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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260417T023230Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Shanghai:20231009T140000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Shanghai:20231009T160000
SUMMARY:Induction and Lotteries
UID:20260423T174422Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c
TZID:Asia/Shanghai
LOCATION:School of Humanities\, Shanghai Jiao Tong University\, Shanghai\, China
DESCRIPTION:<p>Prof. <strong>Jeremy Goodman</strong> (University of Southern California) will give an online lecture titled "<strong>Induction and Lotteries</strong>" in the "Epistemology+"&nbsp\;Lecture Series at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Prof. <strong>Ru Ye</strong> (Wuhan University) will be the commentator.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The lecture will be held on <strong>October 9th</strong>\, from <strong>2:00 PM to 4:00 PM\, Beijing Time</strong> (7 AM\, London Time\; 2 AM\, New York Time). To attend the lecture over Zoom\, please use the following link:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Zoom meeting info:</p>\n<p>Time: 14:00-16:00 (UTC+8)\, 09 Oct 2023</p>\n<p>Link:&nbsp\;&nbsp\;<a href="https://us05web.zoom.us/j/6622740726?pwd=qcavReaXLIET1mOCaRe7jhzfasHo2g.1">https://us05web.zoom.us/j/6622740726?pwd=qcavReaXLIET1mOCaRe7jhzfasHo2g.1</a></p>\n<p>Meeting ID: 662 274 0726</p>\n<p>Password: zXp35R</p>\n<p><strong>Title:</strong> Induction and Lotteries</p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:</strong> What you can know depends on who you are. In one sense this is trivial: different people have different evidence and what you can know depends in part on your evidence. I will argue for a more radical kind of epistemic asymmetry\, one that divides agents with the same relevant evidence. I begin with a new puzzle about induction\, and argue that it motivates positing such asymmetries. I then suggest that this solution extends to the lottery paradox: people are better positioned to know that they will lose the lottery than to know that a given person disconnected from them will lose. In general\, we know enough to run our lives\, but not enough to predict the improbable. I explain how this anti-skeptical strategy can be developed within a framework on which inductive knowledge is underwritten by a default entitlement to ignore especially abnormal possibilities.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Changsheng Lai;CN=Chang Liu:
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