Philosophy of Memory \;
\n
A One-Day Workshop on the metaphysics\, epistemology and phenomenology of memory.
Date: \;Friday 15 November\, 2013\, 9am-6pm.
Topic: \;
Memory has attracted less attention in contemporary philosophy than other faculties \;
such as perception or introspection. The purpose of this workshop is to explore some of the \;philosophically interesting aspects of memory\; aspects such as the connections between \;memory and the notions of subjectivity\, supervenience and knowledge. \;
The workshop is part of a larger project on the 'false memory' vs 'inserted memory' debate \;on whether reports of long-forgotten episodes of childhood abuse elicited by some memory \;recovery techniques in psychotherapy should be taken at face value or not.
Speakers
\nProf. David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney): "Memory and the duration of the supervenience base of experience"
\nJordi Ferná\;ndez (University of Adelaide): "Memory and immunity to error through misidentification"
\nProf. Daniel Stoljar (ANU): "Knowledge of memory"
\nProf. John Sutton (Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science): TBA
\nVenue: \;
\nUniversity of Adelaide\, North Terrace campus\, North \;
\nNapier building\, Room 209
\nhttp://www.adelaide.edu.au/campuses/northtce/
\nOrganized by: \;
\nJordi Ferná\;ndez and Suzanne Bliss \;on behalf of the Philosophy Department at the University of Adelaide\, \;with generous support from the Australian Research Council.
To attend: \;
Registration is free but if you would like to attend the event\, please RSVP by sending an email to \;Suzanne Bliss at: \;suzybliss@gmail.com
\nAbstracts
Prof. David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney) \;
Title: "Memory and the duration of the supervenience base of experience"
\nDoes experience supervene on instantaneous brain states\, or does it supervene across time? Attempts have been made to show that empirical evidence is relevant to the question of whether experience can supervene on instantaneous brain states. This paper argues that there is no way to distinguish between across time supervenient\, and instantaneous supervenient on memory states\, and thus no empirical traction on the issue.
Jordi Ferná\;ndez (University of Adelaide)
Title: "Memory and Immunity to Error through Misidentification"
\nDoes memory support IEM judgments about the past? I discuss two negative answers\; one from philosophy involving the notion of Q-memory\, and one from psychology involving the notion of 'observer memories.' \;I then suggest a positive answer based on a proposal \;about the content of memory experiences and a proposal about the \;content of perceptual experiences.
\nProf. Daniel Stoljar (ANU) \;
\nTitle: "Knowledge of Memory"
This paper discusses a problem about knowledge of memory that is generated by the following inconsistency:
(1) I know that I remember having breakfast.
(2) If know that I remember having breakfast\, there is an answer to the question &lsquo\;how do I know that I remember having breakfast&rsquo\;.
(3) If there is an answer to the question &lsquo\;how do I know that I remember having breakfast&rsquo\;\, that answer must be a proposition that (a) I am aware of and (b) supports what I know.
(4)There is no proposition that is both (a) and (b).
The paper discusses the merits and demerits of various ways of responding to the inconsistency and draws some morals for theories of self-knowledge.
ORGANIZER;CN=Jordi Fernandez;CN=Suzanne Bliss: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR