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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260416T075112Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Stockholm:20221029T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Stockholm:20221030T170000
SUMMARY:Perception and Fundamental Reality
UID:20260419T142333Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c
TZID:Europe/Stockholm
LOCATION:Uppsala\, Sweden
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>PERCEPTION AND FUNDAMENTAL REALITY</strong></p>\n<p>The debate between na&iuml\;ve realism and representationalism has been an ongoing issue in the philosophy of perception. A recent trend in it has been enumerating and assessing the various possible intermediary positions among both extremes. Another has been working out the lesser explored\, na&iuml\;ve realist view in detail. Most recently\, there has been an interest in the relation between na&iuml\;ve realism and fundamental metaphysics. One connection is through the hard problem of consciousness. Some have argued that na&iuml\;ve realism holds the promise to solve the problem. Another connection is through the various desiderata of the na&iuml\;ve realist view\, which&mdash\;some have argued&mdash\;may require a revised materialist\, or even an idealist\, metaphysics.</p>\n<p>Parallel to this development in philosophy of perception\, there has been an explosion in non-standard metaphysical positions in the vicinity of neutral monism and idealism. Those have been targeted explicitly at either solving or dissolving the hard problem. Since each is supposed to have distinctive consequences for the nature of psychological states\, it is also natural to ask what view of perception is suggested by a specific metaphysical framework.</p>\n<p>The conference will bring together philosophers of perception and metaphysicians in an attempt to clarify the relation among perception and fundamental reality in both directions. Scholars interested in those questions are welcome to join us. To obtain the details of the online meeting\, please email <u>perc8real@gmail.com</u></p>\n<p><u><br></u></p>\n<p><strong>SCHEDULE&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><u>DAY 1 (Oct. 29)</u></p>\n<p>8:00 - 9:00 HUA Haiming (Sun Yat-sen): Epistemological Disjunctivism\, Naive Realism\, and Introspective Indistinguishability</p>\n<p>9:05 - 10:25 Maarten Steenhagen (Uppsala): Last Words of a Decaying Idealism</p>\n<p>10:30 - 11:30 TANG Refeng (Beijing Normal): Doxasticist Na&iuml\;ve Realism</p>\n<p>11:30 - 12:05&nbsp\;<em>Break</em></p>\n<p>12:05 - 13:25 Philip Goff (Durham): Why Did Thick Content Evolve?</p>\n<p>13:30 - 14:30 LUO Changjie (Tianjin Foreign Studies): Between Two Ways of Characterizing Hallucination</p>\n<p>14:40 - 16:00 Heather Logue (Leeds): Inextricabilism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness</p>\n<p><em><br></em></p>\n<p><u>DAY 2 (Oct. 30)</u></p>\n<p>8:00 - 9:00 Itay Shani (Sun Yat-sen): No Perception Without Reception: Exploring the Ground of the Given</p>\n<p>9:05 - 10:25 Clare Maccumhaill (Durham): Telekinesis and Anscombe&rsquo\;s Philosophy of Action and Perception</p>\n<p>10:30 - 11:30 Ivan Ivanov (Sun Yat-sen): Dual-aspect Relationalism</p>\n<p>11:30 - 12:05 <em>Break</em></p>\n<p>12:05 - 13:25 Keith Allen (York): Seeing Places</p>\n<p>13:25 - 14:30 Christopher Brown (Xiamen): What Does Russellian Physicalism Require?</p>\n<p>14:40 - 16:00 Helen Yetter-Chappell (Miami): Get Acquainted with Naive Idealism</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Maarten Steenhagen:
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