BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260610T092732Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20130523T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20130523T180000 SUMMARY:Gaps\, Gluts\, and Truth UID:20260613T131230Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:Europe/Rome LOCATION:P.zza Capitaniato 3\, Padova\, Italy DESCRIPTION:

Project: Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy of Logic

University of Padua - Doctoral School in Philosophy (curriculum \;Theoretical Philosophy)

23 May 2013

FISPPA Department -- University of Padua

Workshop "Gaps\, Gluts\, and Truth"

10.30 - 11.40

Pablo Cobreros
Universidad de Navarra (Navarra\, Spain)

Title: Symmetry\, Gaps and Gluts

Abstract: Vagueness and the Liar paradox lead to a symmetry related \;situations that cannot be handled within classical semantics. In the \;case of vagueness\, borderline cases lead to a symmetry of dispositions \;of competent speakers towards assertion and denial. In the case of the \;Liar\, there is a symmetry in truth-value between the Liar sentence and \;its negation. Three-valued strong kleene semantics is a natural way to \;liberalize classical semantics. But then a second symmetry arises: \;should we read the intermediate value as a gap or as a glut?

11.45 - 12.55

Boris Rä\;hme
Fondazione Bruno Kessler (Trento\, Italy)

Title: An explanatory use of the concept of truth

Abstract: A central claim of deflationary accounts of truth for \;propositions is that truth talk has no explanatory role to play in \;philosophical elucidations of our epistemic and discursive practices. \;(An analogous claim is brought forward by disquotationalists\, i.e. by \;proponents of deflationary accounts of truth for sentences. I will \;concentrate on deflationism about propositional truth.) In my talk I \;scrutinize the no-explanatory-role claim with respect to the following \;normative constraint on the speech act of assertion:

(N) It is correct to assert a proposition only if it is true.

Deflationists argue that the truth talk involved in (N) plays a purely \;generalizing role and justify this claim by pointing out that the \;content of particular instances of (N)\, say\,

(T+) [It is correct to assert the proposition that some dogs are \;vicious] only if the proposition that some dogs are vicious is true.

can be expressed equally well without appeal to truth:

(T-) [It is correct to assert that some dogs are vicious] only if some \;dogs are vicious.

While conceding this last point to the deflationist\, I argue that the \;particular &lsquo\;true&rsquo\;-free instances of (N) themselves stand in need of \;explanation and that the only candidate explanation in the offing is \;in terms of truth. The main thesis of my talk is\, then\, that the \;no-explanatory-role claim deprives deflationists about (propositional) \;truth of the resources to answer the following simple question: Why \;does (T-) hold good? After arguing that (T-) does indeed hold good\, I \;discuss and dismiss several rejoinders that deflationists might level \;at my argument.

14.30 - 15.40

Martin Vacek
Slovak Academy of Sciences (Bratislava\, Slovakia)

Title: Dialetheism and Metaphysics

Abstract: In the paper\, I take logical laws to be entrenched in \;reality itself rather than in human conventions. Secondly\, I discuss \;how such a robust realist conception of logical laws captures the \;logical complexity of concrete (possible and impossible) worlds. It \;will be shown that it is the structural properties of a world that
give us its logical laws. If so\, the theory of concrete possible \;worlds instantiating various metaphysical structures enables us to \;non-modally differentiate between logically distinct worlds and\, by \;the same reasoning\, determines which worlds are impossible.

15.45 - 16.55

Sebastiano Moruzzi
University of Bologna (Bologna\, Italy)

Title: Vagueness and Omniscience

Abstract: The paper explores the consequences of the notion of \;omniscience in relation to the problem of vagueness. \;Omniscience is an idealised notion: it is the condition according to \;which a thinker knows everything there is to know. 1 In the context of \;the debate on vagueness\, omniscience can appear to be a loosely \;related topic. If we grant the logical possibility of a thinker who \;knows everything there is to know\, an epistemicist might grant that \;vague boundaries would be known to such a thinker\, while a theorist \;who believes vague predicates are boundaryless would hold that this \;latter knowledge is foreclosed even to an omniscient thinker. In this \;paper I will deal with the latter position\, i.e. with the idea that \;vague predicates lack sharp boundaries.However\, things are more \;complicated than what they appear to at first glance. Before drawing \;conclusions on this issue\, the exact relation between indeterminacy\, \;knowledge and omniscience must be clarified. \;I start introducing and motivating the relevance of omniscience to \;vagueness in relation to the supervaluationist approach. Two basic \;principles which relate vagueness to indeterminacy and knowledge are \;stated\, and three definitions of omniscience are considered. I raise \;problems for all these definitions. Finally\, I suggest that we are not \;in a position to know that omniscience is possible\; we too easily come \;to accept the idea that omniscience is possible because of a \;misapprehension of the phenomenology of vagueness.

Organization: Massimiliano Carrara (University of Padua -- Cogito -
Research Centre in Philosophy) \;massimiliano.carrara@unipd.it

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