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VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260421T184435Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20130830T120000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20130830T140000
SUMMARY:The Real Logic of Individuals
UID:20260424T030145Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:University of Melbourne\, Parkville\, Australia\, 3010
DESCRIPTION:<p>Timothy Williamson has recently been concerned with an argument that seemingly proves that he exists.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;It goes as follows (see Williamson 2002): (1) Necessarily\, if I do not exist then the proposition that I do not exist is true.
 (2) Necessarily\, if the proposition that I do not exist is true then the proposition that I do
not exist exists.
 (3) Necessarily\, if the proposition that I do not exist exists then I exist.
 (4) Necessarily\, if I do not exist then I exist. So (5) I necessarily exist.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;Williamson is unconvinced by this argument\, saying\, amongst other things\, that parallel arguments would have to be equally sound\, such as those that replace &lsquo\;necessarily&rsquo\; with &lsquo\;at all times&rsquo\;\, and &lsquo\;I&rsquo\; with &lsquo\;this body&rsquo\;.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;But the further conclusions then obtained\, namely that he exists at all times\, and that his body necessarily exists\, he finds totally implausible.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;He has gone on to write a book&nbsp\;<em>Modal Logic as Metaphysics</em>\, which debates in great detail whether the existence of individuals is necessary or contingent. &nbsp\;I show in this paper that the conclusion of Williamson&rsquo\;s argument is true\, and in a way that shows the further conclusions that might be drawn in parallel arguments are also true.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;I will not debate\, like Williamson\, the individual worth of his premises\, but arrive at his conclusion(s) another way.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;The central distinction that needs to be made is between logical existence and other forms of &lsquo\;existence&rsquo\;\, such as &lsquo\;being alive&rsquo\;\, &lsquo\;being present&rsquo\;\, and &lsquo\;being actual&rsquo\;. But the required distinction is not readily made using just the Predicate Calculus\, as Williamson does for his non-modal base. Instead what is wanted is its conservative extension\, Hilbert&rsquo\;s Epsilon Calculus.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;The matter has further consequences concerning the notion of Truth.</p>
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