knowledge-seeking enterprises calls, on the one hand, for more educational, scientific, and philosophical cooperation between nations, so as to allow, on the other, greater educational, scientific, and philosophical competition between individuals across cultural, national, and economic borders. Instead of enslavement by bureaucratization of the spirit through global implementation of humanistic, religious and scientific technologies, the ultimate goal of a truly global philosophy should be to perpetually deconstruct ourselves out of the cave of certainty by creating a global learning community not of schools of thought but of individuals who can think.

## Transmission of Secrets in Medieval Kabbalah - Education or Initiation?

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The transmission of secrets in kabbalistic literature shows a very complex structure as many components define this process. Not only the relationship between teacher and student, but also the codification of secrets within the written text outlines such an educational process, which is often simultaneously described as initiation. The transmission of secrets – both oral and written – is not only a rite of initiation described in kabbalistic texts of various schools, but also shows similarities to ancient philosophy of Pythagorean and Neoplatonic background. As in kabbalistic thinking the method of transferring secrets is already part of the message itself, certain esoteric instructions for transmitting such secrets are necessary. Exegetical techniques for discovering – or rather rediscovering – religious worlds that had previously been adopted by the kabbalists or by their philosophical sources from Greek, Arabic and Latin thought, were developed in order to transfer the intellectual innovations of the kabbalistic masters to their disciples and a chain of reliable transmission of secret concepts in order to interpret the secret meaning of Scriptures was cultivated.

In this process we have to distinguish between three approaches to secrets: semantic, parasemantic and phenomenological, the last assuming that secrets were communicated orally and illumine the plain sense without being extracted from it by the kabbalistic writers. The other categories for transmission are conceptual, where kabbalistic concepts are passed along, and technical, where the subject matter is the act of transmission itself. The experience of learning might be described as life in front of an ever-changing perception of the sacred

text, where the mystic's horizon is fusing with that of the text (Hans-Georg Gadamer) so that text and interpretation become inseparable. We might call this initiation, as the student does not receive only secret information, but also details concerning manners of behavior and ritual performance often related to primordial, authoritative revelations that reverberate in the way of life that serves as the background for the secrets.

We therefore need to examine the roles of three parameters for transmitting secret traditions: the function of the text, the position of the expert master within the teaching process and the role of the recipient in various kabbalistic constructs for transmission. In a second step we need to distinguish between educational concepts and models for initiation and how they are synthesized in an interpretative framework. In a third step I intend to compare these concepts with non-Jewish philosophical sources of Greek, Arabic and Latin origin and elaborate on parallel or diverging structures. Finally, I intend relate such models of "interpretative initiation" to modern theories of language and textuality as found in Ricoeur, Derrida, Eco and others.

### Kabbalah and Education: an Epistemological Approach

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There are two reasons for linking Kabbalah and education. First, the main purpose of Jewish tradition is the commitment to Jewish life; kabbalistic worldviews try to configure the Holy Scripture and the conception of God according to the mystical reverberations of this life, thus changing the substance and the role of tradition in itself. Second, every understanding of reality has to be confirmed through language, and vice versa; the Kabbalists maintain that Hebrew alphabetic characters are intrinsic to both, revelation and creation of the world. Regarding this context, the lecture will focus on the meaning of communication within the history of kabbalistic thought, particularly on the importance of communication as the mystical goal of teaching. Following this, the question of hermeneutics and history as well as the relation between ontology and epistemology will be discussed on the basis of selected examples from medieval and early modern kabbalistic literature.

### A Comparison of Three Models of Civil Education:

Civic Humanism, Classical Republicanism, Political Liberalism

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Since ancient Greece, the investigation of the relationship between politics and education has accompanied philosophical reflection. From the Enlightenment onwards, with the establishment of public schools and the introduction of compulsory education for all, philosophy has highlighted the complementary relationship between democracy and education. John Dewey's famous thesis of the special "devotion of democracy to education"



(Dewey, 1916), is one of the most important expressions of this relationship. Today, the question recurs within the framework of a legal culture more aware than ever before of the rights of students (the right to freedom of conscience and belief) and parents (to educate their children according to their beliefs.) Philosophical reflection on education today considers therefore also the legitimacy of the educational mission of public schools, especially in pluralistic and multicultural social contexts. The education of future citizens as subjects being taught in public schools is one of the topics of this political debate. This reflection is also important from the theoretical standpoint, insofar as it is intertwined with lively debate on political philosophy, a circumstance which concerns the political liberalism of John Rawls, classical republicanism and some versions of contemporary political Aristotelianism.

Rawls argued for the thesis that political liberalism and classical republicanism are not incompatible positions. The various contemporary versions of Aristotelianism (which Rawls grouped under the common name of civic humanism) are, however, incompatible with political liberalism, which is a political theory of the neutrality of the state and public institutions. Unlike civic humanism, classical republicanism does not seem to require citizens' adherence to a comprehensive conception of the good and does not seem to be based on a particular metaphysical thesis about human nature. However, like political liberalism, it requires only that citizens actively participate in the democratic political institutions and demonstrate the "political virtues needed to sustain a constitutional regime" (Rawls, 2005). Rawls has not yet clarified further the similarity between his political liberalism and some of the possible versions of classical republicanism, nor has he adequately justified the thesis of their compatibility. Neither is it proven that classical republicanism, or at least some of its variants, actually supports only "one part of the truth, not the whole" as is required by justice as fairness.

Some authors have pointed out the similarity between Rawls and republican thought (Laden, 2006). On the other hand, there are those who think that political liberalism is actually a disguised form of inclusive liberalism and therefore consider Rawls's attempt to distinguish his theory of political liberalism from an inclusive and perfectionistic theory failed (Callan, 1997). Others have argued the futility of the distinction between political ideas and concepts including the education of citizens (Gutmann, 1995).

In order to clarify the ongoing controversy, I find it useful to further deepen the comparison between the conceptions of education of the citizen, civic humanism of classical republicanism and political liberalism.

Part of the issue is already being addressed by Richard Dagger (Dagger, 1997) and John Maynor (Maynor, 2003). Dagger thinks that political liberalism and republicanism are compatible. Comparing the two models of education of the city shows that the conclusion of Dagger is incorrect. Maynor believes that political liberalism and republicanism are incompatible and the republican model of education is better. Maynor's thesis will be discussed. I will argue that of the three models of education examined, political liberalism is the only legitimate one in a pluralistic and multicultural social context.

## Too Painful to Watch?

### The Representation of Violence and Suffering in Classical Athens

Dr. Martino Rossi Monti

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In the Republic of Plato, we find the story of a certain Leontius, son of Aglaion, who one day, while on his way up from the Piraeus, spotted the bodies of some freshly executed criminals: “He wanted to go and look at them, but at the same time he was disgusted and tried to turn away. He struggled for some time and covered his eyes, but at last the desire was too much for him. Opening his eyes wide, he ran up to the bodies and cried: ‘There you are, curse you, fill yourselves with this beautiful sight!’”.

My paper takes the cue from this strange story in order to reflect and raise questions about the general attitude toward suffering and violence and their artistic portrayal in classical Athens, where, despite a general distaste for gratuitous violence and cruelty, death, pain and violence were a common subject both of the visual and performing arts. Plato regarded the kind of violence described in the myths or depicted in the arts of his time as profoundly dangerous for the education of the youth (hence the necessity of censorship). Aristotle seemed to think otherwise. But was Plato’s anxiety somewhat justified? How violent was classical Greek art? I will try to answer these questions by drawing on recent scholarship on the topic of violence in the ancient world and by comparing ancient attitudes with modern ones.

Friedrich Nietzsche a Basilea. Per un’apologia degli studi classici.

Dott.ssa Carlotta Santini

Università del Salento – Centro Studi Colli Montinari

Come è noto a tutti, il filosofo Friedrich Nietzsche nasce, per formazione, filologo classico. Nel decennio che intercorre tra il 1869 e il 1879 Friedrich Nietzsche insegna filologia classica all’Università di Basilea, e tiene numerosi corsi su diversi argomenti della letteratura greca. In questi anni Nietzsche riflette sul valore degli studi classici nella società a lui contemporanea, partendo da una autoanalisi delle influenze della sua formazione classica e del suo mestiere di filologo ed insegnante. Queste riflessioni troveranno un’espressione più sistematica in due scritti molto interessanti e ancora poco conosciuti, presenti nel Nachlass del filosofo, le lezioni sull’ *Encyklopädie der klassischen Philologie*, e l’abbozzo per la *Considerazione Inattuale "Wir Philologen"*.

In questi testi Nietzsche dosa sapientemente elementi critici ed elementi apologetici. Nota è la sua critica feroce al mondo dei filologi eruditi, aridi e astratti vivisezionatori dell’antichità. Meno nota è invece la sua difesa del sistema di studi classici, e dell’educazione dei giovani attraverso le opere dell’antichità greco-latina. Ciò che è più interessante, è che quegli stessi motivi che muovono la sua critica all’educazione classica sono poi gli stessi, osservati da un diverso punto di vista, che ne determineranno invece il riscatto.

Nietzsche accusava i filologi suoi colleghi di mistificare l’antichità introducendovi delle categorie moderne e dunque anacronistiche. Lo scopo di questi sforzi di omologazione

all'esperienza moderna era quello di rendere la Grecia una sorta di "patria spirituale" della nazione tedesca moderna. Al contrario per Nietzsche, l'unico valore educativo dell'antichità greca consiste nella sua straordinaria differenza da qualunque possibile esperienza moderna. La Grecia è irrimediabilmente estranea all'esperienza storica, sociale, politica e culturale moderna, e proprio in questo risiede il suo valore "classico", la sua esemplarità.

La grande carica educativa dell'antichità risiede proprio in quella distanza incolmabile tra due culture rese straniere non solo dalla lontananza nel tempo e nello spazio. Sulla base di questa presa di coscienza, anche la figura del filologo assurge ad una nuova valenza, e recupera così la più antica e originaria delle sue mansioni, quella di educatore. Il destino del filologo è quello di vivere a cavallo tra i due mondi, l'antico e il moderno, senza appartenere veramente a nessuno dei due. Egli conosce l'antico, ed è dunque partecipe dell'estraneità di questo al mondo moderno. Al contempo però egli deve agire nel mondo moderno, sui soggetti moderni, attraverso l'insegnamento, la mediazione tra il passato e il futuro. L'antichità appartiene definitivamente al passato, così come l'azione appartiene esclusivamente ai giovani, al futuro. Nietzsche non vagheggia un nostalgico ritorno all'antico, o un'estetizzante dedizione allo studio dei classici. La domanda che egli si pone è questa: cosa possiamo noi oggi imparare dagli antichi? La risposta sta nella sperimentazione di questa differenza tra noi e loro, che ci permette di conoscerci più a fondo.

Friedrich Nietzsche in Basel. In Defence of Classical Studies (translation)

Dr. Carlotta Santini

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As is generally known, the philosopher Friederich Nietzsche was by profession a Classical philologist. In the decade which extended from 1869 to 1879, Friederich Nietzsche studied Classical Philology at the University of Basel and held numerous lectures on a variety of topics from Ancient Greek literature. During this period, Nietzsche reflected on the value of Classical Studies in his own society, beginning with self-directed reflection on the influences of his own Classical education and his profession as a philologist and teacher. These reflections found more systematic expression in two very interesting and still little known treatises present in the posthumous works of the philosopher, the lectures on the *Encyklopädie der klassischen Philologie*, and the draft for the *Untimely Considerations*, "Wir Philologen".

In these works, Nietzsche prudently combines critical and apologetic elements. His ferocious critique of the world of erudite philologists, arid and abstract vivisectionists of antiquity, is well-known. Less well-known, however, is his defence of the system of Classical Studies, and of the education of the young by means of the works of Greco-Latin Antiquity. What is even more interesting is that these same motifs which motivate his critique of Classical education are then the same, observed from a different point of view, as those which determine moreover its redemption.

Nietzsche accused his philologist colleagues of mystifying Antiquity by introducing modern and therefore anachronistic categories. The purpose of these efforts of assimilation to modern experience was to make of Greece a sort of "spiritual homeland" of the modern German nation. On the contrary, for Nietzsche, the only educational value of Greek antiquity consists in its striking difference from any possible modern experience. Greece is irremediably alien to historical, social, political and cultural modernity, and precisely in this lies its "classic" value, and exemplariness.

The great educational office of antiquity lies precisely in the unbridgeable distance between two cultures, made foreign to one another not only by distance in time and space. On the basis of this awareness, the figure of the philologist also rises to a new value, and thus recovers the oldest and most original of his duties, that of educator.

The fate of the philologist is to live by straddling two worlds, the ancient and the modern, without really belonging to either. He knows the old, and is therefore partaker of foreignness of this modern world. At the same time, however, he must act in the modern world, on modern subjects, through teaching, the mediation between the past and the future. Antiquity definitively belongs to the past, just as action belongs exclusively to the young, the future. Nietzsche does not long for a nostalgic return to the old, or an aesthetizing dedication to the study of the classics. The question he poses is this: what can we learn today from antiquity? The answer lies in the testing of this difference between us and them, which allows us to know ourselves more profoundly.

Wie genau kann ich wissen? - Über Wissenschaftsphilosophie und Bildung

Dr. Rudolf Seising

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„Was kann ich wissen?“ war eine berühmte Frage, die Immanuel Kant im 18. Jahrhundert stellte, und die Beschäftigung mit dieser Frage gehört zur Bildung des Menschen. Nach dem 20. Jahrhundert, in dem sich neue wissenschaftliche Theorien bewährt haben, wenden wir die Kantsche Frage zu „Wie genau kann ich wissen?“.

Schon Heinrich Hertz hätte diese Frage stellen können, als er Die Prinzipien der Mechanik in neuen Zusammenhänge dargestellt am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts präsentierte. Dieses Buch wurde ein Meilenstein der klassischen Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Zehn Jahre zuvor hatte Hertz ein Vorlesungsmanuskript über Die Constitution der Materie geschrieben, in dem er bereits das Konzept unscharfer „Bilder“ entwickelt hatte, um die Wirklichkeit zu beschreiben, und er betonte den Unterschied zwischen ungenauen Begriffen und deren abstrakten und scharfen „Kernen“.

