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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260604T120825Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230606T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230606T170000
SUMMARY:Lies Without Assertions
UID:20260605T165504Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Saint Andrews\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>Lying requires that a person makes a statement\, but does it require assertion? This last thesis has been recently challenged. It has been argued that speakers can lie with presuppositions (Viebahn 2019)\, promises (Marsili 2016)\, and arguments (Sorensen 2017). Questioning the relation between lies and assertion raises further questions: should we capture in one theoretical category all and only cases we pre-theoretically call &lsquo\;lies&rsquo\;? How should we draw the distinction between lying and other kinds of deception such as misleading? What can the nature of lying tell us about the relation between assertion and other speech acts?</p>\n<p>Confirmed Speakers:</p>\n<p>&bull\; Roy Sorensen (University of Texas at Austin/University of St Andrews)</p>\n<p>&bull\; Andreas Stokke (Uppsala University)</p>\n<p>&bull\; Jessica Pepp (Uppsala University)</p>\n<p>&bull\; Neri Marsili (University of Barcelona)</p>\n<p>&bull\; Emanuel Viebahn (Humboldt-Universit&auml\;t/Freie Universit&auml\;t\, Berlin)</p>
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METHOD:PUBLISH
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