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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260611T001000Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20140220T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20140223T170000
SUMMARY:Functions\, proofs\, constructions
UID:20260615T101306Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Tübingen\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p>Aim of the workshop:<br>---------------------------<br>The notion of function lays at the core of constructivism. According&nbsp\;to the intuitionistic explanation of the meaning of logical constants\,&nbsp\;a proof of an implication is understood as a function which gives&nbsp\;proofs of the consequent when applied to proofs of the antecedent.<br><br>How this should be exactly understood is a non-trivial matter and any&nbsp\;attempt at clarifying it requires\, implicitly or explicitly\, to&nbsp\;embrace some particular view on the nature of functions. More&nbsp\;generally\, different ways of accounting for the notion of proof&nbsp\;reflect different conceptions of functions.<br><br>Gentzen&rsquo\;s methods of proof-analysis depict deductive reasoning as&nbsp\;being ultimately constituted by &ldquo\;atomic&rdquo\; operations. Via the&nbsp\;Curry-Howard isomorphism these can be viewed as corresponding to basic&nbsp\;ingredients of computations. Proofs are thus assumed to be linguistic&nbsp\;entities or\, at least\, that it is through language that proofs are&nbsp\;primarily accessed.<br><br>An explanation of a different kind (such as Goodman and Kreisel&rsquo\;s&nbsp\;theory of constructions or the more recent research programme called&nbsp\;&lsquo\;logic of proofs&rsquo\;) is one willing to grasp the notion of proof&nbsp\;&ldquo\;directly&rdquo\;. Viewing proofs as abstract entities\, the focus is not much&nbsp\;on the internal structure of their linguistic presentations\, but&nbsp\;rather on what may be called their &lsquo\;behaviour&rsquo\; (for instance how they&nbsp\;can be combined with each other to produce new proofs).<br><br>The apparent dichotomy between proofs as constituted by inferential&nbsp\;steps\, and proofs as abstract &ldquo\;unstructured&rdquo\; entities reflects the&nbsp\;duality of the notion of function itself. Should functions be viewed&nbsp\;as procedures&mdash\;piecewise constituted by instructions - or are functions&nbsp\;sorts of black boxes to be identified by what they do - giving a value&nbsp\;for each input - rather than by how they do it? Are functions&nbsp\;primarily given as the denotation of linguistic predicates (in a&nbsp\;Fregean manner)\, or are they rather an already given domain which we&nbsp\;disclose through language?<br><br>Contact:&nbsp\;fun.pro.con@gmail.com</a><br><br>Confirmed speakers:<br>---------------------------</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Mark van Atten</li>\n<li>Stefania Centrone</li>\n<li>Thierry Coquand</li>\n<li>Walter Dean</li>\n<li>Fritz Hamm</li>\n<li>Alberto Naibo</li>\n<li>Dag Prawitz</li>\n<li>Peter Schroeder-Heister</li>\n<li>Stewart Shapiro</li>\n<li>G&ouml\;ran Sundholm</li>\n</ul>
ORGANIZER;CN=Luca  Tranchini;CN=Marco Panza:
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