Es ist ein zentrales Problem der Wissenschaftstheorie, den Zusammenhang zwischen abstrakten theoretischen Strukturen und ungenauen Begriffen einerseits und empirisch wahrnehmbaren Dingen und Phänomenen andererseits, sowie deren Beziehungen untereinander zu verstehen. Dies kann anhand neuer wissenschaftlicher Theorien im 20. Jahrhundert, wie z. B. der Quantenmechanik und der Synthetischen Evolutionstheorie, aber auch in anderen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen und bei Tätigkeiten wie z. B. der medizinischen Diagnose, studiert werden.

In seiner Spätphilosophie hat Ludwig Wittgenstein die einfache Bildkonzeption aufgegeben, die er im Tractatus logico-philosophicus eingeführt hatte (und die von Heinrich Hertz Prinzipien der Mechanik beeinflusst war). In seinen Philosophischen Untersuchungen entwickelte er stattdessen die Konzeption der „Familienähnlichkeit“. Diese familienähnlichen Begriffe werden wir als unscharfen Begriff interpretieren!

Im sogenannten Strukturalistischen Zugang der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie können, die theoretischen und empirischen Strukturen wissenschaftlicher Theorien sowie ihre Beziehungen zueinander mit Hilfe der informellen Mengentheorie rekonstruiert werden. Mit der in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts von Lotfi A. Zadeh begründeten Theorie der

Fuzzy Sets gibt es ein Werkzeug, um diesen Ansatz so zu erweitern, dass auch die ungenauen Begrifflichkeiten modelliert werden können.

Wir sehen somit eine Entsprechung zwischen der Familienähnlichkeit von Begriffen im Sinne Wittgensteins und unscharfen Bildern (oder Begriffen) von Gegenständen im Sinne von Hertz, sowie fuzzy sets im Sinne von Zadeh, die die Kluft zwischen empirischer Beobachtung und abstrakter Konstruktion theoretische Strukturen überbrückt. Auch ohne dass die Details zur Modellierung der geschilderten wissenschaftsphilosophischen Konstruktionen zu Lehrkanons in Schulen oder Hochschulen gezählt werden, sollte das Wissen um das in einem Bereich ungenauer Begrifflichkeiten zwischen Theorie und Empirie stattfindende „Spiel“ der Wissenschaft fester Bestandteil der Bildung aller Menschen sein!

How precisely can I know? - On Philosophy of Science and Education (translation)

Dr. Rudolf Seising

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“What can I know?” was a famous question that Immanuel Kant posed in the 18th century and the preoccupation with this question is counted among the essential aspects of human education. In the 20th century, when new scientific theories arose and proved their reliability, the Kantian question was turned into “How exactly can I know?”

Already Heinrich Hertz could have asked this question, when he presented his Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form at the end of the 19th century, which became a milestone of classical philosophy of science. Ten years before, Hertz had written the lecture manuscript The Constitution of Matter, where he already developed a concept of unsharp “pictures” to describe reality and he emphasized the difference between unsharp conceptions and their abstract and sharp “cores”.

To show the connections between theoretical structures and unsharp concepts und relations, on the one hand, and systems or phenomena in reality, on the other hand, as well as their relations to each other, is a central problem in the philosophy of science that we can study in the 20th century’s new scientific theories, e.g. in quantum mechanics and in the Synthetic Theory of Evolution, but also in other scientific disciplines and practice, e.g. in medical diagnosis-making.

In his late philosophical thinking, Ludwig Wittgenstein abandoned the simple picture-concept that he had introduced in the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (which was influenced by Heinrich Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics). In his Philosophical Investigations, he established instead the concept of “family resemblances”. We will interpret concepts that have family resemblance as unsharp concepts!

The so-called Structuralist approach in modern philosophy of science provides the opportunity to reconstruct theoretical and empirical structures of scientific theories and their intertheoretical relationships by using informal set theory and the Theory of Fuzzy Sets founded by Lotfi A. Zadeh in the second half of the 20th century. This theory offers a tool to extend the Structuralist approach, in order to model unsharp concepts.

We see thereby a correspondance between family resemblances of concepts, in the sense of Wittgenstein, pictures (or conceptions) of things, in the sense of Hertz, and fuzzy sets, in the sense of Zadeh, which allows us to bridge the gap between empirical observations and the abstract construction of theoretical structures. Also, without considering the details of modeling the described science-philosophical constructs to any teaching curricula in schools or universities, the knowledge of the “game” of science that takes place in an area of unsharp

concepts between theory and empiricism should be an inherent part of the education of all human beings

'Bildungstrieb' – ein Modell von gestern?

Prof. dr. Violetta Waibel

Institut für Philosophie, Universität Wien

Für Hölderlin ist der Terminus des Bildungstrieb von großer Bedeutung. In meinem Beitrag werden die historischen Wurzeln dieses Begriffs und dieser Idee freigelegt. Ferner wird dessen Einbettung in die Idee einer ästhetischen Erziehung untersucht, wie sie Hölderlin mit und über Schiller hinaus denkt, und auch dem jungen Hegel höchst attraktiv schien. Damit ist die Frage aufgeworfen, ob das Konzept veraltet ist, oder ob wir uns darin auch heute noch wiederfinden können.

'Bildungstrieb' – A Model from Yesterday? (translation)

Prof. Dr. Violetta Waibel

Institute of Philosophy, University of Vienna

For Hölderlin, the concept of 'Bildungstrieb' (drive for formation, cultivation) is of great importance. In my paper, the historical roots of this concept will be examined. Furthermore, its incorporation into the idea of an aesthetic education, as Hölderlin develops it in conjunction with and superseding Schiller – an idea that was also attractive to the young Hegel - will be investigated. The question arises thereby of whether this concept is obsolete, or whether we can still recognize ourselves in it.

Greek *Paideia* and Christian Virtue:

Basil and Gregory Nazianzen on the Importance of Reading Homer

Dr. Sarah Klitenic Wear

Franciscan University of Steubenville

In his *de legendis gentilium libris*, Basil urges young boys to read Hellenic literature before embarking on a study of scripture because the literature of the gentiles contains truths accessible to young, untrained minds. Because young minds cannot begin to contemplate the lofty truths of divine scripture, Basil argues, they should begin with Hesiod, Theognis, Prodicus, and, especially, Homer. These writings contain the same truths as found in scripture, but “as truth appears in a mirror”, as Basil says—this truth is easier to see for the Christian student beginning in his studies. Thus, Basil tells us, the writings of Homer prepare

the young mind to take in scripture for, “as leaves are a protection to a tree, so is pagan literature to divine truth.” The reader is then left with the task of determining where in his poetry Homer describes virtue to be emulated, and where he touches on vice, which must be avoided. In addition to this short treatise, many of Basil’s epistles also discuss the importance of reading Homer as a precursor to approaching the more difficult passages of scripture. Likewise, Gregory Nazianzen discusses the importance of reading Homer—as long as he is properly interpreted!—in his epistles, in his funeral oration for Basil, and in his invective against Julian.

In this paper, I will discuss how Homer, fundamental to Greek *paideia*, becomes foundational in the Christian education of the Patristic period. Thus, as evident in the writings of Basil and Gregory Nazianzen, understanding virtue and the excellence of man as found in the heritage of the Greeks is the starting point for Christian education.

## Bildung and the Historical and Genealogical Critique of Contemporary Culture

Prof. Tomislav Zelić

University of Zadar, Croatia

In my presentation, I would like to discuss some key concepts of neo-humanism in German thought from the late eighteenth century up until today. First, I will recall the basic principles of the university as a public institution of higher education based on the humanities as theorized by the neo-humanist Wilhelm von Humboldt, including the union of teachers and students, academic freedom, excellence and leadership, the idea of humanity and the ideal of humaneness as well as related values such as peacefulness and tolerance. I will focus particularly on the idea of cultivation (*Bildung*) through knowledge/scholarship (*Wissenschaft*).

Secondly, I will sketch out the polemics against neo-humanism as articulated by the classical philologist and anti-modern philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche who convincingly argues that higher education in the Second German Empire achieved the exact opposite effect of what was originally intended. Nevertheless, he recommends philological discipline and philosophical judgment in the Humboldtian spirit as the major human faculties for the historical and genealogical critique of contemporary culture. On a quick excursion from the main trajectory, I will make some short remarks on the “hermeneutics of suspicion” in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

At this point, the question arises as to the institutional place of this kind of cultivation (*Bildung*) today. Is it not in the university or more precisely in the humanities or the faculty of arts and sciences? Is it not rather in another public or perhaps in the private place at the desk of the thinker and poet? I will draw the conclusion that the humanities serve as a sanctuary for philologists and philosophers who articulate their social, political, and cultural engagement without party membership through the historical and genealogical critique of contemporary culture. Under the banner of cultivation (*Bildung*) through knowledge/scholarship (*Wissenschaft*), they keep the idea of humanity and the ideal of humaneness in remembrance in order to criticize its distortions in reality, be it at the university, be it in the state and society, in the face of many different clashes and conflicts within and between different cultures in contemporary world society. Philological and philosophical reading and writing in the second power, as it were, are indispensable for this kind of cultivation (*Bildung*) and the historical and genealogical critique of contemporary

culture. My presentation will implicitly or explicitly investigate some of the thematic clusters specified in the Call for Papers, including the question as to the ends and means of higher education and cultivation, motivation and freedom in higher education, formation of judgment and character, higher education and human values as well as economic, political, and ideological aspects of higher education, particularly tensions between the neo-humanistic idea of cultivation (Bildung) and contemporary criteria of proficiency, learning outcomes, and competencies.

## Hegels Konzept der Bildung im heutigen Kontext

Prof. Dr. Jure Zovko

Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb/ University of Zadar

Die Grundbestimmungen der Modernität wie Freiheit, Recht auf Kritik, Selbstbestimmung und Autonomie des Handelns sollten nicht im Kontext der kulturellen Lebenswelt, die Hegel als „zweite Natur“ bestimmt hat, plausibel gemacht werden. Dies ist unter anderem wichtig weil Hegels Gedanke der „zweiten Natur“ in der gegenwärtigen philosophischen Diskussion sehr aktuell geworden ist und als Grundlage für die Korrektur einseitiger Argumentation in der Gegenwartsphilosophie gebraucht wird.

Die Transformation der "ersten Natur" zur zweiten findet Hegel zufolge nicht in abstrakten Proklamationen statt, sondern in der gesellschaftlichen Praxis und ihren Institutionen, was Hegel als System der Sittlichkeit gekennzeichnet hat. Der Mensch als Subjekt existiert nicht im Kontext der abstrakt proklamierten Rechte, sondern im Rahmen konkreter Institutionen, innerhalb deren er seine Freiheit realisieren soll. Staat und Gesellschaft sind nach Hegels Urteil das System der Sittlichkeit in welchen das Subjekt „sein Selbstgefühl hat und darin als seinem von sich ununterschiedenen Element lebt“ (WW 7, S. 295.)

Hegel meint, dass die institutionellen Lebensformen, die durch Bildung, Kultur, durch technischen und gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt sich gebildet haben, die „zweite Natur“ des Menschen ausmachen. Die Unmittelbarkeit der institutionellen Lebensformen, die unsere zweite Natur konstituieren, ist nach Hegels Ansicht ein Ergebnis sozialer und kultureller Vermittlung. Hegel meint, dass die institutionellen Lebensformen, die durch Bildung, Kultur, durch technischen und gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt sich gebildet haben, die „zweite Natur“ des Menschen ausmachen. Die Unmittelbarkeit der institutionellen Lebensformen, die unsere zweite Natur konstituieren, ist nach Hegels Ansicht ein Ergebnis sozialer und kultureller Vermittlung.<sup>1</sup> Das Phänomen des Sittlichen ist für Hegel von zentraler Relevanz weil durch die Sittlichkeit die natürliche Willkür des Willens aufgehoben und der substanzielle Geist der Freiheit sich durchgesetzt hat.

Unter der „zweiten Natur“ versteht Hegel „die Welt des Geistes aus ihm selbst hervorgebracht“. (Rechtsphilosophie, § 4.). Diese Welt des Geistes, in welcher die Freiheit als vorhandene Notwendigkeit präsent ist, ist auch Lebenswelt der tradierten und geformten Kunst und Kultur. Die Anerkennung des Sittlichen, dass es zur „zweiten Natur“ des Individuums wird, ist nach Hegels Urteil ein Werk der Erziehung und der Bildung. Bildung wird bei Hegel seit der Phänomenologie des Geistes als Fähigkeit des individuellen Geistes, sich zur Allgemeinheit zu erheben. Im Unterschied zur klassischen Form der Herausarbeitung des Allgemeinen aus der Vielfältigkeit des Konkreten, soll nach Hegels Urteil die Aufgabe

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<sup>1</sup> Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §§ 4, 146 und 151.



der philosophischen Bildung darin bestehen, den Gedanken des Allgemeinen aus den starren Prinzipienhaftigkeit zu befreien und zu verwirklichen. Erst dadurch werden die abstrakten Gedanken, die Hegel terminologisch „Vorstellungen“ nennt zu konkreten Begriffen.

Bildung als Erhebung des Bewusstseins zur Wissenschaft besteht nicht in der multiplizierenden Ansammlung des Wissens, sondern in der Formation des Subjekts. Bildung ist nach Hegel die kritische Aneignung und Vermittlung der Kultur. In der Rechtsphilosophie behauptet Hegel, dass die Pädagogik die Kunst ist, „die Menschen sittlich zu machen: sie betrachtet den Menschen als natürlich, und zeigt den Weg ihn wiederzugebären, seine erste Natur zu einer zweiten geistigen umzuwandeln, so daß dieses Geistige in ihm zur Gewohnheit wird.“

### Hegels Concept of "Bildung" Today (translation)

Prof. Dr. Jure Zovko

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In this paper, I will attempt to show the plausibility of the fundamental characteristics of modernity such as freedom, the right to a critical opinion, autonomy, within the context of the cultural "Lebenswelt", which Hegel designated as "second nature". This is important because, among other reasons, Hegel's idea of "second nature" is of central interest in contemporary philosophical discussion, and because it can serve as the basis for correction of one-sided argumentation in contemporary philosophy.

The transformation of "first nature" to "second nature" takes place according to Hegel not by means of abstract proclamations, but in social practice and institutions, something with Hegel described as "system of morality" ("System der Sittlichkeit") Human beings as subjects do not exist in the context of abstractly proclaimed rights but in the framework of concrete institutions, within which they realize their freedom. State and society are in Hegel's estimate the system of morality in which the subject "has his feeling of self and lives therein as in his element, from which he is not differentiated" („sein Selbstgefühl hat und darin als seinem von sich ununterschiedenen Element lebt“ WW 7, 295).

Hegel thinks that institutional life forms which have been generated through education (Bildung), culture, technological and societal progress constitute the "second nature" of human beings. The immediacy of institutional life forms which constitute our "second nature" is according to Hegel a result of social and cultural mediation.<sup>1</sup> The phenomenon of morality is for Hegel of central relevance because by means of morality the our natural freedom of choice is relativized and transformed and the substantial spirit of freedom asserts itself.

By "second nature" Hegel understands "the world of the spirit produced from the spirit itself" („die Welt des Geistes aus ihm selbst hervorgebracht“, Rechtsphilosophie, § 4). This world of the spirit, in which freedom is present as existing necessity is also the life world of transmitted and formed art and culture. The recognition that the moral becomes the "second nature" of the individual, is in Hegel's estimate a work of formation and education. Bildung is understood by Hegel since the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* as the capacity of the individual intellect to raise itself to the universal from the multiplicity of the concrete. As opposed to the classical form of the elucidation of the general/universal from the multiplicity of the concrete in Hegel's conviction the task of philosophical Bildung should consist in the liberation of the thought of the general or universal from the petrified being of principles and its realization in

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<sup>1</sup> Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §§ 4, 146 und 151.

the concrete. Only thereby can the abstract thoughts which Hegel calls "representations" become "concrete concepts".

Bildung as the raising of consciousness to the level of science consists not in the multiplicative accumulation of knowledge, but in the formation of the subject. Bildung is according to Hegel the critical assimilation and mediation of culture. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel asserts that pedagogics is the art "of making human beings moral: it considers the human being as natural, and shows him the path by which to be reborn, to transform his first nature into a second spiritual one, so that this spiritual element in him becomes habitual" ("die Menschen sittlich zu machen: sie betrachtet den Menschen als natürlich, und zeigt den Weg ihn wiederzugebären, seine erste Natur zu einer zweiten geistigen umzuwandeln, so daß dieses Geistige in ihm zur Gewohnheit wird.")

*Homoiosis theoi* and *Ebenbildlichkeit*: Likeness to God and the Metaphysical Grounding of Education in Plato, Plotinus and Meister Eckhart  
(lecture and text interpretation)

Prof. Dr. Marie-Élise Zovko  
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb

In Plato, it is analogy which establishes the basis for perception, belief and knowledge of reality and of the forms. The presence (*parousia*) of ideas in particular things, and their participation (*metexis*) in the ideas makes possible recognition of what each thing is according to its nature and how it behaves, a conviction prefigured in Heraclitus' first fragment regarding the *logos*. The proportion of the Line provides the central image of this fundamental insight, distilling into a single seminal text the complex constellation of interrelated levels and types of knowledge and reality which provide the basis for Plato's approach to the central question of how to live well.

At the heart of the Line and the source of its implications for Plato's theory of knowledge and reality, as well as for his psychology, ethics and theory of education, is the conviction or hypothesis that what we can know is based on what we are, and that both intellectual capacities and our knowledge of intelligible and sensible reality, as well as the structure and activity of our being, are grounded in a higher reality of which our own forms an image or likeness. The relationship of image and archetype is the basis for the relationship of our knowledge of reality and for the real existence of things, as well as for the subtle interrelationships which repeat and reflect – *ana ton logon* – that fundamental ratio at each of the levels which go to make up the entire proportion.

The ascent of the Line has as its goal the attainment of the "unconditioned beginning" (*anupotheton arhe*) which is the ground of all hypotheses. But we are not to stop here. As confirmed by the Analogy of the Cave, the ascent to the *anupotheton arhe*, to the vision of reality and the idea of the Good issues in a turning about and a redescent "through ideas, by means of ideas to ideas" of the things first recognized only on the basis of obscure images, outlines, reflections of those realities accessible to us in the sensible world. In the Cave, the goal of the ascent is the re-descent of the philosopher to the inhabitants of the Cave for the purpose of attempting to turn them toward the light and – by force or persuasion - inciting them to undertake the ascent themselves. This is to be realized in the concrete daily existence of the individual by means of the program of education outlined in the Republic, but also by

implementation of aspects of philosophical method illustrated in the conversations of the early dialogues (definition, refutation) and further developed in the middle and later dialogues (differing forms of the method of hypothesis, anamnesis, division, *diairesis*). The integral role of analogy in philosophical method is often overlooked in this connection.

The word "image" or *eikon* is used in the context of the Line to denote the furthest limit of the idea's reflection or stamp in sensible being, but constitutes at the same time an affirmation of the pervading presence of the highest principle of reality in all that exists. This is the basis for Plato's affirmation of *homoiosis theoi* as the ultimate goal of human striving, which informs and ultimately transcends the efforts described by the program of childrearing and formation, as well as in the program of formal education prescribed for the philosopher in the Republic. Our "likeness to God" and assimilation to the divine comes thus to constitute the metaphysical foundation of education in Plato and in his successors in the philosophy of Platonism.

The relationship of image and archetype appears also in the biblical tradition and Judeo-Christian interpretations of the Biblical texts. In junction with the Platonic tradition of "assimilation to God", it forms the basis for the tradition of philosophical mysticism whose aim is union of the individual soul with God or the ultimate principle (*henosis, unio mystica*)

As Dillon has noted<sup>1</sup>, an apparently insuperable tension and opposition remains between the task of realizing virtue or arete in the concrete and the task of achieving unity with the ultimate principle of being and knowledge, which beyond the cathartic refutation of unquestioned assumptions, and the conversion of the mind by the practice of dialectic and analogy (as the method of philosophy) to higher realities, requires ultimately a stripping away of all finite determinations and all preoccupation with particular things and escape from the multiplicity of sensible and even intelligible reality to union with that which is "beyond being and knowledge" (*epekeina tes ousias*).

Through reflection on selected passages from Plotinus and Meister Eckhart we shall attempt to bring the seminal concept of "likeness to God" and "assimilation to God" and its fundamental tension with the parallel demand of formation in the moral and civic virtues into focus, and to consider in what manner and to what extent these fundamental constellations continue to effect pedagogical theory and practice today.

