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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260405T181145Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Shanghai:20220906T181500
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Shanghai:20220906T184500
SUMMARY:Memory Belief Is Weak
UID:20260406T021255Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-4s97k
TZID:Asia/Shanghai
LOCATION:Hangzhou\, China\, 310058
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract:&nbsp\;</strong>Recent years have seen extensive debate over whether &lsquo\;belief is weak&rsquo\;\, viz\, whether the epistemic standard required by belief is lower than that for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions like &lsquo\;ordinary belief&rsquo\; and &lsquo\;outright belief&rsquo\;\, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief&mdash\;memory belief. I will argue that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are &lsquo\;weak&rsquo\; due to two forms of &lsquo\;entitlement inequality&rsquo\;. My key argument is thus twofold. First\, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory\, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second\, by scrutinizing the communicative function of memory\, it will be demonstrated that one can be entitled to belief but not to assertion\, such that memory can play its functional role in supporting epistemic vigilance.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Jie Gao;CN=Davide Fassio:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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