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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260718T012856Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221112T144500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221112T154500
SUMMARY:Privacy\, Knowledge\, and Self-Presentation
UID:20260721T023314Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:74d0:1ff:feb1:3c52%3
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Faculty of Philosophy\, Oxford\, United Kingdom\, OX2 6GG
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract:</p>\n<p>Epistemologists and privacy theorists have (mostly) ignored each other. This paper argues that this is a mistake. Despite the centrality of epistemic concerns to discussions of privacy\, almost no theorists frame their theories in epistemic terms. I argue for an account which does just that. First\, I raise two prominent theories of privacy that reject epistemic framing and argue this is a mistake for a variety of reasons. I then offer an epistemic frame (a constraint) on one of these theories and present a larger theory&mdash\;the Knowledge Account of Privacy&mdash\;of which it is a part. I then respond to two objections\, one of which comes from the small quarter of privacy theorists who do cast their theories in epistemic terms.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Julian Ratcliffe;CN=Kyle van Oosterum;CN=Alexander Arridge;CN=Tom Ralston:
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