BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T232724Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Sao_Paulo:20220622T170000 DTEND;TZID=America/Sao_Paulo:20220622T183000 SUMMARY:Thomas Kivatinos (Auburn University). Causally Derivative Hierarchical Dependence UID:20260418T132541Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:America/Sao_Paulo LOCATION:Centro de Lógica\, Epistemologia e História da Ciência\, Rua Sérgio Buarque de Holanda\, 251\, Campinas\, Brazil DESCRIPTION:

[All seminars] 17:00 to 18:30 pm (GMT+0): https://meet.google.com/odf-sdnr-grw

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Abstract: \;I defend the view that a sub-set of grounding relations are derivative of causal processes\, and that this entails \;grounding pluralism: the view that grounding relations are not all of the same basic nature or type\, for \;grounding relations fall into in a plurality of types that are inherently distinct. As I argue\, scientific \;explanations that are &ldquo\;vertical&rdquo\; qualify as grounding explanations because they satisfy the telltale explanatory \;role of grounding explanations. And because grounding explanations are thought to track or pick out \;grounding relations\, it follows that vertical scientific explanations pick out grounding relations. This\, in \;conjunction with the leading account of vertical scientific explanation\, entails that the grounding relations that \;are picked out by vertical scientific explanations are fundamentally distinct from those that are not so picked \;out. For as I argue\, the leading account&mdash\;that which stems from the &ldquo\;new mechanistic&rdquo\; conceptual \;framework&mdash\;implies that the grounding relations picked out by vertical scientific explanations emerge and \;derive from causal processes\, whereas other grounding relations do not. This difference between causally \;derivative and non-causally derivative categories of grounding\, I suggest\, marks a distinction between \;fundamentally distinct types of grounding that should not be treated as uniform in nature. For if all grounding \;relations were uniform in nature\, then they would obtain in virtue of the same phenomena\, and thus there \;would be a uniform explanation for why they all obtain. But this is not the case. Some grounding relations \;obtain in virtue of causal processes obtaining\, whereas others do not. And the obtaining of some grounding \;relations can be explained by appeal to causal processes obtaining\, whereas the obtaining of others cannot be \;so explained. The ramification of this is that a prevailing view about grounding&mdash\;the view that grounding is a \;unified phenomenon&mdash\;is mistaken.

ORGANIZER;CN=Raoni Arroyo;CN=Pedro Merlussi: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR