BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260405T141744Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221112T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221112T103000 SUMMARY:Slurs as Ideology: A Defence of Prohibitionism UID:20260405T220434Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-4s97k TZID:Europe/London LOCATION:Faculty of Philosophy\, Oxford\, United Kingdom\, OX2 6GG DESCRIPTION:

Abstract:

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Prohibitionism is the view that slurs are offensive because they are prohibited &ndash\; not because they have special semantic or pragmatic properties. Despite its intuitive appeal\, prohibitionism suffers from several well-known problems. Amongst other things\, it can&rsquo\;t distinguish slurs from other taboo words like obscenities\, or explain why we would ban slurs if they truly are neutral descriptors. To make matters worse\, I also argue that prohibitionism conflates the psychological phenomenon of offence with the linguistic phenomenon derogation.

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Here I nonetheless argue that prohibitionism is worth saving. I develop the suggestion that the label 'slur' itself is normatively loaded into a novel version of prohibitionism &ndash\; so-called ideological prohibitionism. On my account\, a pejorative is a slur only insofar it reliably communicates derogatory attitudes towards a socially protected group &ndash\; and we condemn derogation towards this group on ideological grounds. Slurs are thus not simply descriptive words we ban &ndash\; they are pejoratives we ban because they are problematic. I conclude that my account redeems prohibitonism&rsquo\;s good qualities without inheriting its defects.

ORGANIZER;CN=Julian Ratcliffe;CN=Jen Semler;CN=Kyle van Oosterum;CN=Alexander Arridge;CN=Lewis Williams;CN=Dom Mcguire: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR