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DTSTAMP:20260415T145555Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230429T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230429T170000
SUMMARY:Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Conference
UID:20260417T050649Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c
TZID:America/Los_Angeles
LOCATION:Stanford\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are excited to announce that the annual Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Conference will be held on April 29\, 2023 at Stanford University.&nbsp\;</p>\n\n<p><u>Schedule</u>:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Building 90 Room 92Q</p>\n<p>10-11 &ndash\; &ldquo\;How to count to one and a half&rdquo\; Aglaia von G&ouml\;tz (Berkeley)&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>11:15-12:15 &ndash\; &ldquo\;Kant&rsquo\;s doctrine of the organism and the threat of organic materialism&rdquo\; Juan Carlos Gonzalez (UCSD)&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>1:45-2:45 &ndash\; &ldquo\;The Rationality of Non-Intentional Epistemic Akrasia&rdquo\; Ayala Colette Haddad (USC)</p>\n<p>3-4 &ndash\; &ldquo\;Hope as Risky Investment&rdquo\; Jaeha Woo (Claremont School of Theology)</p>\n\n<p>Building 100 101-K</p>\n<p>10-11 &ndash\; &ldquo\;Blind Rule-Following and the Normativity of Belief&rdquo\; PM Irvin (Stanford)</p>\n<p>11:15-12:15 &ndash\; &ldquo\;De-centering the Everett Interpretation&rdquo\; Jerome Romagosa (Davis)</p>\n<p>1:45-2:45 &ndash\; &ldquo\;The Problem of Warranted Objections&rdquo\; Russell Ming (UC Irvine)</p>\n<p>3-4 &ndash\; &ldquo\;Words\, Slurs\, and Social Ontologies&rdquo\; Yasha Sapir (USC)</p>\n\n<p>Building 90 Room 92Q</p>\n<p>4:15-5:45 - Keynote Speaker: Antonia Peacocke (Stanford)</p>\n<p>"A Refinement Model of Creative Conception"</p>\n<p>As I see it\, the most interesting philosophical problem of creativity concerns personal credit. Usually we credit people when they exercise agency. But what agency can someone exercise to produce a brand new idea? To some\, it has seemed impossible to come up with a particular new idea intentionally. To do that\, you'd already need to have an intention involving that particular new idea\, and so your forming the intention would obviate any need to execute it. This particular puzzle about creative agency is an instance of a more general problem regarding intentional mental action. I reject two popular responses to this puzzle&mdash\;one that backs off to a less determinate intention\, and one that proposes an alternation between inaction and intentional action in creative thought. Then I offer a different solution. Agency in creative conception begins with a proto-work: some early draft or incomplete idea that nonetheless proposes a certain standard to be met by further refinement. A creator can act on an intention to meet the standard presented by this object\, and this intention does not obviate its own execution. I call this a refinement model of creative conception.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Email PM Irvin (pmirvin@stanford.edu) or Mikayla Kelley (mikelley@stanford.edu) with any questions.&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Mikayla Kelley;CN=Paul-Michael Irvin:
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