### *Bildung and Gottebenbildlichkeit in Meister Eckhart – Reflection and Text Interpretation on the Theme of Likeness to God and Assimilation to God*

Prof. Dr. Marie-Élise Zovko

Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb

The terms "bilden", "Bildung" have their roots in 14th Century German Mysticism,<sup>2</sup> more specifically in the vernacular works of Meister Eckhart. Eckhart is responsible for the rich theological and philosophical development of the concept of Bild, a concept central to

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<sup>1</sup> ("An ethic for the late antique sage", *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus* (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) 315-335.

<sup>2</sup> H.U. v. Balthasar, "Der Mensch in Gott", in *Theodramatik* Bd. II: *Die Personene des Spiels* (Einsiedeln 1976) 182, n. 14), cited in Alois Haas, *Sermo mysticus. Studien zu Theologie und Sprache der deutschen Mystik* (Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz 1979) 209, n. 1. On the development and transformation of the meaning of the terms "Bild" and Bildung" cf. the works cited by Haas, *op. cit.* n. 1.

his thought as a whole. Eckharts doctrine of *Bildung* stems from two primary sources: the *imago dei* doctrine of Judaeo-Christian Scripture, "primarily in the interpretation of Aquinas", on the one hand; on the other hand, from the apophatic or "negative" theology of Christian Platonism, deriving via Ps. Dionysius Areopagita, John Scotus Eriugena and others from Proclus and the Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophical tradition as a whole. Negative theology considers the relationship of particular things and the universe to their transcendent and immanent source (the Idea of the Good, Unconditioned Beginning, the One/Good). The interpretation of the *imago dei* doctrine by Thomas Aquinas and his predecessors is, moreover, itself rooted in the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition of kataphatic theology, a term also coined by Ps. Dionysius, but rooted in Platonist and Neoplatonic interpretation of the Platonic dialogues. It describes an indirect and "positive" manner of speaking about the highest principle by means of metaphors and images, whose ontological basis and epistemological justification is to be found in the hypothesis of an *analogia entis* of finite being to its principle, i.e. of the immanence or real presence of the image of the transcendent principle and source of being in individual beings and the universe as a whole – and their resulting "likeness to God" – as well as vice versa of the immanence of finite things and the universe in the highest principle. This hypothesis of the paradoxical unity of immanence and transcendence of the principle of being and knowledge is characteristic of the Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophical tradition.

The union of these two apparently "heterogenous" elements: the Thomistic interpretation of the Biblical *imago dei* doctrine, incorporating an analogical and metaphorical approach to speaking of God, as well as a negative and apophatic approach to the transcendent principle, involves a fundamental paradox, but not an insuperable opposition. This paradox continues to inform educational models from Ancient times to the present. Although modern and contemporary models of education, in emphasizing the autonomy of the human individual tend to play down or negate "religious" elements in education and the role of a divine element in the human personality, the relationship of image and archetype, which, considered from an historical viewpoint, informs Renaissance and Enlightenment ideals of human dignity, remains albeit at a subconscious level and in unexamined form central to our understanding of human values and education today.

Using examples from some of Meister Eckharts German works, the symposium participants will consider the meaning of the terms *bild*, *bildung* and related concepts, and the implications of the opposition between "negative" and "positive" elements in the doctrine of *Bildung* and *Ebenbildlichkeit* for the philosophical problem of education today.

## *II. Doctoral students' Poster Session*

*Periagōgē* : Turning Around, Ascending and Redescending  
as a Central Aspect of Education

Kristina Grubor, MA

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In Plato's parable of the Cave, one of the key moments is that of "turning about" or "turning away" (*periagōgē*) from shadows and illusion and toward the truth and the good that is the ascent to the vision of the idea of the good. This conversion or „turning around of the soul“<sup>1</sup> is a moment of freedom and liberation. Freedom and liberation in the moment of *periagoge* means liberation from the chains of ignorance, and implies in this respect an (re-)awakening of curiosity, of readiness for learning and open-mindedness, and, in general, a readiness for intellectual endeavour.

As Plato tells us, the ability to learn is in each of us but the problem is that this ability needs to be "turned around" and pointed in the right direction. Without this "turning about", it is futile to try to throw information at someone. That person can try to memorize the information presented to him, but actual learning can only take place when a person undergoes conversion of his entire being and becomes ready to actively engage in the acquisition or assimilation of knowledge. Only then can this knowledge be assimilated in a lasting manner, that is, in a manner which permits it to be implemented by the knower for the purpose of thought, action and creative productivity. *Periagoge* thus appears to be a central pedagogical principle of Plato's philosophy and raises further questions about what Plato tells us and how we can compare his thinking to the situation of educational systems today.

A person who is able to make the effort of turning away from common and generally accepted opinion and climbing up to the world of true knowledge, and who after such enlightenment is prepared to take the further effort upon himself of returning into the cave and to encourage others to turn to intellectual endeavour, is in some sense educated and an educator. It seems only logical that a person who has gone through the process of conversion and who is now pointed in the right direction can try to transfer his or her knowledge to others. Maybe some of these others will be curious enough to try to turn around. This raises all kind of other questions, like the question of obligation of educators with respect to sharing their knowledge, its method and content, the question of responsibility towards those being educated, the question of how to motivate and encourage dialogue and exchange.

In the context of an elaboration of Plato's notion of *periagōgē* as an essential characteristic of the Platonic *paideia*, an attempt will be made propose an answer to some of these questions and to discuss the need to adopt the philosophical principles in educational systems today. In today's world of total information, educational systems still tend to promote uncritical acceptance of unexamined notions through unquestioned adoption and reproduction of "factual" content. For this reason, it is of pressing importance to discover how principles of wise selection and sharing of important and valuable information may be promoted or instilled in the learner, rather than indiscriminate "consumption" of the valuable, relevant and helpful, together with information which is irrelevant, false, or even damaging. It seems as though Plato wished to suggest the need for assimilation of this kind of true philosophical principle through his notion of *periagoge* based *paideia*, and a paradoxical image of how to incorporate true knowledge and insight into learner's soul.

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<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 518d.

## The Realisation of Plato's Idea of Common Education in Contemporary Educational Systems

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When Socrates in Plato's dialogue the Republic formulated for the inhabitants of his ideal state a system of common education of children (his "third wave", after the thesis of the philosopher-ruler, and the equality of women), he appears to have had in mind the formation and education of children who would all enjoy equal rights and opportunity to become philosopher-rulers. Though it has often been taken to imply the opposite, the logical implications of Socrates' radical statements on this topic may be taken to indicate that Plato's intention was in fact the creation of a society in which every child would receive the same educational opportunities. The consequence of this effort would be the creation of a society in which there were no class differences and in which the level of education of a child would not be decided by his (ethnic, economic, social, political) origins. What is essential in respect to Plato's educational system is the ability of the individual to raise himself from the level of mere opinion and unquestioned (and more often than not contradictory or incompatible) assumptions to the level of true and reliable knowledge. Only in this case will we achieve a society in which all enjoy equal rights and are in a position to become active participants and leaders in a fair and just state.

