BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260429T225915Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220519T121500
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20220519T134500
SUMMARY:Personal Identity and the Preservation of Mind
UID:20260501T141900Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Asia/Jerusalem
LOCATION:Tel Aviv\, Israel
DESCRIPTION:<p>On May 19 (Thursday)\, Alexander Geddes (King's College London) will give a Zoom talk at Tel Aviv University. Interested parties should contact the organizer\, David Kovacs (david.mark.kovacs@gmail.com) for the Zoom link. Below are further details.<br><br> <strong>Time</strong>: 19 May\, 10:15-11:45 (UK) / 12:15-13:45 (Israel) / 19:15-20:45 (Sydney)</p>\n<p><strong>Speaker</strong>: Alexander Geddes (Research Associate at King's College\, London)</p>\n<p><strong>Title</strong>: "Personal Identity and the Preservation of Mind"</p>\n<p><strong>Abstract</strong>: The personal identity debate revolves around the apparent tension between the claims that we are animals and that we&nbsp\;must go where our minds go. These are taken to be in tension on the basis that there are possible&nbsp\;<em>separation&nbsp\;cases</em>: cases in which&nbsp\;a human animal and a human mind part ways. The tension therefore depends both on assumptions about the persistence&nbsp\;conditions of human animals and on assumptions about the preservation of mind. In the present paper\, I focus on the latter. &nbsp\; I show&nbsp\;that a mind should be taken to go somewhere in a would-be separation case only granted a certain sort of account of the preservation of&nbsp\;reference-involving mental properties. I argue that this sort of account is without support\, and motivate an alternative\, according to which&nbsp\;identity of subject is a requirement on the preservation of all such properties. Accepting this requirement is shown to involve no incoherence or&nbsp\;implausibility\, and to have considerable intuitive and explanatory appeal. Finally\, I argue that this not only allows us to resolve the tension above in a novel way\, it also suggests that\, in order to arrive at a principled verdict about the mental facts in would-be separation&nbsp\;cases\, we may have to&nbsp\;<em>bring to bear&nbsp\;</em>an account of our nature&mdash\;precluding any attempt to develop an account of our nature on the basis of such cases.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Mark Kovacs:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
