Rethinking Kantian Analyticity – Andrea Salvador (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart (Milan))

The aim of my talk will be to reconstruct Kant's view on analytic judgements, focusing mainly on the 2nd edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and on some of his lessons on logic. I will thus use contemporary logic to try to regiment Kant's account of the conditions under which a proposition ought to be considered "analytic".

Kant's main concern in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was, notably, to understand "how are synthetic judgements *a priori* possible" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B19). Because of the importance Kant gave to this type of judgement, which he considered the distinctive trait of established scientific disciplines, his work focused mostly on synthetic judgements, rather than analytic ones. Nonetheless, philosophers who after Kant have accepted the analytic-synthetic distinction have sometimes assigned an important role to analytic judgements too, therefore, having a clear understanding of Kant's theses on analyticity could be historically relevant to contemporary discussions on this topic (see, as an example, Frege's view on the analyticity of arithmetic formulas and Carnap's explanation of necessary true propositions as analytically true propositions, that is, true in virtue of the conceptual framework of a language.). Moreover, a correct account of Kant's view on analyticity would be of importance also with regard to understanding his notion of synthetic judgements, and therefore of science itself. In fact, Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements did rest on his notion of analytic judgement, since Kant often described synthetic judgements as those that are not analytic ones (see, as a few examples, *Critique of Pure Reason* B10 and *Jäsche Logic* §36).

In the first part of the talk, I will identify what conditions are given by Kant that ought to be met in order for a judgement to be an analytic one. In this part I will underline one aspect that is mostly taken to be more or less irrelevant to Kant's view, but which is actually considered by him to be the fundamental trait that distinguishes analytic judgements from the others, that is *being true in virtue only of the principle of non contradiction*. In the second part, I will regiment Kant's claims using classical logic and standard modal logic, and proceed to show how one could argue in favour of Kant's theses on analyticity using our contemporary logical tools. The main goal of this part of the talk will be to show how one could in fact reduce the conditions previously extracted from Kant's works to just the condition regarding the principle of non contradiction, as Kant suggested in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B191). By doing this, I aim also at making clear what assumptions must be assumed in order to hold Kant's position, so as to unveil what implicit premises Kant could have held himself.