In this concept I would like to consider today's educational system, which attempts, from the level of kindergarten and preschool onward to put into practice the principle of common (universal) education. In today's world, where the right of every individual to access to the educational system, without regard to religious belief, race, or ethnic origins belongs to our fundamental human rights (Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights) – the outlines of Plato's doctrine of education are clearly manifest.

Although Plato's doctrine of universal education of children was considered by Popper to be an expression of the totalitarian tendencies of the Republic and one of the elements of enmity to the "open society", the fact is that Plato's doctrine of universal education, when its principles are properly understood and put into practice, prevents and attenuates autocratic and totalitarian tendencies in civil society and contributes to the realisation of an open society in the truest sense, as opposed to caricature and falsification of those principles, as historically manifested eg. in the "Lebensborn Projekt" of the Nazi regime.

### Perfection of Human Nature through Education

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All men naturally desire knowledge, says Aristotle. In this sentence we can see that our pursuit for knowledge is universal; it expresses a fundamental need of every human being. Because of this, humans have to take part in education. All human beings have the need and capability of being educated; it is in our own nature. Unlike the nature that is all around us, however, in which human beings participate and of which human beings also form a part, humans also have their own specific nature, which is manifest through time in the gradual

realisation of what we may call „second nature“. „Second nature“ implies that we can/should in a certain sense become unlike our "first nature", that is nature insofar as it operates on the basis of necessity and instinct, according to preexisting conditions and natural law. The difference is between what we are at a purely natural and what we can or should become on the basis of a "higher" nature grounded in our distinctive capacities as intelligent beings capable of learning and acting on the basis of conscious reflection and decision.

But what should we become and how? At what should we aim in our choices and actions? Here we can connect our „second nature“ and the question of education. Through education, humans and their nature are developed and cultivated from the necessary condition of our existence to the sufficient reason which guides our behaviour and choices. Because of education and cultivation we became the beings we were "meant to be". Our „final“ aim in this respect is to achieve perfection of our nature, or human excellence in moral sense.

In my presentation, I will try to show the connection between human nature, education and human excellence or perfection as final goal toward which we should aim.

## Humanism and Education Today

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Humanism is a group of philosophies and ethical perspectives which emphasize the value and agency of human beings, individually and collectively, and generally prefers individual thought and evidence over established doctrine or faith. In philosophy and social science, humanism refers to a perspective that affirms some notion of "humanity". I take humanism, as a perspective in education, to be based on human generation of knowledge, meaning, and ultimately expertise through interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligence. The learning goal is thereby to realize oneself as a unique personality and one's possibilities and talents on the basis of intrinsic motivation toward accomplishment. The learner is able to adapt prior knowledge to new experience. The educator's role in humanistic learning is to encourage and enable the learner, andragogically, by providing access to appropriate resources without obtrusive interference. The learning goal is high order learning of procedural knowledge, strategy, reasoning, abstract analysis, and development of expertise.

## Passion and Reason: On Nussbaum and the Cultivation of Political Emotions

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The overarching interest of my paper is, from an ideo-historical perspective, to explore how relations between the body, emotions and reason have been constructed in the intellectual history of the modern university in light of an understanding of the concepts of *Bildung* and cultivation. The concept of "Bildung" or cultivation has through Western history



often been formed the basis of ethical arguments for human development and emancipation. In my research, I will pose the question of what happens if one reconstructs the idea of *Bildung* to an aesthetic defense of togetherness.

My study will concentrate on how this aim can be discerned in a contemporary defense of cultivation and *Bildung* as the core mission of the university, taking as point of departure the work of American philosopher Martha Nussbaum. The subject of my thesis is to explore how Nussbaum engages intellectual history in her defense of the humanities and their role in the cultivation of humanity. Furthermore, I consider how this correlates to how the relation between body, emotion and reason has been constructed within an idea of man's emancipation through higher education. In line with Nussbaum's Aristotelian theory from *The Capabilities Approach*, this implies cultivation of political emotions.

My primary focus will be Nussbaum's implementation of intellectual history, in other words, how she constructs her argument for the cultivating mission of higher education by engaging the history of ideas. This focus will be central throughout my research. Apart from a critical reading of Nussbaum's position on the potential of higher education as an arena for cultivation of political emotions, my thesis will examine Nussbaum's work as activity in the realm of the humanities, highlighting this activity itself as praxis and action. This topic touches upon the changed conditions for the university and the marginalization of the humanities. Nussbaum's defense of "cultivating humanity" is in this frame questioned within a contemporary discussion on the role of the humanities and also, the role of intellectuals in an era of new public management of higher education and research.

The ideohistorical perspective of my research implies an exploration of the reciprocal relation between ideas and their historical contexts. Above all, my thesis will pay attention to the different techniques which have been constitutive for the formation of Western subjectivity in relation to the idea of the transformative effects of higher education. By highlighting the historicity and contextuality in the genealogy of the concept of education, reflection on the mere conceptual structures of the ideas will be transcended.

The thesis will argue that research within the humanities on the value of the humanities needs to be discussed, criticized and redefined by examining the humanities' own narratives and axioms. Finally, Nussbaum's construction of an ethical-political subject will be confronted with perspectives from critical theory, and on this basis an understanding of the concept of cultivation more relevant to contemporary discussion within educational policy proposed.

## Education: For What and For Whom?

### Kant and the Purpose and Human Dignity in Education

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In my paper, I will focus on two crucial questions emerging in today's society, connecting Kant's critical philosophy (period of the Critiques) to the present situation in formal, public and institutionalized education. These two questions are first of all, the question of education's real purposes, and, second, the question of the subject of education. The latter question is by no means trivial, since it evokes philosophical inquiry on the questions: Who and what am I? What is a human being? Starting from the text *Beantwortung*

der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? to the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft as well as the Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant's philosophical thought is of no little importance with respect to emerging problems in today's education, economy, politics and society in general.

The questions posed here regarding education, as I will argue, are closely connected with Kant's moral philosophy and his aesthetics. The first hint on what Kant considered to be education's real purpose goes back to his response to the question What is Enlightenment? where he clearly states and promotes cultivation of critical and autonomous thinking, instead of submissive acceptance of unquestioned claims of authority of whatever kind, i.e. heteronomous mind. In this regard, it is important to ensure the circumstances which will grant people freedom to think for themselves, concerning which conditions considerable progress has been made in comparison to 18th century.

Furthermore, in the second Critique and related to my latter question, Kant touches upon the theme of the subjects included in education. According to one of the alternative versions of the categorical imperative, education should be student-related in that, that every individual is treated as an end in him- or herself and not as an instrument for the realization someone else's ends. The dignity of a person should therefore be the highest standard in educational practice.

As the two questions I mention above are intimately connected, the answer to the question what and who a human being is and could be illuminates the path to understanding of the actual purpose of education. Although the Kant's question: What is a human being? (Was ist Mensch?), which sums up the questions which form the heart and inspiration of the three Critiques (What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope ?), is not directly intended as an argument within the context of philosophy of education, it is clear what implications it has for the question posed. In this sense, education should include the education of the whole human being, i.e. its purpose should be continuous cultivation of all our human powers or faculties, of understanding, of desire, of feeling and of judgement.

## Curiosity and Education

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The subject of my poster is the concept of curiosity. My focus will not be on theoretical aspects of curiosity, because it seems that practical and correlative issues are of much greater importance to the matter. In exploring related notions such as creativity, openness to new experience, motivation, playfulness, lasting knowledge, investigation, research and learning, we can discover the central role of curiosity. Its affective element is often misconstrued as negative and unconstructive for acquiring of knowledge. One of purposes of my thesis is to show that it is especially and primarily the affective side of curiosity which is relevant for scientific and everyday cognitive research.

Although the definition of curiosity varies from an aesthetic emotion, and behaviour evoked by that emotion, to an innate driving force, a sort of 'thirst' for knowledge, or urge to explore and respond to new stimuli, the most significant aspect which emerges from attempts to define this characteristic trait of human behaviour surely lies in curiosity's role in the interactions which humans have with the 'physical world' and the 'world of ideas'.

There is close connection between creativity and curiosity. Most theoreticians claim that artists and scientists among their personal characteristics always exhibit a fundamental

sense of curiosity. The creative process necessarily includes, at least in its first stage, curiosity. Furthermore, curiosity appears to be associated with other characteristic personality traits such as willingness to take risks, openness to new experience, and persistence (eg. in investigation, in striving to attain one's learning goals or research aims). Readiness for possible failure goes hand in hand with curiosity. A curious person will probably be courageous and adaptive enough in the face of setbacks, opposition and failure to respond creatively and achieve a relative degree of productivity. Through my poster I will try to present a description of the theoretical kind of curiosity which underlies every truly creative act in the area of intellectual activity.

On the practical side, natural curiosity is evident from the earliest phases of human behaviour, developing depending on the favourability of circumstances in early childhood (insofar as it is encouraged and not discouraged). Later, in early school age curiosity needs to be guided in a constructive manner. As a student explores with interest, through playing and wondering, it is essential for the teacher to subtly guide the process of learning. In order to cultivate the child's creative abilities, the teacher needs to try together with student to capture important and motivating questions. The aim should be for students to see school not as place where every answer is presupposed, but rather as a place where space is allowed for questions and the relevance and importance of the state of wondering is acknowledged and respected. The task of posing questions and capacity for wonderment is extremely important for learning, in order that learning may become interesting and exciting, and children may be motivated to actively engage in the learning process. However, it is also important for the attainment of lasting and stable knowledge which is best acquired and assimilated by a playful process. In order for learned content to be assimilated in a lasting manner, it is necessary to inspire interest and curiosity before entering and introducing new lesson. Teachers also need to nurture persistence, patience, and commitment to task along with curiosity.

Curiosity as the instinctive drive for knowledge is in very close in meaning to philosophy, love for seeking wisdom. Hence, curious people enjoy novelty, knowledge and new experiences. Fully understanding something for the first time for the curious person must be a singular experience, an experience accompanied by a higher form of happiness. The Scientist, artist, and others with their curiosity, bring society prosperity through inventions, discoveries, artistic productions, and so forth. In this respect, every one of them is truly a philosopher, curious about the world, lover of wisdom.

The main question is how to support a child who, just like the scientist or artist or philosopher, has in himself an intense and exciting curiosity. What is the right method of cultivating student's curiosity? Perhaps, teachers must foster students to ask questions that are perplexing as much to them as to teachers themselves.

## Critique and Critical Thinking as Basis of our Knowledge

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From the first steps of our education, mostly we are just passive observers of its process. Yes, we learn by reading sentences in books and listening to teachers but if we are just absorbing their sentences without critical thinking and judgment, can we really learn? Is

passive learning enough to develop our thinking so that, one day, we can be capable to cope with practical problems of life?

In my poster I will show how the idea of critique and necessity for developing critical thinking is not just important for educational process but *conditio sine qua non*.

From ancient times collectors and interpreters of historical texts used methods of critic of texts and hermeneutic to try to establish authenticity of certain unclear and difficult to understand places in manuscripts and fragments. Also, they were very conscious of evaluating the importance and meaning of the authors and their work.

Fr. A. Wolf was one of the key figures for development of the idea of critique, because he expands and transforms critique from an ancillary discipline of philology into the activity of *diaskeuasis*, which was comprised of revisions of certain texts. Wolf's philological discussions on the development of Homer's epics influenced Fr. Schlegel's development of his hermeneutical critique as a universal method of understanding. I will try to show, on the basis of Schlegel's idea and understanding of critique, how we can develop and improve our way of thinking and judgment.

### *III. Public lecture*

## Long-Distance Sea Travel on the East Adriatic in the 15th Century from Contemporary Travelogues

Marinko Petrić, Senior curator

Hvar Heritage Museum

Sailing along the Adriatic in the 15th century was neither pleasant nor safe. The Venetians had safeguarded the shipping routes from the beginning of the 15th century, following Venice's conquest of the whole eastern coast partly with money and partly by force. Despite Venetian control, these waters presented enormous challenges to those who needed to sail them, including danger from the Turks, frequent plagues, and insufficient knowledge of local shipping conditions and hazards. Worst affected were the ordinary travellers, who had at their disposal only local or Venetian trading vessels, which were slow and lightly armed.

However, there were also proper passenger ships which were quick, better equipped, and fully capable of carrying travellers for longer distances. These were the Venetian galleys which sailed between Venice and the port of Jaffa in Palestine, carrying pilgrims, who formed the majority of travellers at that time, bound for the holy Christian sites. These Venetian pilgrim boats were far from offering the comforts of today's cruisers, but they were the first of the kind on the Mediterranean, and the route between Venice and Jaffa was the first passenger shipping line. The galleys regularly stopped at Croatian ports along the route, thus maintaining a regular thoroughfare of travellers along our coast, so one can justifiably say there was true long-distance passenger shipping on the Adriatic in the 15th century.

Many of those who travelled to the Holy Land came from the distinguished, educated classes of European society, and a custom which many followed was to express their religious experiences and adventurous exploits in written journals. Three such journals stand out from the many preserved specimens as relevant to our tale of passenger journeys on the Adriatic in the 15th century. The journal of the Dominican monk Felix Faber (c.1441 – 1502) from Ulm is the most comprehensive, and most often cited. Faber visited the Holy Land twice, in 1480 and 1483 – 4. Less extensive, but equally enlightening, is the account of Canon Pietro Casola (1427 – 1507) from Milan, who went to the Holy Land in 1494. Of particular interest is the work of German knight Konrad von Grünenberg (1442 – 1494?) from Konstanz, who embellished his journal with superb and lavish illustrations of the places he saw, including some of our coastal towns. All three journals are written in vivid style, and are credible descriptions of the journey along our coast and the places where they docked. They reveal at first hand what the passenger galley route was like, how they sailed, what the weather conditions were like at sea, and how accommodation facilities were organized on board ship, providing us with many extremely interesting insights.

