BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260510T160804Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20221125T150000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20221125T170000 SUMMARY: Moral Fictionalism and the Problem of Imaginative Barriers UID:20260519T024721Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:250 Victoria Parade\, East Melbourne\, Australia\, 3002 DESCRIPTION:

Meta-ethicists often accept the following two theses.

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Utility Thesis. \;There is significant value in engaging with moral thinking\, discourse and practise\; however (despite this) &hellip\;

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Moral Error Theory. Moral thought and talk is systematically false.

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Once we recognise our error\, we might respond in a number of different ways. \; Abolitionists advise us to stop thinking and talking as though such claims were true\; the value of doing so is just not worth it. \; Strong conservationists\, on the other hand\, suggest that the utility of engaging in moral thinking and discourse should motivate us to indulge in self-deception and (if possible) continue to believe moral claims\, compartmentalising our beliefs where necessary. \; \;

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Revolutionary moral fictionalists adopt a middle ground. \; Unlike the strong conservationist\, fictionalists advise us to abandon our previously held moral \;beliefs \;and to stop \;asserting \;basic moral claims. \; Contrary to the abolutionist\, though\, fictionalists advise us to maintain moral thought and talk by make-believing what we say in this domain and by pretending to assert what we make-believe. \; The justification for doing so is that the value of moral thought and talk is too significant to allow us to abolish it altogether.

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In this paper\, I outline an underappreciated problem for moral fictionalism: moral fictionalists presuppose that we have direct control over what we make-believe\; but this presupposition does not seem to stand up in the moral domain. \; The empirical and philosophical literature on the so-called puzzle of imaginative resistance suggests that direct control over our moral imaginings is not possible. \; I discuss the problem in detail\, considering various positions one might take on the issue\, and suggest that there is no obvious solution to the problem for the moral fictionalist. \; In the final sections\, I contrast moral fictionalism with religious fictionalism. \; Fictionalism in the religious domain\, I suggest\, fares better than fictionalism in the moral domain. \; Moreover\, it has many of the same benefits.

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