BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260417T025323Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Shanghai:20220906T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Shanghai:20220906T190000
SUMMARY:Strong Belief Is Ordinary
UID:20260423T184245Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c
TZID:Asia/Shanghai
LOCATION:Hangzhou\, China\, 310058
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract:&nbsp\;</strong>In an influential recent paper\, Hawthorne\, Rothschild\, and Spectre (&ldquo\;HRS&rdquo\;) argue that belief is weak. More precisely: they argue that the referent of&nbsp\;believe&nbsp\;in ordinary language is much weaker than epistemologists usually suppose\; that one needs very little evidence to be entitled to believe a proposition in this sense\; and that the referent of&nbsp\;believe&nbsp\;in ordinary language just is the ordinary concept of belief. I argue here to the contrary. HRS identify two alleged tests of weakness&mdash\;the neg-raising and weak upper bounds tests\, as I call them&mdash\;which they claim&nbsp\;believe&nbsp\;and&nbsp\;think&nbsp\;pass. But I identify several other expressions in ordinary English for attributing belief\, all of which fail both tests. Therefore\, even if HRS are correct that&nbsp\;believe&nbsp\;and&nbsp\;think&nbsp\;refer to a weak attitude\, it does not follow that the ordinary concept of belief is weak. I conclude by raising some problems for the accounts of belief as guessing\, building on HRS&rsquo\;s arguments\, due to Kevin Dorst\, Matt Mandelkern\, and Ben Holgu&iacute\;n.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Jie Gao;CN=Davide Fassio:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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