Abstract
\nRecently\, there has been interest in the relation between epistemic injustice and the concept of recognition (cf. Congdon 2017\; Giladi 2018\; Giladi &\; McMillan 2018\, 2022\, Hä\;nel 2020\, McConkey 2004). In this lecture\, Hä\;nel reviews the current research to carve out the distinctively causal or constitutive relation between theories of epistemic injustice and recognition theory. A review of the current research shows that (a) most theorists have a very detailed understanding of epistemic injustices\, but only an intuitive understanding of the notion of recognition\, (b) the few papers that show detailed knowledge of recognition theory focus almost exclusively on a Honnethian understanding of recognition. Hä\;nel suggests that there are (at least) three further understandings/critiques of recognition that could be fruitful to carve out the distinctly constitutive relation between epistemic injustice and recognition theory: (i) a Marxist-indigenous understanding inspired by Glen Coulthard\, (ii) a Hegelian-republican understanding inspired by Brandom and Pippin\, and (iii) a feminist understanding grounded in Hegelian thought.
\nLecturer
\nDr. Hilkje Hä\;nel \;is currently a Helene Lange visiting professor in the department of philosophy at Oldenburg University and will take up a research position for five months at the Department of Philosophy\, San Diego State University starting in June 2023. Hä\;nel also works as assistant professor/postdoc in political theory at Potsdam University\, where she is currently on research leave. Since October 2021\, she is the principal investigator of a DFG-research network \;The Relation between Theories of Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory.
\nPlace
\nGeorg Morgenstiernes hus (https://www.uio.no/om/finn-fram/omrader/blindern/bl16/index.html))
\nRoom 452 and Zoom
\nPractical information
\n