Abstract:
\nI maintain that we are justified in believing that rocks can survive motion because we perceive \;rocks in motion. So I think that perceptual experience can justify claims about the persistence \;conditions of ordinary objects. While this thesis might seem obvious\, it is incompatible with almost \;every way that contemporary metaphysicians justify persistence claims\; most metaphysicians \;justify persistence claims by appealing to some mix of conceptual or linguistic analysis. Call this \;approach to the justification of persistence claims 'conceptualism'. I argue that we should abandon \;conceptualism. In its stead\, I defend a view &ndash\; 'perceptualism' &ndash\; according to which perception \;justifies persistence claims about objects. \;
\nAmie Thomasson defends the most well-developed variant of conceptualism. On her view\, \;persistence claims like &ldquo\;Rocks can survive motion&rdquo\; are true in virtue of the fact that the term &lsquo\;rock&rsquo\; \;comes pre-packaged with certain rules of use. These rules of use guarantee that expressions like \;&lsquo\;that rock&rsquo\; are appropriately applied before and after motion. This allows us to justifiably claim \;&ldquo\;Rocks can survive motion&rdquo\;. But consider incars\, objects that are essentially co-located with cars \;inside of garages. Thomasson&rsquo\;s view entails that claims like &ldquo\;There are incars&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;Incars cannot \;survive leaving garages&rdquo\; are true. This is counter-intuitive\, for we do not see incars. So we should \;be on the lookout for another justificatory story. \;
\nI defend a justificatory story for persistence claims that accords perception a central role. Around \;rocks in motion\, we form beliefs like . This belief is formed on the basis of a \;perceptual link with a rock\, and beliefs formed on the basis of a perceptual link are justified. So \;the claim &ldquo\;That&rsquo\;s moving&rdquo\; is justified. And if &ldquo\;That&rsquo\;s moving&rdquo\; is justified\, then so is &ldquo\;That \;survives over the course of its motion&rdquo\;. Since the perceptual demonstrative in the belief is about a rock\, the demonstrative &lsquo\;that&rsquo\; in &ldquo\;That survives over the course of its motion&rdquo\; \;refers to a rock. And if we know what rocks are\, we can infer &ldquo\;That rock survives over the course \;of its motion&rdquo\;. This immediately implies &ldquo\;Rocks can survive motion&rdquo\;. Therefore\, &ldquo\;Rocks can \;survive motion&rdquo\; is justified. \;
\nThis justificatory story does not secure justification for claims like &ldquo\;There are incars&rdquo\;\, or &ldquo\;Incars \;cannot survive leaving garages&rdquo\;. This is because we do not enter into perceptual links with incars. \;As such\, perception does not justify beliefs about incars. \;
\nI close by highlighting three advantages that perceptualism displays over conceptualism. First\, \;perceptualism accounts for conceptualism's explanatory shortcomings. Second\, perceptualism \;secures an epistemic asymmetry between ordinary and extraordinary objects that conceptualism \;cannot capture. Most imporantly\, conceptualists justify persistence claims about cars in just the \;same way as they justify persistence claims about incars. But this means that conceptualists fail to \;register obvious epistemological differences between cars and incars. Finally\, perceptualism \;avoids deflationary views about persistence and ontology. I conclude that we should reject \;conceptualism and endorse perceptualism.
ORGANIZER;CN=Julian Ratcliffe;CN=Jen Semler;CN=Kyle van Oosterum;CN=Imogen Rivers;CN=Alexander Arridge;CN=Lewis Williams;CN=Tom Ralston;CN=Dom Mcguire: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR