Abstract:
\nColonialism is always seriously pro tanto wrong. But why? Is colonialism wrongful \;for merely contingent reasons? If so\, then\, in principle\, colonialism could be \;unobjectionable. I argue against this possibility by showing there is something \;necessarily pro tanto wrong about colonialism. Colonialism always involves \;political subjugation of the colonized people. This conceptual observation is\, I \;believe\, key to ascertaining what is necessarily wrong with colonialism. By \;politically subjugating the colonized\, colonial institutions treat them as inferior with \;respect to the Rawlsian moral powers for a conception of the good or for a sense of \;justice. By treating the colonized in this way\, colonial institutions seriously threaten \;their social bases of social respect. But the social bases of self-respect are the most \;important social primary good\, the most important good to distribute justly. \;
\nColonialism is particularly detrimental to colonized peoples&rsquo\; social bases of \;self-respect because it involves control over a significant part of colonized peoples&rsquo\; \;basic structure of society. But a basic structure consists of a society&rsquo\;s most important \;sociopolitical institutions. So\, colonialism egregiously degrades colonized peoples \;by making some the most important sociopolitical institutions that they live under \;colonial institutions. The way in which colonialism permeates their basic structure \;make it a pervasive influence on colonized peoples&rsquo\; lives. So\, since colonialism \;necessarily treats the colonized as inferior\, it must threaten their social bases of self respect. This is the necessary pro tanto wrong of colonialism. \;
\nI conclude by objecting to two of the most influential accounts of \;colonialism&rsquo\;s wrongfulness: Stilz&rsquo\;s autonomy account and Ypi&rsquo\;s associative \;account. \;
\nFor Stilz\, colonialism is pro tanto wrong because it involves alienating \;coercion. This is because colonialism cannot respect the colonized people&rsquo\;s shared \;political will if any. For Stilz\, it follows that colonial rule cannot be fully legitimate\, \;no matter how beneficial it is to colonized and no matter how substantively just it is. \;However\, Stilz&rsquo\;s view is unable to explain why colonialism always contributes a \;significant pro tanto wrong. Suppose a people lacks a shared political will to \;cooperate together. For Stilz\, their state lacks full legitimacy. But if they are \;colonized by another state\, this colonial state also lacks full legitimacy. However\, \;intuitively colonialism adds an additional wrong. But Stilz&rsquo\;s view does not supply one. The self-respect account\, in contrast\, can. On this view\, colonial rule contributes \;a new threat to colonized people&rsquo\;s social bases of self-respect. \;
\nFor Ypi\, colonialism is wrong because it involves unequal or unreciprocal \;terms of political association. Ypi argues the reason why is that colonialism involves \;coercion. However\, this explanation either undergenerates or overgenerates the \;wrong of colonialism. Either colonialism need not involve coercion\, or if it does\, \;then the colonial coercion pervades ordinary life. The wrong of colonialism cannot \;be that common. Ypi can solve this problem of extensional adequacy\, but only at the \;cost of rendering her view insufficiently explanatory. My appeal to self-respect\, \;however\, avoids this problem.
ORGANIZER;CN=Julian Ratcliffe;CN=Jen Semler;CN=Kyle van Oosterum;CN=Imogen Rivers;CN=Alexander Arridge;CN=Lewis Williams;CN=Tom Ralston: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR