The CNY Moral Psychology Workshop is an opportunity for philosophers to present papers in progress and to receive useful feedback on their work. Its goal is to bring together those interested in moral psychology for fruitful interaction and discussion. We welcome papers in moral psychology as it was traditionally construed\, as well as more empirically based approaches. \;
\nPossible topics include\, but are not limited to:
\nThe Nature of Morally Relevant Mental States: What is desire\, pleasure\, emotion\, or intention? What is anger\, conscience\, regret\, respect\, or sympathy? What kinds of objects can these states be directed towards? What sort of rational relations do they bear to other mental states? Does acting ethically or virtuously presuppose the possession of any such states?
\nMoral Motivation: Are all actions\, as Hume thought\, actuated by some sort of desire or passion? Or are some actions motivated\, as Kant thought\, by a recognition that they accord with duty or reason alone? How do emotions or conscience or sympathy operate in the course of motivating a morally commendable action?
\nThe Virtues: What is courage\, generosity\, modesty\, or kindness? Similar questions occur for vices: what is wickedness\, cruelty\, or hypocrisy? What do all virtues have in common\, and what makes them good? What is the difference between virtue and vice? How are virtues cultivated?
\nIrrationality and Moral Failures: What is &lsquo\;akrasia&rsquo\; or weakness of will? What is self-deception? Could it sometimes be morally acceptable or commendable to be weak-willed or self-deceived? Is it possible to do evil or wrong in a clear-eyed way\, without ignorance\, akrasia\, or self-deception? Are there other sorts of interesting moral failures with psychological sources?
\nSubjective Theories of Value: Could desires\, pleasure\, or emotions be part of the standard for what makes something good\, or what constitutes a good life for a person\, or what constitutes a reason for action? Is pleasure the sole good\, as hedonists suggest?
\nMoral Responsibility: What does it mean to be morally responsible for an action? Does responsibility involve\, as Strawson thought\, &ldquo\;reactive attitudes\,&rdquo\; such as blame and praise? Can one be responsible for having or lacking virtues? Is one responsible for desires\, thoughts\, or emotions? \;
\nThis workshop meets once a year. Each workshop will feature 4 papers in an informal\, seminar-style format\, as well as a keynote speaker.
\nThis year's keynote speaker will be Dr. Christian Miller\, A. C. Reid Professor of Philosophy at Wake Forest University.
\nThis year's papers will be:
\n"Untethered Pain"\, Alycia LaGuardia-LoBianco (Grand Valley State University)
\n"Fitting Partiality and Selflessness Together\," Austen McDougal (Princeton University\, UCHV)
\n"Does Friendship Require the Fulfillment of Friendship Duties?"\, Yiran Han (Brown University)
\n"Knowing Our Character\," Jared Peterson (State University of New York at Oswego)
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR