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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260605T055136Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20130606T130000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20130606T143000
SUMMARY:Emotion vs. Principle in Moral Judgment
UID:20260607T082011Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:The University of Melbourne\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3010
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract:&nbsp\;How should we conceive of moral judgment in light of recent empirical research? Many have suggested a starring role for emotions (e.g. Prinz\, Nichols\, Haidt). Others\, especially proponents of the so-called "linguistic analogy" (e.g. Dwyer\, Mikhail\, Hauser)\, have pointed to evidence that moral principles play an important role in moral judgment. One such principle is the Doctrine of Double Effect\, which on one formulation states roughly that bringing about a bad outcome is permissible if it is an unintended consequence of intentionally bringing about a good outcome. I shall raise worries for both trends\, focusing on the most recent empirical developments\, which motivate a more complicated picture. However\, I will conclude with some optimism about the rationalist idea that moral principles do sometimes drive moral judgment and that emotions are inessential.</p>
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