Topic: Stephen Hetherington 'Gettier&rsquo\;s Platonic Moment'
\nTime: 2023/11/17 10:00-12:00 (GMT+08:00) China Standard Time - Beijing
\nSpeaker: Stephen Hetherington (University of New South Wales)
\nCommentators: Xingming Hu (Nanjing University)
\n\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Qilin Li (Peking University)
\nChair: Changsheng Lai (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)
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\nAbstract: All epistemologists know this official story: Edmund Gettier made a distinctive and decisive contribution to epistemology with his famous 1963 challenge. Yet is that entrenched story correct? Did Gettier \;actually \;do that? This paper argues that he did not. His argument was directed at a generic justified-true-belief conception of knowing (for short: JTB). He cited some illustrious precedents for that conception &ndash\; most notably\, two Socratic musings\, in Plato&rsquo\;s \;Meno \;and \;Theaetetus. He then described two counterexamples to JTB. But this paper uncovers a deep irony in how he used those counterexamples\, and a correlatively significant oversight within the decades of post-Gettier epistemology inspired by his argument. Focusing on Gettier&rsquo\;s first case\, I show how we may read it as illustrating knowing&rsquo\;s being absent \;when the conception of knowing that appeared in the \;Meno \;is failed. The case can thus function as in effect arguing \;for \;that \;Meno-Platonic conception. So\, in following Gettier by regarding the case as a successful counterexample to JTB\, have we been unwittingly \;applying and thereby \;endorsing \;that ancient \;Meno-Platonic conception\, in opposition to the contemporary JTB? In effect even if not intent\, have we &ndash\; when reacting to Gettier&rsquo\;s case &ndash\; been implicitly \;favouring \;the \;Meno-Platonic conception over JTB? Did &ndash\;do &ndash\; Gettier&rsquo\;s cases\, as standardly used\, amount to \;practical \;endorsements \;of that conception? I propose that\, yes\, Gettier was &ndash\; unintentionally &ndash\; having a \;Meno-Platonic moment. Epistemologists generally view Gettier as having described something distinctively new. They are mistaken. He was \;putting into effect \;a conception already present with \;Meno-Plato. In which event\, does epistemology&rsquo\;s continued endorsement of Gettier&rsquo\;s reading (of knowledge&rsquo\;s being absent) amount likewise to a tacit acceptance of that \;Meno-Platonic conception? In which event\, has post-Gettier epistemology been unwittingly \;Meno-Platonic in its underlying motivation? Should it now become more \;wittingly \;Meno-Platonic? Should we be examining more fully that \;Meno-Platonic conception &ndash\; its explanatory strengths and weaknesses\, metaphysical implications\, and so on? Might such inquiry into epistemology&rsquo\;s past be a step \;forward \;for our reflections on knowing&rsquo\;s nature?
ORGANIZER;CN=Changsheng Lai: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR