



# Participatory Moral Reasons: Their Scope and Strength

Garrett Cullity (Australian National University)

## ABSTRACT

According to ordinary moral thought, we have reasons to join in worthwhile group activities and reasons not to join in morally bad group activities. Reasons of both kinds can exist even when the group is very large, and your participation or non-participation will make little difference to what is achieved by the group. If we take this thought seriously, two sets of questions arise. First, there are questions of scope. What conditions must a group meet in order to generate participatory reasons of these kinds, and what conditions must I meet for those reasons to apply to me? Secondly, there are questions about what it takes for such reasons to generate moral requirements. Can a general explanation be given of the conditions under which participating in worthwhile joint actions and not participating in bad ones is morally required? I present answers to these questions, and draw out some implications of the answers.

**Garrett Cullity** is Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. His research ranges across theoretical and applied topics in moral and political philosophy. His most recent book, *Concern, Respect, and Cooperation* (2018, Oxford University Press) explores concern for others' well-being, respect for others' self-expression, and cooperation in collective activity as three independent foundations for morality.



## DATE AND TIME

17/18 NOVEMBER 2021

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